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PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS: THE CASE OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Jeffrey Manns* 
Abstract: This article shows how the enlistment of private monitors can overcome the 
limits of public enforcers in overseeing gatekeeper compliance with liability-induced duties.  
Gatekeepers are private actors who possess skills or advantages that allow them to detect and 
prevent wrongdoing in a more cost-effective way than the state.  The problem enforcers face is 
that the same skills or advantages that equip gatekeepers with the ability to identify wrongdoing 
often provide them with the means and incentives to subvert their duties and to evade public 
oversight.  Policymakers have largely attempted to remedy this challenge by increasing sanctions 
against gatekeepers and have ignored the potential for heightened monitoring of compliance.  
This article shows how governments may overcome their inability to oversee gatekeepers by 
providing private actors, such as victims, qui tam litigants, informants, or even the targeted 
wrongdoers, with incentives to monitor gatekeeper compliance.  
This article puts this private monitoring approach to the test by showing how private 
monitoring of gatekeepers can redress the chronic failure of efforts to enlist employers as 
verifiers of employees’ immigration status.  It suggests that the most effective way to induce 
employer compliance is to divide the interests of undocumented aliens from employers by 
offering undocumented aliens immunity and temporary worker status in exchange for reporting 
their illegal employment.  This decentralized, de facto sting operation would make large-scale 
amnesty serve a productive enforcement purpose.  The article also suggests how competitors 
may serve a similar function as in anti-trust law by serving as qui tam litigants who are 
empowered to prosecute wayward competitors.   
 
 *  J.D., Yale Law School; D.Phil., Oxford University.  This article is forthcoming in the University of 
Illinois Law Review.  I owe a debt of gratitude to the many people who took the time to read and discuss 
this article.  But in particular I would like to thank the participants in the Harvard Law & Economics 
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current form.  I would also like to thank the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent corporate scandals and failures in other areas such as immigration and drug 
enforcement have highlighted the limitations of public oversight and the critical role private 
gatekeepers may play in filling gaps in public enforcement.1  The desirability of private 
gatekeepers turns on the fact that the goods or services they supply or demand provide them with 
cost-effective opportunities to detect and potentially prevent wrongdoing by customers or 
suppliers.  For example, lawyers and accountants may be well-positioned to detect fraud by their 
clients, employers can confirm the immigration status of job applicants, and internet service 
providers and search engines can identify and block access to illegal gambling or child 
pornography web-sites at significantly lower economic and social costs than public enforcers.  
Enlisting these types of private actors as public monitors of narrowly defined areas of 
wrongdoing may provide governments with cost-effective ways to outsource enforcement 
functions that may otherwise be beyond their ability to perform.2 
 
 1 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1408–09 (2002) (arguing that “the true denominator in the Enron debacle” was “the 
collective failure of the gatekeepers”); Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 403–07 (2003) (arguing that gatekeepers, such as accountants, lawyers, and 
investment bankers, failed the public by not adequately screening for corporate wrongdoing). 
 2 A broad literature has explored the issue of enlisting private gatekeepers to perform public 
enforcement functions, but there is no clear consensus as to what unique features define gatekeepers.  See, 
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant 
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308–09 (2004) (describing a gatekeeper as a “reputational intermediary” 
who “receives only a limited payoff from any involvement in misconduct” compared to the primary 
wrongdoer); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 63 (2003) (defining 
gatekeepers as parties who “offer a service or sell a product that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a 
particular market or engage in certain activities”); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: 
Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1050–54 
(1993) (describing gatekeepers as actors who provide indispensable, or at least extremely useful, services 
to the targeted wrongdoers, have similar monitoring capacities, and who cannot easily be replaced by 
wrongdoers); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by 
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”).  This article understands gatekeepers as private actors 
whose role as suppliers or consumers of goods or services provides them with the cost-effective ability to 
detect and potentially prevent wrongdoing. 
4                                                                                     PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS 
This article considers how to overcome the “monitoring paradox” that public enforcers may 
face in attempting to monitor gatekeeper compliance.3  In many contexts the very skills or 
advantages that equip gatekeepers with a greater ability to detect potential wrongdoing than 
public enforcers may also provide gatekeepers with the means and incentives to subvert their 
duties and to evade public oversight.  The same types of shortcomings that limit the ability of 
public enforcers to police certain categories of wrongdoing on their own may compromise their 
ability to oversee gatekeepers.4  For example, both policymakers and academics frequently rely 
on mandatory disclosures to monitor gatekeeper compliance, but in many cases public enforcers 
may face great difficulties verifying compliance due to the complicated nature of the disclosures 
or the sheer number of disclosing parties.5  Similarly, public enforcers may face both practical 
 
 3 The question of how to monitor gatekeeper compliance is a significant yet underscrutinized 
problem confronting gatekeeper regimes.  Much of the literature on gatekeeper compliance has focused 
on determining the optimal duty standards to provide gatekeepers with adequate incentives to carry out 
their enforcement duties.  See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 
916, 934–49 (1998) (advocating that regulators allow reputational intermediaries to design and be bound 
to a set of self-tailored due diligence procedures and potential sanctions to allow market-based incentives 
to shape liability, rather than to rely on government-imposed gatekeeper liability); Coffee, supra note 2, at 
350–63 (advocating that auditors face modified strict liability for corporate disclosures with a cap on 
liability based on a multiple of their expected revenue streams from a given client and arguing that 
attorneys should face suspension or disbarment if they fail to monitor adequately corporate nonfinancial 
disclosures); Hamdani, supra note 2, at 102–06 (discussing how cost concerns should shape the choice 
between imposing strict liability, negligence, or knowledge standards on gatekeepers in any given case); 
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1044–46 (1994) 
(advocating the imposition of strict liability on internet system administrators to enlist them as 
gatekeepers against wrongdoing); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers? A Proposal for a 
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540–46 (2001) (advocating the imposition of 
strict liability on all gatekeepers, including investment banks, accountants, and lawyers, for material 
misstatements and omissions in offering documents).  While these questions are important for designing 
any gatekeeper regime, the absence of effective oversight of gatekeepers may condemn even the best-
designed gatekeeper regimes to failure.  If the probability of oversight is low or nonexistent, then 
gatekeepers may not have incentives to invest sufficiently in screening for prospective wrongdoers, may 
turn a blind eye to detected wrongdoers, or may even collude with wrongdoers for mutual profit. 
 4 Public enforcers may be better equipped to oversee private gatekeepers than the primary 
wrongdoers, but in many cases both tasks may be well beyond the theoretical and practical ability of 
public enforcers.  See infra Part I.A–B. 
 5 Academics and policymakers often place great and potentially unfounded faith in the ability of 
public enforcers to compel and process disclosures in order to recognize gatekeeper noncompliance.  See, 
                                                                                                                       PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS                                                        5 
and political limits on the potential sanctions that they can impose on wayward gatekeepers.6  
This article will argue that these shortcomings may make designing innovative ways to sustain 
the monitoring of gatekeeper compliance crucial for providing gatekeepers with incentives to 
comply with their duties. 
This article will show how private enforcers may serve as effective monitors of gatekeeper 
compliance and complement or substitute for public oversight of gatekeepers.  Enlisting private 
monitors is appealing because they may have cost-effective access to insider information about 
gatekeeper compliance, which public enforcers may not be able to acquire or may only acquire at 
prohibitive economic or social costs.7  This article will address four complementary ways in 
 
e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2002)) (imposing governance structures and disclosure 
requirements on auditors and mandating that the Securities and Exchange Commission create “minimum 
standards of professional conduct” for lawyers); 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003) (requiring lawyers to 
disclose to a corporation’s chief legal officer or chief executive officer any “credible evidence” of a 
material violation, by the corporation, of U.S. federal or state securities law or other laws or fiduciary 
duties); Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers 
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 789–98 (2004) (discussing the validity of the SEC’s 
disclosure rules for lawyers); Sung Hui Kim, Ethics in Corporate Representation: The Banality of Fraud: 
Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1052–54 (2005) (criticizing 
the disclosure rules for lawyers as not going far enough and proposing ways to make disclosures more 
effective by enhancing the independence of corporate counsel). 
 6 The law and economics literature frequently posits that sanctions levels are one of many variables 
that can be heightened to severe levels to secure enforcement outcomes.  See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime 
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172 (1968); Eric A. Posner, Controlling 
Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 
1177 (2001).  As a matter of political practice, the range of sanctions that may be used in any given 
context may be far more limited than economic theory would suggest. 
 7 Other works have explored the benefits and shortcomings of using private enforcement to fill gaps 
in public enforcement.  See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 54–68 (2002) 
(assessing the potential of a broad range of private enforcement tools); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public 
Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 93, 121–44 (2005) (arguing that administrative agencies should play a greater role in determining 
the existence and scope of private enforcement actions); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing 
Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 186–88 (discussing how environmental 
nonprofit organizations and individual citizens may play important roles in uncovering information about 
and prosecuting environmental law violations).  This article’s original contribution is showing how the 
enlistment of private monitors may overcome the shortcomings of public oversight of gatekeepers and 
provide gatekeepers with greater incentives to comply with their duties.  This article will show how the 
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which private monitors may fill public enforcement roles.  First, victims may have the incentives 
and the means to pursue enforcement actions against gatekeepers, especially in cases where the 
primary factor limiting public enforcement is resource constraints.8  Second, a qui tam approach 
may empower private litigants to police and initiate actions against gatekeepers in exchange for a 
percentage of the sanctions.9  Third, a broad private informant approach could enlist competitors, 
employees, and other members of the community to oversee gatekeeper compliance.  Lastly, 
enforcers may paradoxically enlist as monitors the very wrongdoers that gatekeepers are 
supposed to oversee by offering them immunity and additional incentives to report gatekeeper 
violations, because they may be best placed to know and establish the nature and scope of 
gatekeeper noncompliance.  This article will show how enlisting private enforcers to oversee 
private gatekeepers entails significant costs, uncertainties, and tradeoffs that must be balanced 
against enforcement gains.  However, it will suggest that in narrowly defined contexts, each of 
these private enforcement tools may offer politically plausible and economically feasible ways to 
enhance gatekeeper compliance. 
 
use of private monitors can dramatically enhance access to insider information on gatekeeper compliance 
and provide a cost-effective way to sustain oversight of gatekeepers.  This article will also highlight the 
range of costs, risks, and uncertainties public enforcers face in relying on both gatekeepers and private 
monitors of gatekeepers, which makes this approach one with tremendous possibility, but also with 
significant tradeoffs that must be taken into account in designing gatekeeper regimes. 
 8 See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 7, at 13–31 (discussing a range of victim suits that are designed to 
compensate victims and deter wrongdoers); Stephenson, supra note 7, at 108 (discussing how victim suits 
may fill public enforcement roles).  The more remote the connection between the gatekeepers and the 
potential victims, the less plausible it may be to enlist victims as monitors of gatekeeper compliance 
because of challenges in gaining insider access to information on compliance.  Alternatively, the “crime” 
may be victimless or impose widely diffuse costs on society that make it difficult to identify particular 
victims. 
 9 Citizen suits are a close cousin of qui tam suits that are used extensively in environmental 
enforcement.  As the discussion in part II will emphasize, citizen suits do differ from qui tam suits in 
significant ways, as qui tam litigants may receive a percentage of sanctions and face no standing barriers 
while citizen suit litigants must establish injury-in-fact and the proceeds from citizen suits go to the 
federal government.  See Stephenson, supra note 7, at 99 & n.18; Thompson, supra note 7, at 192–94.  
But because many of the other substantive features of citizen suits overlap with qui tam suits, this article 
will focus on the potential of enlisting qui tam litigants to oversee gatekeeper compliance.  See infra Part 
II.B. 
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This article will argue that the use of private monitors may add the most enforcement value 
in cases of chronic enforcement failure, where the incentives for gatekeepers and prospective 
wrongdoers appear closely aligned and compliance with gatekeeping duties is difficult to 
monitor.  No case better illustrates this type of gatekeeper challenge than the context of 
immigration enforcement, where both a range of public enforcement efforts and an attempt to 
enlist employers as gatekeepers have failed to deter rising levels of undocumented aliens.10  
Employers of low-wage illegal immigrants face the threat of gatekeeper liability, yet have strong 
economic incentives to subvert their duties and face a low probability that noncompliance will be 
detected.11 
Therefore, this article will explore the potential for private monitoring of gatekeepers by 
laying out a proposal for reforming employers’ duty to verify employees’ legal status.12  This 
 
 10 See infra Part III.B. 
 11 See, e.g., Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 347–48 (1994) (highlighting how the employer 
verification regime has failed to reduce illegal immigration); Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of 
Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 688–95 (1997) 
(arguing that the employer verification system has failed to deter illegal immigration); Spencer S. Hsu & 
Kari Lydersen, Illegal Hiring is Rarely Penalized, WASH. POST, June 19, 2006 (discussing how the Bush 
administration “virtually abandoned employer sanctions before it began pushing to overhaul U.S. 
immigration laws last year” and noting how “[t]he government’s steady retreat from workplace 
enforcement in the 20 years since it became illegal to hire undocumented workers is the result of fierce 
political pressure from business lobbies, immigrant rights groups, and members of Congress”). 
 12 See infra Part IV.  Reform of employer verification duties is a timely topic as illegal immigration 
has become a significant issue in the run-up to the 2006 mid-term elections.  Proposals to strengthen 
employer verification duties are one of many issues that Congress has considered as part of broader 
immigration reform..  For example, both H.R. 4437, which passed the House in December, 2005, and 
S.2611, which passed the Senate in May, 2006, would require employers to confirm the social security 
numbers of job applicants against an electronic database and significantly increase sanctions for employer 
noncompliance.  See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d), 
274A(e) (2006).  The House and Senate have been at loggerheads over whether immigration reform 
should focus on enforcement or more comprehensively address immigration issues, such as introducing a 
temporary worker program and addressing legalization of existing undocumented aliens.  See Carl Hulse, 
House Adds Hearings on Immigration, WASH. POST June 21, 2006.  This Article has neither the space or 
time to analyze the strengths and shortcomings of the House and Senate proposals.  But as part IV will 
discuss, integrating electronic verification into the employer verification duties is part of the solution and 
would form an important tool for heightening the accuracy of the verification process and making identity 
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approach will show how competitors, employees, other community members, and even 
undocumented aliens may serve as private monitors of employer compliance and help to 
overcome the information and resource gaps that cripple public oversight of employer 
compliance.  The contentiousness of immigration enforcement makes assessing the costs and 
benefits of heightened enforcement difficult.13  Nonetheless, this article will suggest how private 
monitoring of gatekeepers, coupled with other reforms to heighten the accuracy and cost-
effectiveness of gatekeeper compliance and to safeguard against incentives for preemptive 
discrimination against legal individuals of foreign origin, may overcome the shortcomings of 
public enforcement. 
Part I will highlight the structural and practical limits of public enforcement that in many 
contexts create the need to enlist private gatekeepers to detect and deter prospective offenders.  It 
will show how gatekeepers may be well positioned to fill enforcement gaps and, in some cases, 
may provide the only means to uncover wrongdoing.  This part will also underscore the 
challenges policymakers face in designing effective gatekeeper regimes.  Part II will focus on 
ways to overcome the difficulties public enforcers face in overseeing gatekeeper compliance.  It 
 
and document fraud by undocumented aliens more difficult.  However, part IV will show how this 
approach is an incomplete solution by itself as employers will continue to retain the ability and the 
incentives to sidestep or subvert verification requirements if there is no sustained oversight of compliance 
measures, such as through the enlistment of private monitors. 
 13 Immigration issues understandably raise political passions, as the debate on immigration reform in 
2006 has underscored.  See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, In the Streets, Suddenly, an Immigrant Groundswell, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2006, at A1 (discussing how hundreds of thousands of people across the country 
marched to protest Congress’s consideration of immigration enforcement legislation); Nina Bernstein, On 
Lucille Avenue, The Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2006 (discussing “the grass-roots anger 
over immigration policy that many members of Congress say they keep hearing in their districts”).  This 
article has neither the time nor space to do the extensive debates on immigration enforcement any justice.  
This topic was chosen because of the extraordinary challenge that immigration enforcement poses to 
public enforcers as this case study offers a chance to explore the potential and limits of both private 
gatekeepers and private monitors.  For an overview of debates on immigration reform, see GEORGE J. 
BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (2001); BILL ONG 
HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY (2004); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, 
STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998). 
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will show that the structural and practical limits of public enforcement that make public 
enforcers poorly positioned to detect primary wrongdoers may frequently make them almost or 
equally as poor monitors of gatekeeper compliance.  For this reason, this part will assess the 
benefits and costs of using a range of private enforcers, such as victims, qui tam litigants, private 
informants, and even the primary wrongdoers to oversee gatekeeper compliance. 
Parts III and IV will apply the insights on private monitoring to the enforcement challenges 
surrounding illegal immigration.14  For over twenty years, public enforcers have enlisted private 
employers as gatekeepers to confirm immigration status, but failed to create adequate incentives 
for employer compliance.  These two parts will suggest how enlisting private monitors to 
oversee employer gatekeepers could lead to dramatic enforcement enhancements at palatable 
political and economic costs.15  Although these enforcement gains entail social costs and 
tradeoffs that society may not wish to accept, this proposal will suggest that the failure of the 
employer verification system is a product of a lack of vision, rather than a matter of inevitability. 
I. THE POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES OF ENLISTING GATEKEEPERS 
A. The Case for Gatekeeper Liability 
 
1. The Limits of Public Enforcement 
 
The rationale for enlisting private gatekeepers turns on the limits of public enforcers and the 
comparative advantages gatekeepers may enjoy in overseeing the primary wrongdoers.16  For 
 
 14 See, e.g., Espenoza, supra note 11, at 347–48 (documenting the failure of the employer verification 
regime to reduce the employment of undocumented aliens); Andrew Parker, Collecting What America 
Owes, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at 12 (quoting Mark Everson, head of the Internal Revenue Service, as 
saying, “What we cannot afford is to let our tax laws be viewed in the same way as our immigration or 
drug laws are, where too large a segment of the population says: ‘Those laws are not what we respect.’”). 
 15 See infra Part III.C. 
 16 See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 61–66 (discussing how private actors may offer advantages over 
public enforcers as “bouncers” or “chaperones” in screening prospective wrongdoers in one-off contexts 
or repeat player interaction respectively). 
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example, in a world without resource constraints, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
might be able to confirm the accuracy of every corporate disclosure and transaction, but in the 
real world of scarcity, lawyers and accountants are likely far better positioned to detect signs of 
wrongdoing by their clients.  The challenge for public enforcers is that regardless of the 
theoretical scope of legal obligations and the level of sanctions facing wrongdoers, the ability to 
deter wrongdoing will prove only as effective as the reach (or rather wrongdoers’ perceptions of 
the reach) of public enforcers extends.  In spite of how sweeping public enforcement powers may 
be in theory, in practice, the efficacy of public enforcement is often compromised by limits in 
public enforcers’ ability to monitor private actors, scarce resources to fulfill competing 
enforcement mandates, and the low responsiveness or nonresponsiveness of the primary 
wrongdoers to the threat of sanctions.17 
In many contexts public enforcers may be unable to gain access to information about 
wrongdoing on their own or to process the available information effectively.  The more complex 
the activity or the offense, the more prospective offenders may enjoy an advantage over 
enforcers in concealing their wrongdoing.18  Public enforcers may be skilled in gathering 
information on and apprehending those who literally rob banks.19  In contrast, public enforcers 
often may lack the skills and access to information to oversee more complex types of 
wrongdoing, such as the accounting frauds perpetrated by executives at Enron, WorldCom, and 
 
 17 See id. at 56–57. 
 18 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate 
Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 3–16 (2004) (arguing how changes in financial 
markets, changes in business-to-business relationships, and the growth of new financial products have 
made fraud far easier and more likely to occur). 
 19 When insiders are the people robbing the banks, public enforcers may be slow both to detect the 
wrongdoing and to intervene to stop the harm.  See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating 
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1162 & n.74 (1993) (noting the shortcomings of 
public regulators in overseeing the infamous Lincoln Savings & Loan). 
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Sunbeam.  Few public enforcers may be experts in arcane accounting rules,20 and even those 
who are may be less capable of detecting fraud than their private sector counterparts working for 
corporations, law firms, and accounting firms are in concealing their tracks.21  For example, 
although heightened disclosure requirements may make it easier for public enforcers to oversee 
corporations,22 informed insiders, such as a corporation’s accountants and lawyers, may still be 
the only actors who are in a position to detect fraud.23 
A related problem is that private networks may be so dense that they are difficult for public 
enforcers to penetrate and effectively oversee.  The ethnic-based networks that facilitate most 
 
 20 For example, in 2001 the Securities & Exchange Commission had approximately 600 accountants 
or financial analysts and 200 investigators or examiners who were supposed to oversee approximately 
14,000 public companies, 8000 registered broker-dealers employing 700,000 registered representatives, 
8000 transfer agents, 5000 investment companies, 7400 registered investment advisers, as well as the 
stock exchanges.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-02-302, SEC OPERATIONS: 
INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 3 (2002).  While the SEC’s funding and staffing has 
increased in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the number of accountants and investigators is still 
dwarfed by the enormity of their oversight tasks. 
 21 For example, Steven Schwarcz argues that “the Enron debacle highlights the increasingly 
widespread problem of complexity” that makes it difficult to regulate and oversee “virtually all 
securitization and derivatives deals and other forms of structured-financing transactions.”  He asserts that 
these transactions may be so complicated that even sophisticated private investors may have difficulty in 
understanding detailed disclosures in a reasonable time period.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the 
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2–6, 18–20. 
 22 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2002)); see also David S. Ruder et al., The Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s Pre- and Post-Enron Responses to Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and 
Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103, 1112–13 (2005) (describing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
expansion of disclosure requirements as the “most far-reaching reforms in the securities laws regulating 
corporations since the enactments of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934”). 
 23 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 336–37 (arguing that the Sarbanes Oxley Act does not 
adequately address the incentives that corporate directors and officers have to “cook the books” and that 
accounting gatekeepers have to acquiesce to irregularities); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 918–20 
(2003) (describing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as sweeping in scope concerning what it claims to address, but 
limited in its direct efforts and ability to enhance accounting compliance or corporate governance). 
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illegal immigration exemplify this type of challenge.24  A web of family, regional, and ethnic ties 
inform prospective immigrants about opportunities in the United States, facilitate illegal entry 
into the United States and relocation into ethnic communities, and often match immigrants with 
employers.25  Linguistic and cultural barriers, as well as economic interests and threats of 
violence from human smuggling and trafficking networks, may create a wall of silence in ethnic 
communities.26  Even linguistically capable and culturally sensitive public enforcers may be 
unable to overcome these obstacles on their own to police illegal immigration, or they may be 
capable of doing so only at prohibitive economic and social costs. 
Another challenge public enforcers face is how to target wrongdoers when they have a low 
level of responsiveness to enforcement actions or are judgment-proof.27  Typically, it appears 
both just and economically efficient for the primary wrongdoers to face direct sanctions to force 
them to internalize much of the costs of their actions.  However, public enforcers are placed in a 
quandary when sanctions, such as the revocation of licenses, monetary sanctions, or 
imprisonment are hollow threats that the government either cannot carry out for political or 
 
 24 See, e.g., RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM 188–190 
(2003) (discussing how ethnic social networks form a channel for disseminating information on economic 
opportunities and facilitating illegal entry and settlement in the United States). 
 25 See, e.g., ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBEN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 230–
34 (1996) (discussing how family, community, and ethnic networks facilitate illegal immigration flows 
and help to match undocumented aliens with employers); Douglas S. Massey, The Social and Economic 
Origins of Immigration, 510 ANNALS 60, 68–70 (1990) (discussing the role that social and familial 
networks play in facilitating legal and illegal immigration). 
 26 Ethnic-based criminal networks often facilitate human trafficking and smuggling, and they may 
easily threaten violence against members of their ethnic communities or their relatives in their home 
countries to deter any cooperation with authorities.  See Hussein Sadruddin, Natalia Walter & Jose 
Hidalgo, Human Trafficking in the United States: Expanding Victim Protection Beyond Prosecution 
Witnesses, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 382–84 (2005). 
 27 The low level of responsiveness may be due to the inability of enforcers to impose sanctions or to 
the sheer obliviousness of the targets.  For example, homeowners and small business owners may have 
widespread ignorance about how the wide range of environmental regulations may affect them.  See 
Kraakman, supra note 2, at 56 & n.7. 
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economic reasons or because there is nothing of worth to the wrongdoer to seize.28  
Alternatively, the problem may be practical limits on the level of sanctions, which pale in 
comparison to the returns from wrongdoing.29  For example, the chronic failure of drug 
enforcement in spite of high sanctions and high expenditures on enforcement underscores the 
fact that the returns from illicit activity may so substantially outweigh the expected value of 
sanctions that they have little deterrence value to prospective wrongdoers.  In these contexts, it 
may be an exercise in futility simply to throw more resources at the problem or to tweak the 
tactics of public enforcers in an effort to heighten direct enforcement against primary 
wrongdoers. 
Even in contexts where higher public enforcement levels could make a significant impact, 
public enforcers generally face competing enforcement priorities and limited resources.30  In a 
world without resource constraints, public enforcers could attempt to go through every tax return 
and confirm every oxycontin prescription’s validity.  But while academics may have the luxury 
of assuming away the problem of scarcity, public enforcers often must make do with what 
resources they have.  At a time in which counter-terrorism priorities have begun to trump more 
routine law enforcement activities, public enforcers have had to become even more accustomed 
to trying to do more with less.31 
 
 28 Public enforcers confront this problem when trying to enforce laws against illegal immigrants, 
attempting to collect fines from bankrupts, or to punish children who have committed criminal offenses.  
See id. at 57. 
 29 See Steven Shavell, A Note on Marginal Deterrence, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 345, 345 (1992) 
(discussing how marginal deterrence concerns constrain the level of sanctions which can be imposed for 
any given offense because of fears that more harmful offenses may thus appear  “costless” to the 
offender). 
 30 See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 181–82 (1992) (discussing how private enforcement may be vital for filling 
enforcement gaps caused by limited public resources). 
 31 For example, the consolidation of a broad range of federal agencies into the Homeland Security 
Department signifies the subordination of other federal enforcement objectives to national security 
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2. The Appeal of Gatekeepers 
Enlisting private gatekeepers offers public enforcers the potential to overcome these 
obstacles to enforcement in cost-effective ways.32  In many cases, gatekeepers may offer the only 
alternative when public enforcers cannot otherwise identify or prosecute primary wrongdoers.  
Private gatekeepers fall into two broad categories: suppliers and consumers whose lawful 
activities are necessary for wrongdoers to pursue their illicit ends.33  The distinctive features of 
these demand- or supply-driven relationships with prospective wrongdoers may significantly 
shape the responsiveness of gatekeepers to threats of liability. 
The conventional image of gatekeepers is private actors, often professionals, who offer 
lawful products or services that may be used to legitimize or substantially advance illicit ends.34  
These suppliers may literally function as “gates” inasmuch as the goods or services they supply 
are essential to perform certain illicit acts or are functionally essential because of the high cost or 
 
concerns in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO 05–06, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: DHS HAS INCORPORATED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
OBJECTIVES AND IS ADDRESSING FUTURE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS 5–7 (2004) (discussing how 
“immigration enforcement should be viewed as part of a comprehensive homeland security strategy” and 
noting how particular objectives such as worksite enforcement are now focused almost exclusively on 
advancing national security objectives); Jeffrey Manns, Comment, Reorganization as a Substitute for 
Reform: The Abolition of the INS, 112 YALE L.J. 145, 151–52 (2002) (discussing how the Homeland 
Security Act reorganization would lower the profile for immigration issues). 
 32 See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 61–66 (discussing potential ways that private gatekeepers may 
complement public enforcement). 
 33 One could add a third category and frame public regulators as gatekeepers.  See Peter B. Oh, 
Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 755–66 (2004).  But public actors may have strikingly different 
incentives and responsiveness than private actors.  See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: 
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 414–15 (2000).  For 
this reason, lumping public regulators with private gatekeepers may only muddy the waters for 
considering the optimal scope of private gatekeepers’ duties and means for oversight. 
 34 See, e.g., Hamdani, supra note 2, at 58 (defining gatekeepers as parties who “offer a service or sell 
a product that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular market or engage in certain activities”); 
Jackson, supra note 2, at 1050–54 (describing gatekeepers as actors who provide indispensable, or at least 
extremely useful, services to the targeted wrongdoers, have similar monitoring capacities, and who cannot 
easily be replaced by wrongdoers). 
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drawbacks of alternatives.35  Lawyers and accountants who serve corporations, doctors who 
write prescriptions for drugs, and internet service providers all fall under this category.36  Some 
of these service providers may actively collude with wrongdoers to retain or expand their 
business.  However, the more significant threat for policymakers is that gatekeepers will not have 
the incentives to invest sufficiently in screening for prospective wrongdoers or turn a blind eye in 
the absence of a credible threat of liability.37 
Other gatekeepers may create the demand that attracts prospective wrongdoers.38  The 
paradigm case for demand-driven gatekeepers is employers whose attempts to keep wage levels 
as low as possible attract underage workers or undocumented aliens.39  Another example is 
American companies that outsource production facilities to firms in developing countries, which 
(“unbeknownst” to the American companies) abuse human rights to cut costs or bribe officials to 
help their business and indirectly aid their American clients.40  These gatekeepers may pose the 
 
 35 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 
MD. L. REV. 869, 883 (1990) (arguing that a defining feature of gatekeepers is that the targeted 
“misconduct cannot occur without the gatekeeper’s participation”); Kraakman, supra note 2, at 54, 61–63 
(arguing that “a specialized good, service, or form of certification that is essential for the wrongdoing to 
succeed—is the ‘gate’ that the gatekeeper keeps”).  While these authors emphasize how a gatekeeper’s 
goods or services are necessary for the targeted wrongdoers’ illicit acts, their views overstate the 
distinctiveness of the goods or services that gatekeepers supply or demand.  Generally, going through a 
gatekeeper offers a more cost-effective option for prospective wrongdoers who can almost always secure 
or demand goods or services at greater cost through the underground economy. 
 36 Other examples include bar owners who have a license to serve alcohol, yet face legal liability for 
serving minors or for serving drunken individuals.  See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 63. 
 37 See id. at 61–63. 
 38 See id. at 53 (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by 
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”).  Kraakman’s definition of gatekeepers is consistent 
with both a supply-side and demand-side conception of gatekeepers, although in practice, his and most 
other writings on gatekeepers focus on supply-side driven gatekeepers. 
 39 See id. at 54. 
 40 American firms may outsource production in developing countries as a way of sidestepping limits 
imposed by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FPCA).  While corruption by agents of the U.S. firm may 
still fall within the FCPA’s scope, these types of violations may be hard for public enforcers to monitor.  
See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 1, 29–35 (1998) (laying out the scope of parent-subsidiary liability under the FCPA). 
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greatest challenges for public enforcers to oversee.  The economic interests of this type of 
gatekeepers and their suppliers may be intimately interconnected and oriented towards explicit or 
tacit subversion of the law. 
The defining characteristic of both types of gatekeepers is their dual capacity: the services 
they offer or demand may serve lawful ends or they may substantially assist wrongdoers in 
pursuing their illegal activity.41  Because of their commercial or professional relationships, 
gatekeepers may enjoy privileged access to information about prospective wrongdoing or skills 
that may allow them to process and recognize potential illegal acts in cost-effective ways.  In 
contrast, public enforcers may lack access to this information or the ability to process the 
information, except at prohibitive economic and social costs or disruption to markets.  
Alternatively, the primary wrongdoers may be very difficult or impossible for public enforcers to 
target directly because the wrongdoers are judgment-proof or outside of American jurisdiction, 
such as in the case of foreign outsourcing companies or illegal pornography or gambling 
websites based outside of the United States.42 
The argument for enlisting gatekeepers turns on the efficiency of focusing policing on the 
gatekeepers rather than on the primary wrongdoers.  Gatekeepers may be able to deter primary 
wrongdoers more easily and cost-effectively than public enforcers.  Gatekeepers often receive a 
disproportionately small percentage of the fruits of the wrongdoing, yet bear disproportionate 
exposures to a risk of loss from both detection of the wrongdoing and the resulting gatekeeper 
 
 41 If the gatekeepers merely provided or demanded illegal services, then these cases would fall under 
accomplice liability or conspiracy to commit criminal acts or civil wrongs.  But the fact that the goods or 
services gatekeepers demand or supply can generally be used either legally or illegally places gatekeepers 
in a unique position as potential screeners of wrongdoing, yet makes their culpability more ambiguous as 
they may or may not actively or tacitly assist in wrongdoing. 
 42 See Matthew Miller, Catch Me If You Can, FORBES, Mar. 27, 2006, at 113 (discussing how 
offshore gambling web-sites escape U.S. jurisdiction). 
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liability or reputational effects.43  Gatekeepers’ assets may be more vulnerable to seizure or liens 
than those of prospective wrongdoers; they may enjoy revocable rights such as licenses; or 
gatekeepers may simply be fewer in number than the primary offenders they are called to 
oversee.  Although gatekeepers may be more responsive to the threat of sanctions than primary 
wrongdoers, in practice this difference may simply be one of degree.  As significantly, the fact 
that public enforcers may theoretically be able to target gatekeepers with sanctions does not 
necessarily mean that enforcers are in a position to oversee gatekeeper compliance. 
But even if gatekeepers may be responsive to sanctions, the question of whether the threat 
of gatekeeper liability will heighten enforcement levels in any given context turns on whether 
gatekeepers can screen effectively for prospective wrongdoers in a cost-effective way.44  
Gatekeepers may strengthen public enforcement by withholding their support from 
wrongdoers,45 by notifying public enforcers when wrongdoers are detected,46 or by routinely 
providing the government with relevant documentation about their suppliers or clients that make 
it easier for government actors to screen and develop patterns or profiles of wrongdoers.47  These 
 
 43 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 308–09. 
 44 See Hamdani, supra note 2, at 104. 
 45 This is the conventional vision of the role for gatekeepers literally to close the gates by 
withholding their services.  See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 2, at 54 (“Gatekeeper liability is distinguished 
by the duty that it imposes on private ‘gatekeepers’ to prevent misconduct by withholding support.  This 
support—usually a specialized good, service, or form of certification that is essential for the wrongdoing 
to succeed—is the ‘gate’ that the gatekeeper keeps.”).  This narrow conception of gatekeepers misses the 
fact that literal gatekeepers often also performed other important functions of recording information and 
pulling the alarm when wrongdoing was identified.  A gatekeeper who did anything less might well have 
risked his neck by being viewed as betraying his duty. 
 46 This approach would effectively make voluntary whistleblowing compulsory for gatekeepers and 
leave the decision about whether and how to act on information about potential wrongdoing in the hands 
of public enforcers. 
 47 Employers and banks routinely face this type of requirement.  For example, employers and 
investment companies must disclose individual wages and capital gains to the Internal Revenue Service, 
which at least in theory equips the IRS to police tax fraud.  Immigration officials could also piggyback off 
of this preexisting duty to check whether multiple parties are attempting to use the same social security 
numbers, thus signaling possible illegal immigrant employment.  Banks must disclose cash transfers of 
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potential complementary roles to public enforcement suggest why enlisting gatekeepers may 
appear to be an attractive policy option.48 
3. The Question of Whether Gatekeeping Liability is Necessary 
 
The fact that enlisting gatekeepers to screen for primary wrongdoers may have significant 
advantages does not necessarily mean that public enforcers should enlist gatekeepers through the 
threat of liability.  Some prospective gatekeepers may have such a tenuous relation with 
consumers or service providers that it would seem unreasonable to subject them to gatekeeping 
obligations.  For example, although sophisticated color printers may be used to print counterfeit 
currency, it would be extraordinarily difficult and costly for companies to identify or monitor 
prospective wrongdoers in this context.49  In contrast, it appears reasonable to use the threat of 
liability to require gun salesmen to screen for former felons by checking identification against 
federal and state databases.  In the context of gun sales, the risk factors would be high and the 
monitoring burden would be comparatively low on both gatekeepers and their customers.50  
Although no precise formula exists for who may serve as a desirable gatekeeper, the plausibility 
of a gatekeeper duty appears to turn on whether a gatekeeper has access to reasonably cost-
effective means to identify prospective wrongdoers.51 
 
$10,000 or more, with a similar goal of alerting the police to transactions that may be related to illicit 
activity, such as money laundering.  31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (2005). 
 48 The extent to which gatekeepers may complement or substitute for public enforcement ultimately 
depends on the particulars of the enforcement context.  See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 2, at 1048–49 
(arguing that public regulatory controls of financial institutions must remain the focus of securities 
enforcement efforts and that gatekeepers must assume a more limited, complementary role at best). 
 49 If copier companies were held strictly liable, one can imagine mandatory purchases or insurance or 
postings of bonds that would cover this risk.  But these costs would either cut into the printers’ profits or 
economic viability if they could not be passed on to customers, or serve as a new tax on all customers that 
may price marginal users out of purchasing copiers, thus causing a deadweight loss. 
 50 See Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (enlisting gun dealers as gatekeepers for screening for 
former felons). 
 51 If the costs of screening are too high, then gatekeepers may either stop demanding or offering 
services, relocate to a jurisdiction where they do not face gatekeeper liability, or shift to the underground 
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Some private actors may routinely perform gatekeeper functions on their own because the 
reputational costs far outweigh the marginal returns they may gain from colluding with 
wrongdoers or casting a blind eye to their wrongdoing.52  In the case of true reputational 
intermediaries,53 adding gatekeeper liability may simply raise the financial exposure of 
gatekeepers yet have little effect on heightening enforcement efforts.  The best candidates for 
reputational intermediaries are third parties with no direct connection to the prospective 
wrongdoers who may perform gatekeeper functions on their own and make gatekeeper liability a 
redundancy at best.54  Here, the classic case is the role that Moody’s Investors Service, Standard 
& Poor’s Rating Services, and Fitch Investors Service play in assessing corporate debt offerings 
for creditworthiness, as their economic interest lies in their accuracy.55  Although these types of 
 
economy.  It is clear that the level of compliance costs coupled with residual liability must be lower than 
the gatekeepers’ valuations of demanding or offering services, but how low these costs must be depends 
on the context of individual markets. 
 52 See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 781, 787 (2001) (arguing that reputational intermediaries are “repeat players who will 
suffer a reputational loss, if they let a company falsify or unduly exaggerate its prospects, that exceeds 
their one-time gain from permitting the exaggeration”); see also Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability 
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 898 & n.124 (1984) (describing how reputational 
intermediaries may face analogous incentives to publicly imposed gatekeeper liability because these 
intermediaries “place established reputations on the line”). 
 53 In practice, reputational markets appear inefficient as reputational intermediaries in the securities 
markets have repeatedly demonstrated by their failures over the past decade.  See Coffee, supra note 2, at 
311–18 (documenting the failures of reputational intermediaries in securities law compliance); Frank 
Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 366–37 
(2004); see also Black, supra note 52, at 787–89 (arguing that true reputational intermediaries cannot 
fulfill their role in vouching for disclosure quality and thus reducing information asymmetry in securities 
markets because of the ability of false reputational intermediaries to free-ride off of true reputational 
intermediaries’ credibility and to provide false or misleading information on securities). 
 54 To the extent to which gatekeeper liability would burden these actors with liabilities that these 
actors could not screen for (or only at prohibitive cost), gatekeeper liability may have the perverse effect 
of raising the costs of their services or causing them to exit the market. 
 55 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26 (arguing that rating agencies’ “reputational motivation is sufficient” and that 
“[a]dditional regulation of rating agencies thus would impose unnecessary costs and thereby diminish 
efficiency”).  In some cases corporations directly pay rating agencies to assess their creditworthiness, but 
there is little evidence that corporations have been able to manipulate ratings of their debt.  To the extent 
to which there is a danger of interconnections of interests that distort ratings, it may lie in the ancillary 
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third parties may still be far from perfect gatekeepers in policing wrongdoing,56 they may make 
liability-driven monitoring by other intermediaries more costly than it is worth in terms of 
enforcement outcomes. 
In contrast, advocates for professions such as law, medicine, and accounting may argue that 
their reputations are their business.57  However, a reliance on self-professed reputational 
intermediaries alone may prove to be a risky approach in many contexts.  This risk would be 
high if these intermediaries have direct relationships with prospective wrongdoers, especially if 
wrongdoers form a significant portion of their client base, or if the intermediaries have more 
indirect economic interests that may compromise their independence.58  If the intermediaries’ 
incentives are rightly (or rather wrongly) aligned with wrongdoers, then this reputational cover 
may be the very good that these actors can leverage to cover up wrongdoing.59  For this reason, 
 
services that the rating agencies or their parent companies provide.  See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the 
Ratings Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 50–52 (2004). 
 56 One significant concern is how a combination of regulatory barriers to entry and the nature of the 
ratings market have led to the existence of only a small number of ratings companies, which means that 
there are only a limited set of eyes watching the gates.  See Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit 
Ratings, in RATINGS: RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 66 (Richard M. 
Levich et al. eds., 2002).  Another concern is that rating agencies have a good track record of assessing 
risks in initial ratings of creditworthiness, but in recent years have done a poorer job in the timing of 
upgrades and downgrades of corporate ratings.  See Hill, supra note 55, at 67–68. 
 57 See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 295, 296–98 (1988) (arguing that the reputational costs that accountants may face from 
failing to detect wrongdoing gives them adequate incentives to monitor their clients); see also DiLeo v. 
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (arguing that an accountant’s concern for her 
reputation and exposure to potential loss would make collusion with her clients’ accounting fraud 
irrational). 
 58 Even if institutions consciously seek to function as reputational intermediaries, the individual 
interests and business relationships of analysts may compromise the institutions’ reputational 
intermediary role. 
 59 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 3, at 920 (arguing that producers will not engage in fraud only if “the 
long-term reputational loss is greater than the short-term gain the producer received from overstating the 
value of . . . lower quality [information]”); Coffee, supra note 2, at 309–11 (discussing how incentives for 
reputational intermediaries may change over time and cause them to stop fulfilling their gatekeeper roles); 
Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 752 (2004) (arguing that “in the long-run, reputational 
intermediaries will commit fraud if the risk is acceptable either for the firm or its agents”); Robert A. 
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 
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policymakers should employ healthy skepticism about gatekeepers’ claims that their self-interest 
or market incentives cause them to screen optimally for wrongdoers without the threat of 
liability. 
B. The Challenges Surrounding the Design of Gatekeeper Regimes 
 
If public enforcers cannot effectively target primary offenders on their own and market 
actors lack sufficient incentives to police wrongdoers, then gatekeeper liability becomes an 
appealing strategy.  However, enthusiasm for enlisting gatekeepers should be tempered by 
concerns about the cost-effectiveness and potential collateral consequences of this approach.60  
Policymakers must consider whether the costs gatekeeper liability would inflict on the 
government, the gatekeepers, and markets as a whole are less than the costs that similar levels of 
public enforcement would entail.61  The issue is not merely one of efficiency, but also concerns 
political palatability in determining whether enforcement gains justify the economic and social 
costs on the state and society.62 
Policymakers may be able to anticipate some costs of gatekeeper compliance with a high 
degree of precision.  But the limited information that both policymakers and gatekeepers possess 
makes it difficult to anticipate the full costs and collateral effects of gatekeeper liability.  
 
NW. U. L. REV. 133, 143–47 (2002) (discussing reasons why reputational intermediaries will put their 
reputations in jeopardy). 
 60 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 2, at 1070–74 (arguing that greater public regulation may be an 
appealing alternative to imposing gatekeeper liability on lawyers because of the difficulties in designing 
and enforcing gatekeeper regimes and politicians’ “irresistible” temptation to create rules that overdeter).  
But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 726–27 (1996) (discussing how it is often assumed that defendants are in a better 
position than policymakers to assess costs and benefits and to adopt the optimal response). 
 61 See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 75 (framing the costs that gatekeeper liability may create as 
administrative, private, and tertiary costs). 
 62 Law and economics literature often overlooks, or rather assumes away, the question of political 
viability.  But the benefits of private enforcement tools, such as gatekeepers, may come with greater 
social costs (or at least greater uncertainties concerning the scope of social costs), and therefore concerns 
of political feasibility may be interconnected with the question of efficiency. 
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Designing gatekeeper regimes entails uncertainties surrounding the effects of liability standards 
on gatekeeper behavior and markets, difficulties in assessing the relative costs versus benefits of 
gatekeeper liability and setting the level of sanctions, as well as significant challenges in 
overseeing gatekeepers.  This article will focus on overcoming the obstacles to monitoring 
gatekeeper compliance, but it is important to highlight the range of costs that gatekeeper liability 
may inflict on gatekeepers and markets, as policymakers must weigh all of these costs in 
designing liability and oversight mechanisms. 
1. The Challenges of Choosing Liability Standards 
 
Much of the literature on gatekeepers has focused on what standard to impose on 
gatekeepers and, in particular, on the potential for strict liability.63  However, policymakers’ 
limited information about gatekeepers’ responsiveness to liability risks and limited ability to 
monitor gatekeeper compliance means that any standard will entail uncertain costs and effects on 
gatekeepers and markets.  For this reason, policymakers must approach standard-setting as an 
imprecise science based on assessments of the relative risks of under- or overdeterrence from any 
given standard.64 
Strict liability, negligence, and knowledge-based duties for gatekeepers each have distinct 
advantages and disadvantages.  Strict liability shifts the burden of determining optimal 
 
 63 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 350–63 (advocating that auditors face modified strict liability for 
corporate disclosures); Hardy, supra note 3, at 1044–46 (advocating strict liability on internet system 
administrator gatekeepers); Partnoy, supra note 3, at 540–41 (2001) (advocating the use of strict liability 
for gatekeepers in the securities offering context).  But see Hamdani, supra note 2, at 114 (arguing strict 
liability would overdeter in most contexts and impose excessive costs relative to the enforcement gains). 
 64 Liability incentives created by a given standard may lead gatekeepers to undertake costly 
compliance efforts or avoidance strategies, such as greater discrimination against suspect classes or 
decisions to exit the market in part or in whole.  See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 75–78.  These collateral 
effects may distort markets and significantly raise costs or bar access for legitimate market participants. 
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compliance levels into the laps of gatekeepers,65 and saves courts and public enforcers the costly 
and difficult tasks of ferreting out subtle distinctions between good-faith compliance and 
subversive obfuscation.66  The case for negligence is that strict liability may overdeter by 
punishing good-faith efforts to comply even in cases where there was no way (or at least no 
reasonably cost-effective way) that enforcers could have identified the wrongdoers.67  However, 
gatekeepers may still be overly cautious if they face significant uncertainty concerning what 
constitutes good-faith compliance.68  If the concern is deterring the targeted activity at any price, 
then strict liability may have great appeal because of potential chilling effects, although a strict 
liability approach is likely to pose the largest costs and most uncertain effects on markets in the 
process.  In contrast, negligence poses potential risks of under- or overdeterrence depending on 
the degree of ambiguity concerning what reasonable compliance measures consist of and the 
costs of compliance relative to liability avoidance strategies.69 
The downside of these sweeping standards is that they may prove too burdensome and 
costly in any given context.  These standards may provide gatekeepers with incentives to exit or 
 
 65 It is important to note that strict liability would only theoretically force gatekeepers to internalize 
the cost of their misconduct.  Even an optimal standard and sanction would bear little fruit if the 
probability of enforcement were low.  See Coffee, supra note 2, at 322–23. 
 66 See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–17 (1987) (providing a 
comprehensive overview of the merits of strict liability versus negligence liability). 
 67 But see Partnoy, supra note 3, at 510–516 (discussing the costs that imposing negligence liability 
on gatekeepers may inflict). 
 68 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 10–14 (1994) (discussing how varying interpretations by courts concerning what constitutes good-faith 
compliance may lead to excessive caution by potential defendants). 
 69 The more ambiguous the question of reasonable compliance is, the greater the residual liability 
that gatekeepers will face under a negligence standard.  Similarly, the higher the costs of compliance 
relative to liability avoidance strategies, the more likely gatekeeper liability will cause distorting effects 
on markets.  The relative weight of these two factors may largely determine whether negligence liability 
poses greater risks of over- or underdeterrence.  See Partnoy, supra note 3, at 510–16. 
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to selectively reduce their exposure to markets.70  This may push markets into the underground 
economy or result in greater discrimination against suspect classes.71  For example, much of the 
debate concerning liability for employer gatekeepers in the immigration context turns on the 
legitimate concern that discrimination against individuals of perceived foreign origin may appear 
to be the cost-effective way for employers to minimize liability exposure.72  If the odds of and 
damages from successful employment discrimination suits are low enough, gatekeepers may find 
routine discrimination to be a preferable strategy to good-faith efforts at compliance.  
Additionally, gatekeeper strategies of exiting markets or discriminating against prospective 
clients or service providers with suspect characteristics may force otherwise law-abiding people 
into the underground economy and actually heighten levels of wrongdoing taking place outside 
of the public eye. 
In contrast, a knowledge-based standard would impose the lightest burden on gatekeepers.  
It is the least invasive approach with the lowest uncertainty as to its effects on gatekeepers and 
markets, which may suggest its desirability when concerns about the costs or collateral effects of 
gatekeeper liability loom large.73  However, knowledge standards may be the hardest to police 
and may underdeter because of the ease with which gatekeepers may turn a blind eye or engage 
in tacit collusion with wrongdoers to subvert the duty.  Gatekeeper liability under a knowledge 
 
 70 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 833, 840–49 (1994). 
 71 See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 75–77. 
 72 See Espenoza, supra note 11, at 344–45 (discussing the concern that the employer sanctions 
regime would heighten discrimination against all individuals of perceived foreign origin). 
 73 See Hamdani, supra note 2, at 104 (discussing how knowledge standards leave “gatekeepers with 
no incentives to scrutinize client conduct even when detecting misconduct is relatively easy”). 
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standard may run the risk of becoming a charade of “don’t ask, don’t tell” more than the 
formalist minimum of information.74 
Because each standard has both strengths and potential shortcomings, gatekeeper duties 
should be designed as narrowly as is consistent with advancing the enforcement objectives.75  
The more focused and clear the duty and compliance measures, the more confidently 
policymakers can rely on a strict liability or a negligence standard without fears of 
overdeterrence.76  In contrast, the broader or more amorphous the duty, the more appealing a 
knowledge standard will be to mitigate dangers of overdeterrence and resulting cost-avoidance 
strategies or excessive precautions by gatekeepers.77 
2. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Gatekeeper Liability 
 
Whether gatekeeper liability is desirable turns on a balancing of the costs versus benefits.  
As discussed above, the imposition of gatekeeper liability necessarily entails a degree of 
uncertain costs and effects on gatekeepers and markets because of the under- or 
overinclusiveness of duty standards.  But under any duty standard, gatekeepers will face 
heightened screening costs, the danger of residual liability, and decisions about whether and how 
to minimize liability exposure.  Gatekeepers will understandably seek to pass on their 
compliance costs to their clients or customers to the degree that they can.  To the extent to which 
demand for the category of good or service affected by gatekeeper liability is elastic, gatekeepers 
may have to stomach much of these costs and weigh whether continued participation in the 
 
 74 Cf. id. 
 75 See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 79–81. 
 76 If a negligence and strict liability duty have the same deterrence value in a given context, then a 
negligence standard would be preferable because it would impose less costs than a strict liability standard.  
However, because all other things are rarely equal (except in the world of academic assumptions), in 
practice policymakers must choose between these standards and seek to take the resulting risks of over- or 
underdeterrence into account. 
 77 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1055–56. 
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market in whole or in part is profitable.  If gatekeepers limit participation or exit markets, lawful 
actors who consume or provide gatekeepers’ goods or services will be forced to bear the burdens. 
Alternatively, to the extent to which demand is inelastic, then gatekeepers would seek to 
pass these costs on to their clients.  Market participants will be subject to an implicit tax of 
higher fees to cover compliance costs and to indemnify gatekeepers from any residual liability.  
While gatekeeper clients could try to mitigate these costs by producing evidence of their lawful 
intentions, this information may be costly and in some cases may not even be possible to 
produce.  Policymakers will have to weigh the burdens that these duties may impose on a wide 
set of market participants with the enforcement gains both in deciding whether to impose 
gatekeeper liability and what level of sanctions to impose. 
The sanctions level is also essential for providing gatekeepers with credible incentives for 
compliance.  However, policymakers’ limited information about gatekeeper responses and their 
limited ability to oversee gatekeeper compliance makes sanction-setting a question with no easy 
or uniform answer.  Ordinarily, policymakers attempt to force wrongdoers to internalize the costs 
of their actions by setting the expected value of a sanction to the social cost of wrongdoing.78  
But forcing gatekeepers who fail to fulfill their duty to bear all of the resulting social costs 
inflicted by primary wrongdoers could impose high costs and lead to significant distortions of 
markets, which could make the cure worse than the disease of wrongdoing.79  It may be equally 
hard to define what the social harm is; in areas such as immigration enforcement, the discussion 
 
 78 See id. at 1062. 
 79 Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of 
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564–66 (1988) (arguing that 
policymakers should not focus on the social cost of wrongdoing in setting sanctions on third parties). 
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as to the extent of the harm is at the center of a polarizing debate.80  For these reasons, the focus 
should be on two factors: the ability of gatekeepers to detect the wrongdoing and the benefits 
gatekeepers receive from the goods or services that they demand or sell.  Policymakers should 
ideally seek to make the expected value of sanctions that gatekeepers face from noncompliance 
higher than the costs of compliance plus residual liability.  At the same time, these costs must not 
be so high that the expected value of sanctions exceeds the profitability of the activity for 
gatekeepers.81  Otherwise, gatekeepers may decide to exit the market or to engage in 
discrimination against suspect classes that include law-abiding actors. 
This is a difficult balancing act and these uncertainties make setting the level of sanctions 
imprecise at best.82  Because policymakers’ knowledge is most limited at the time gatekeeper 
regimes are first enacted, setting broad sanction ranges may provide flexibility for courts or 
public enforcers to gauge gatekeeper responsiveness and to adjust sanctions accordingly.  This 
approach may be particularly appealing where there is a single enforcement body that has the 
statutory authority to assess the impact of a gatekeeper regime and to adjust the sanctions in a 
uniform way.  This solution will not necessarily overcome risks of under- or overdeterrence and 
raises dangers of selective enforcement, although it does offer a way to overcome some of the 
uncertainties surrounding the enlistment of gatekeepers. 
Determining the full costs of gatekeeper liability is difficult, but the social benefits may also 
be very hard to pin down.  Politicians and policymakers often posit enforcement objectives, 
 
 80 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Rights, Reality, and Utopia, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1789, 1805 
(2004); Michelle Rae Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right?  A Closer Look at the True Nature of 
Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 29, 52–55 (2003). 
 81 The more heterogeneous gatekeepers are, the harder it is to calculate the impact of sanctions.  See 
Jackson, supra note 2, at 1052–53.  For example, profit margins vary widely by industry and within 
sectors of industry, and sanctions that may drive one set of market participants out may have a minimal 
effect on others. 
 82 See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 76. 
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which may not have a readily quantifiable value.83  Even when there are concrete numbers to 
debate, raw enforcement outcomes may prove to be poor, or at the very least contentious, 
measuring sticks of success.84  For example, decisions to prosecute some types of offenses, such 
as prostitution, may turn more on a moral judgment than on quantifiable factors about the social 
benefits of enforcement efforts, such as reducing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.85  
In other cases, such as securities fraud, policymakers may be able to calculate some of the social 
costs and benefits with greater precision, but determinations on optimal enforcement levels may 
ultimately rest on policymakers’ assumptions about the relative costs and benefits. 
For this reason, weighing the social costs and benefits may be contentious in any given 
gatekeeper context.  Despite the fact that social costs and benefits and the optimal level of 
sanctions may be hard to calculate with precision, policymakers should not abandon the use of 
gatekeepers.  This point does, however, suggest that enlisting gatekeepers would be most 
appealing in contexts where public enforcers simply cannot police against wrongdoing on their 
 
 83 See, e.g., Michael Chertoff, Homeland Sec. Sec’y, Remarks at the Houston Forum (Nov. 2, 2005), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=44&content=4920 (asserting that two key 
objectives of border control effects are preserving national security and “the rule of law”). 
 84 For example, in the immigration context politicians frequently point to the rising numbers of 
undocumented aliens detained in the Mexican border region as a sign that American enforcement efforts 
are bearing fruit.  See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Radio Address to the Nation (Oct. 22, 2005), 
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/Oct/24-735450.htm.  But in truth, increasing numbers 
of apprehended undocumented aliens may tell a very different story: that the incentives of illegal 
immigration to the United States continue dramatically to outweigh the deterrence value of enforcement, 
and thus spur increasing levels of illegal immigration. 
 85 At first glance, it might appear strange to think of prostitution as an offense that could be regulated 
by a gatekeeper regime.  But one need only open up the yellow pages to see how prostitution is no longer 
relegated to the underground economy, but instead exists in the open under euphemisms such as escort 
services or adult entertainment.  Imposing negligence-based or strict liability on yellow pages and online 
directories for serving as intermediaries for these services may help to reduce access by casual users and 
the young, who may be the most vulnerable to contracting sexually transmitted diseases.  Yet the value of 
this type of enforcement would ultimately not turn on a balancing test of social benefits, but rather on a 
moral perspective on the merits of targeting vice that may judge enforcement well worth the tradeoffs 
because of its symbolic value, even if the administrative, gatekeeper, and market costs far outweighed the 
concrete social benefits. 
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own because the primary wrongdoers cannot be detected (except perhaps at prohibitive costs) or 
are unresponsive to the threat of sanctions.  In these cases, the choice may be abandonment of 
enforcement entirely or accepting that enforcement may entail significant costs and uncertainties 
and therefore attempting to tailor gatekeepers’ duties in as narrow a way as is consistent with 
advancing the enforcement objectives. 
The other significant factor that remains to be considered is an issue that the literature has 
largely overlooked: the challenge of overseeing gatekeeper compliance.  Even the best-designed 
gatekeeper regime is bound to fail if gatekeepers can evade oversight, and all of the other cost 
and benefit calculations hinge on the ability of enforcers to sustain credible monitoring of 
gatekeeper compliance.  For this reason, part II will explore the limits of public oversight of 
gatekeepers and the potential for private actors to fill this critical enforcement gap. 
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS 
A. The Merits of Private Oversight of Gatekeepers 
 
1. The Appeal of Private Monitoring 
Much of the literature on gatekeeping appears to posit that public enforcers are capable of 
overseeing gatekeepers on their own and thus largely overlooks the potential or need for private 
enforcers.86  It is true that much of the appeal of gatekeepers lies in the fact that they offer a way 
to outsource enforcement functions in whole or in part.  However, enlisting gatekeepers does not 
eliminate the oversight challenge for public enforcers because it merely shifts the locus of public 
enforcers’ monitoring responsibilities.  Although gatekeepers may in theory be more responsive 
to sanctions than the primary wrongdoers, they may also be as or more capable of intentionally 
 
 86 See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 2, at 75 (arguing that “the least important costs [in designing a 
gatekeeping regime] are likely to be the highly visible administrative expenses of detecting and 
prosecuting wayward gatekeepers”). 
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or unintentionally avoiding public oversight.  Monitoring gatekeepers may well be beyond the 
capabilities of public enforcers for similar reasons that public enforcers may be unable to detect 
and prosecute the primary offenders.87 
In the case of specialized expertise, such as from medical, legal, and accounting 
professionals, the gatekeepers may be best positioned to detect prospective wrongdoers.88  But 
this same expertise may empower gatekeepers to conceal wrongdoing from public enforcers’ 
eyes and make gatekeeper compliance extraordinarily difficult to monitor.89  For example, 
doctors may be best positioned to discern that patients want prescription drugs for illicit 
purposes, but may just as easily accept or manufacture “symptoms” that justify granting a 
prescription, and public enforcers are ill-equipped to oversee this doctor-patient interaction.  In 
other cases, such as the employment of illegal immigrants, the number of businesses that may 
employ undocumented aliens may be almost as numerous as the eleven million undocumented 
aliens.90  Although it may be easier to track corporate entities than individuals, the enforcement 
burden is staggering and appears well beyond the capacity of any set of public enforcers. 
 
 87 Public enforcers may fail to oversee gatekeepers for a wide range of reasons.  See, e.g., J.R. 
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1443, 1454–55 (2003) (discussing how government agencies may not fulfill their mandates because 
public officials may be “lazy, uninterested, under-resourced, [or] overburdened”); Stephenson, supra note 
7, at 110–11 (discussing how private enforcers may overcome enforcement slack by public agencies, due 
to political pressure, enforcers’ sloth or inaction, or lobbying); Thompson, supra note 7, at 191–92 
(discussing how political considerations, institutional structures, and lack of resources may compromise 
public enforcement efforts). 
 88 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 89 See Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 18–20 (discussing how the complexity of a broad range of 
transactions makes it difficult for anyone to detect fraud). 
 90 There are 6.5 million registered employers in the United States, which does not include employers 
who operate exclusively in the underground economy.  See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, A-08-5-25023, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER MISUSE IN THE SERVICE, 
RESTAURANT, AND AGRICULTURE INDUSTRIES 9 (2005), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-08-05-25023.pdf. 
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The case for using private actors to monitor gatekeepers is strongest in the context of 
chronic enforcement failures that have overwhelmed public enforcers and undercut their 
credibility, such as the large-scale efforts to combat drug trafficking and illegal immigration.  
Where time and experience have demonstrated the limits of public efforts to oversee gatekeepers 
and wrongdoers, this fact may provide both a compelling reason and political opportunity for 
exploring the potential of private alternatives.91 
Other features that may suggest the desirability of private enforcement tools include the 
potential for large-scale fraud due to both the nature of the activity and the sociology of criminal 
networks.  If the danger for fraud by tacit collusion or corruption by gatekeepers is significant 
because the offense can be easily concealed, then a sole reliance on public enforcement may be 
wishful thinking that gives gatekeeper liability little teeth.  A related concern turns on the 
sociology of criminal networks as culturally and linguistically based networks may be far harder 
for public enforcers to penetrate on their own, if they can effectively oversee them at all.  This 
point would be especially true both for drug and human trafficking and smuggling networks that 
tend to work through homogeneous groups and use the threat of violence within ethnic 
communities to command silence.92 
Private oversight appears particularly attractive in the context of gatekeepers who create the 
demand for primary wrongdoers’ services.  Because this type of gatekeepers’ economic viability 
 
 91 This is the classic rationale for experimenting with the privatization of state functions.  
Privatization always poses the risk of exacerbating the situation, but the real or perceived exhaustion of 
public alternatives is often the political catalyst for exploring what private alternatives have to offer.  See, 
e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 
2148 n.175 (2005) (considering benefits of market water allocation); S.L. Rundle, The Once and Future 
Federal Grazing Lands, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1803, 1832–33 (2004) (advocating private ownership 
of federal grazing lands). 
 92 See Sadruddin et al., supra note 26, at 382–84.  While policymakers might point to prosecutions of 
mob groups as signs of the potential for public enforcement under such harsh conditions, even these 
successes largely turned on the efficacy of private informants and wrongdoer turncoats rather than public 
enforcers acting on their own. 
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may turn on their suppliers’ cost-saving illicit activities, gatekeepers may face overwhelming 
incentives to turn a blind eye to, or to actively collude with, wrongdoers.  In competitive 
markets, entire industries may feel all but compelled to use illicit suppliers as a means to bend 
the rules to ensure cost competitiveness.93  For example, if some firms in an industry employ 
Chinese or Indonesian suppliers who violate human rights and bribe local officials to keep costs 
low, then their competitors face high pressures to engage in similar practices.94  Given how 
intertwined the incentives of gatekeepers and suppliers may be, it would hardly be surprising that 
corporations may end up investing far more in covering their tracks to subvert the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, rather than in fulfilling gatekeeper duties.  Private enforcers who have an 
insider view on these business relationships, such as employees of the corporation, competitors, 
or even the illicit suppliers themselves, may be in far better positions to expose this type of fraud 
than public enforcers. 
Gatekeepers who are goods or service providers may also face significant temptations to 
facilitate illicit activity.  These incentives would be most prominent, especially in the short run, 
in contexts where prospective wrongdoers formed a significant share of a gatekeepers’ business 
that cannot easily be replaced.95  Serving prospective wrongdoers rather than legitimate 
 
 93 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 90, at 2 (discussing a Social Security 
Administration study that found that forty-eight percent of Social Security number filings by agricultural 
employers did not match SSA records). 
 94 U.S. multinational companies may be liable for subsidiaries’ violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act if the parent company has knowledge, is willfully blind, or consciously disregards acts of 
bribery committed by their subsidiaries.  See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000); 
Brown, supra note 40, at 29–35.  Outsourcing production to independent companies in countries with 
widespread corruption, such as China, is designed to subvert the substance of compliance with the law.  
See Peter S. Goodman, Common in China, Kickbacks Create Trouble for U.S. Companies at Home, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2005, at A1 (discussing how U.S. companies face high pressure to pay bribes in 
China because they are standard business practices). 
 95 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 322–23 (discussing how auditing firms as a whole may have a broad 
set of clients, but arguing that individual auditors who serve a large client such as Enron effectively have 
their economic interests interconnected with a single client); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron 
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customers may also appear more appealing if they offer higher compensation that reflects the 
higher margins that may be earned from illicit activity and more than offsets the risks that 
gatekeepers may assume.96  In these contexts, enlisting private monitors may be valuable in 
uncovering illicit relationships between gatekeepers and their clients because of how closely 
their interests intertwine. 
2. The Broad Features of Private Oversight 
Private enforcement tools have both strengths and weaknesses compared to public 
monitoring of gatekeepers.  Each type of private oversight tool has its own distinctive merits and 
shortcomings that will be discussed in depth in the next section.  This section’s focus is on the 
broadly shared features of these tools. 
First, enlisting private monitors may allow public enforcers to achieve mandates within 
limited manpower and budget constraints.  Private insiders are likely far better positioned than 
public enforcers to uncover information on gatekeeper violations in a more cost-effective way.97  
Private monitors may have incentives to innovate new ways to uncover gatekeeper violations or 
to prosecute gatekeepers because they personally internalize the monitoring costs and monetary 
rewards in ways that public monitors do not.98  Although some may feel that appeals to 
 
Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237–38 (2002) (discussing how gatekeepers who provide a given client 
multiple types of services outside of their gatekeeper duty could face indirect incentives to compromise 
their compliance measures). 
 96 See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 69–70 (noting that in theory wrongdoers can offer bribes up to the 
expected value from their wrongdoing, but in practice the difficulties of negotiation make it unlikely that 
wrongdoers can make credible commitments to that high a level of bribes). 
 97 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 224–26 (discussing how interested citizens may be far better 
positioned than public enforcers to monitor environmental compliance). 
 98 See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and 
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1403–04, 1438–39 (1998) (discussing how private litigants have 
pursued the most challenging and significant discrimination cases); Stephenson, supra note 7, at 112–13 
(suggesting how private litigants may employ novel strategies and approaches to expand enforcement 
potential); Thompson, supra note 7, at 206–09 (discussing how environmental groups made supplemental 
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mercenary motives are inconsistent with American civic virtues, in many contexts there may be 
no other way to provide adequate incentives for gatekeeper compliance. 
The primary downside of private oversight techniques is also their strength: the 
responsiveness of private actors to financial incentives.  Because private actors can be expected 
to respond to financial incentives so long as the expected value of rewards exceeds the risks and 
costs of their monitoring, reporting, or enforcement,99 private oversight and particularly private 
enforcement actions may serve as a blunt tool that poses dangers of over- or underenforcement in 
any given context.100  Putting aside potential exceptions such as the role of environmental groups 
in citizens suits,101 we can safely assume in most contexts that private actors’ decisions about 
disclosing information or initiating an action about gatekeeper compliance will turn almost 
exclusively on their private benefits from these actions.102  Private actors will not take into 
 
enforcement projects aiding the local environment a condition of  citizen suit settlements, an approach the 
Department of Justice has subsequently embraced).  Empowering private monitors may be a two-edged 
sword, however, as private monitors may also have incentives to find ways to engage in fraud against 
gatekeepers to extract rewards.  Alternatively, private litigants may develop novel enforcement strategies 
that may expand the scope of enforcement well beyond its intended scope or may set precedents that 
hamstring subsequent public or private enforcers.  See Jeannette L. Austin, Comment, The Rise of Citizen-
Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 NW. U. 
L. REV. 220, 222–23 (1987) (discussing how citizen suits may force judges to engage in judicial 
lawmaking to define regulatory requirements that may siphon regulatory power away from administrative 
agencies). 
 99 See Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 
167, 175–76 (1985). 
 100 See Stephenson, supra note 7, at 117–20 (discussing how private enforcement may disrupt 
cooperative relationships between regulators and regulated entities, dictate enforcement agendas, and 
eliminate possibilities for discretionary enforcement). 
 101 In the case of environmental groups and other ideologically oriented organizations, the ability to 
achieve their goals, to raise societal awareness, and to gain publicity for fundraising through citizen suits 
may make enforcement decisions in their self-interest even if the expected value of any suit that they 
pursue is negative.  The noneconomic aspirations of ideologically oriented groups do not neatly fit into 
economic models for predicting what level of incentives can induce a given degree of enforcement 
activity.  See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, 
and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 137–39 (2002). 
 102 See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to 
Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 578 (1997) (arguing that private litigants sue for 
compensation or relief and “not chiefly, if at all, to deter socially undesirable behavior in the future”). 
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account the broader social costs and benefits or public values at stake from information 
disclosure or decisions on whether and how to litigate.103  Therefore, using private monitors by 
definition entails risks of over- or underinvestment of resources in any given context of 
oversight.  For example, the economic incentives of private actors may be to pursue decisions to 
go to trial or to settle cases in contexts where broader public objectives would be best served by 
other approaches.  For this reason, policymakers must seek to align the economic interests of 
private monitors in disclosing information or prosecuting gatekeepers as closely as possible with 
public enforcement objectives to guard against risks of over- or underdeterrence. 
Second, private oversight often entails a tradeoff between the value of uncovering private 
information and the inefficiencies of enlisting uncoordinated private actors.104  If public 
enforcers can uncover insider information about gatekeeper violations on their own in a cost-
effective way, it may be more efficient for them to do so because public actors could coordinate 
investigations and prosecutions to minimize wasteful overlap of efforts.  Given the shortcomings 
of public enforcement, policymakers may have to risk the inefficiencies of overlapping 
monitoring by private actors to gain access to insider information on violations.  Public enforcers 
could mitigate this risk of inefficiency in some cases by enlisting informants on a regular basis 
and coordinating their activities.  However, when the goal is to enlist a very broad pool of 
 
 103 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 
1314–20 (2003) (discussing the challenges of enlisting private actors to perform public functions while 
attempting to ensure that private actors uphold the values that public law seeks to promote).  At the same 
time, public enforcers may not take social benefits fully into account or act on them at all as enforcers 
may be ignorant of the social cost and benefits at stake or be motivated by other factors such as 
minimizing time and resources spent on cases, as occurs routinely in plea bargaining.  See, e.g., Jeffrey 
Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 
1962–68 (2005) (arguing that prosecutors often make the efficient resolution of cases, rather than justice, 
the focus of criminal prosecutions by routinely using pretrial detention as a means to pressure defendants 
into swiftly making guilty pleas). 
 104 See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
589, 616–17 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 394, 431–32 (1982). 
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potential monitors it would be far more effective in terms of costs and outcomes to give private 
actors the incentives to come forward with information or a suit when gatekeeper violations 
occur. 
Third, it is difficult to determine the optimal level of rewards for private monitors.  Too high 
or low a reward may lead to over- or underdeterrence and either fail to provide gatekeepers with 
adequate incentives for compliance or encourage wasteful harassment tips or suits or fraud by 
insiders.105  Enforcers must balance the need to create sufficient incentives for private oversight 
with concerns about how these incentives may attract excessive private enforcement.  If generous 
rewards elicit dubious or frivolous claims on a large scale, they may impose wasteful burdens on 
gatekeepers in fending off these claims, on courts in addressing victim suits and qui tam claims, 
and on public enforcers in responding to informant tips.  The challenge is that reward setting 
may at best constitute an educated guess based on subjective judgments or assumptions about the 
worth of a given tip or of the degree of culpability or liability that a gatekeeper must bear for the 
primary wrongdoers’ illicit acts. 
A fourth set of tradeoffs concerns the social and cultural impact from using private 
monitors.  Cultivating a mercenary zeal to oversee gatekeeper compliance may create 
atmospheres of distrust within communities and chill interaction within firms, because anyone 
might be a potential informant or saboteur of compliance.106  Private oversight may push 
wrongdoing further underground and lead violators to resort to threats or violence to deter 
 
 105 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 656–57 (1998). 
 106 This point should not be overstated as anyone currently could be an uncompensated whistleblower 
at any time.  The issue is whether adding mercenary motives for whistleblowing could have a more 
corrosive effect on relationships. 
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potential private monitors.107  Public enforcers who cannot effectively enforce the laws on their 
own may be even less capable of protecting the private monitors they seek to enlist.108  The 
threat of violence or retaliation may make prospective private qui tam litigants or informants less 
likely to assist the government and may therefore make a private monitoring approach fall short 
of its goals.  Policy design can only seek to mitigate these tradeoffs as social costs and the risks 
of private retaliation may be unavoidable.  Although private oversight tools share many of these 
traits, each tool entails distinctive challenges and tradeoffs that merit further elaboration. 
B. Four Approaches to Private Monitoring 
Public enforcers may enlist four main types of private enforcers to monitor gatekeeper 
compliance.  First, parties directly harmed as a result of a gatekeepers’ action or inaction may be 
empowered to sue gatekeepers for compensation.  Second, private actors may be enlisted as qui 
tam litigants, serving as private attorney generals in exchange for a percentage of the damages.  
Third, public enforcers may use private informants to gain intelligence on gatekeeper compliance 
from insiders, competitors, or members of the community.  Lastly, public enforcers may offer 
clemency and other forms of compensation to the primary wrongdoers to come forward and 
uncover gatekeeper violations. 
 
 107 See FRANCIS T. MIKO, TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN: THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE, CONG. RES. SERV. (2002), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9107.pdf 
(discussing the use of violence by human smugglers to silence undocumented aliens or coerce payments). 
 108 For example, the failure of public enforcers to protect cooperating witnesses from threats of 
violence suggests that public enforcers who are not in a position to detect violations may be no more 
capable of guarding the private enforcers that they solicit.  See, e.g., William Glaberson, ‘Lie or Die’ 
Aftermath of a Murder; Justice, Safety and the System: A Witness is Slain in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, July 
6, 2003, at A1 (discussing the failure of the criminal justice system to protect a voluntary witness in a 
murder/drug-related case). 
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1. The Limited Potential for Victim Suits 
The most conventional approach for enlisting private oversight would be to create a private 
cause of action for parties who are directly harmed as a result of a gatekeeper’s failure to uphold 
her duty.  Statutes have granted private causes of action to victims who can prove concrete harms 
in many other settings109 and, in many instances, courts have found implicit private causes of 
action in legislation.110  The appeal of this approach is intuitive: parties who may be harmed by 
the primary wrongdoers have the powerful incentive of self-interest to monitor gatekeeper 
compliance and to prosecute gatekeepers for compensation when gatekeepers’ action or inaction 
allowed the primary wrongdoers to inflict harm.  These suits would serve to compensate victims 
for the wrongs they have suffered and simultaneously serve to deter gatekeepers from future 
violations.111  Specific acts, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and 
the antitrust Clayton Act, provide for treble damages to magnify the deterrence effect of victim 
suits.112  Similarly, class action lawsuits offer the potential to consolidate victim claims and 
compensation process without having to involve public enforcers at all.113 
 
 109 See, e.g., Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981, 2000 (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). 
 110 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395–97 
(1971) (recognizing a private cause of action for individuals for encroachments on their federal statutory 
or constitutional rights by federal agents); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) (finding 
an implied private cause of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  But see 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (calling for courts to “adhere[] to a stricter 
standard for the implication of private causes of action”). 
 111 See Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 556–558 (1981) (discussing the 
deterrence role that victim suits may play). 
 112 See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000). 
 113 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as 
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 222–23 (1983) (arguing that private class-action 
suits can complement public enforcement by raising the financial consequences of wrongdoing to levels 
far above any fees that public enforcers are able or willing to impose). 
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Private causes of action may make perfect sense when a wronged party seeks to be made 
whole by suing the wrongdoer who caused the injury.114  The political appeal of empowering 
victims to sue gatekeepers may be clear, though this approach is more problematic in practice 
and may have limited enforcement value.  Holding gatekeepers jointly and severally liable with 
the primary wrongdoers for all of the costs that wrongdoers inflict following failed gatekeeping 
could easily overdeter.115  From both a culpability and cost standpoint, the liability of the 
gatekeeper should turn on her ability to guard against the harm inflicted by the primary 
wrongdoer and the gatekeeper’s ability to profit from the activity, rather than on the actual harm 
the primary wrongdoer inflicted on the victim.  Otherwise, gatekeepers may choose to exit or 
reduce their exposure to markets because the potential liabilities of providing their goods or 
services may far exceed the benefits.  It may also prove difficult to delineate the percentage of 
the harm that rests on the gatekeeper’s shoulders for failing to live up to her duty.  For example, 
a negligent doctor may prescribe prescription drugs to a patient who feigned the symptoms, but 
holding the doctor financially liable for all acts that the drugged-up patient may commit might 
appear outrageous and likely to overdeter.116 
A more significant problem with this approach is that victims of primary wrongdoers may 
have an economic interest in pinning the blame on gatekeepers (especially if the gatekeepers 
have deep pockets and wrongdoers cannot be apprehended or are judgment-proof).  But the 
 
 114 The logic that a wrongdoer who inflicted an injury should restore victims to their state prior to the 
injury is an underlying premise of tort law.  See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability 
be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 427 (1994). 
 115 The exception would be in cases where a conspiracy existed between the primary wrongdoers and 
the gatekeeper, thereby making the gatekeeper fully implicated in any wrongdoing that occurred pursuant 
to the conspiracy. 
 116 The degree of liability to which a gatekeeper is exposed may turn on the extent of their complicity 
with the wrongdoing.  For example, if a gatekeeper entered into a conspiracy with the wrongdoer, then 
she would be liable for all acts that are reasonably foreseeable from the underlying conspiracy.  See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2004).  In contrast, holding a merely negligent gatekeeper 
liable for all acts that a wrongdoer performed would seem far more unjust. 
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victims may be no better and may often be worse positioned than public enforcers to uncover 
information about whether gatekeepers failed to live up to their duties.117  In cases where victims 
are part of the community with gatekeepers or the primary wrongdoers, they may have cost-
effective access to information on gatekeeper compliance.  However, this advantage may at least 
partly be offset by greater exposure to risks of retaliation or injury by the gatekeepers or the 
primary wrongdoers. 
But in cases where victims are far removed from gatekeepers, victims may enjoy no cost 
advantage over public enforcers in uncovering gatekeeper noncompliance.  Victims may be in a 
far worse position than public enforcers in these contexts because they lack access to public tools 
of investigation and may have no countervailing access to insider information on gatekeeper 
compliance.118  This point is particularly significant if gatekeeper compliance is difficult to 
monitor because of the nature of the interaction between gatekeepers and potential wrongdoers.  
For this reason, relying on private causes of action alone to heighten enforcement may end up 
having only a marginal impact because the insiders best placed to monitor gatekeepers, such as 
employees, competitors, or even the primary wrongdoers, would likely not be involved in this 
type of action. 
Nonetheless, private causes of action for victims may still be a valuable complement or 
substitute for public enforcement if the goal is to heighten enforcement levels in cases in which 
gatekeeper violations are easy to detect and the government lacks the resources to detect and 
prosecute these violations on its own.  But aside from picking the low-lying fruit of 
 
 117 See Bucy, supra note 7, at 59–60.  But see Stephenson, supra note 7, at 108 (arguing that people 
directly affected by a potential defendant’s conduct may be in the best position to detect violations). 
 118 Unless we grant victims broad leeway to conduct “fishing expeditions” by using discovery against 
gatekeepers to uncover evidence of wrongdoing, a victim suit approach may end up being hamstrung by 
the problem that we started with: the difficulties of monitoring gatekeeper compliance. 
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enforcement,119 victims may often be no better positioned than public enforcers to gather 
information on violations.  There are also many public enforcement contexts where there is no 
concrete harm against an identifiable subset of people, or the harm against the public is diffuse 
and difficult to calculate.120  In these contexts, turning to other types of private enforcers who 
may have a more direct connection to the gatekeepers may offer a more viable alternative for 
uncovering gatekeeper noncompliance. 
2. The Potential for Qui Tam Litigation 
In contrast to victim suits, a qui tam approach would provide incentives for any private 
party to serve as an overseer of gatekeeper compliance.  Qui tam provisions allow any citizen to 
enforce specific areas of federal law in return for a reward or a percentage of fines levied from 
successful prosecutions.121  This approach serves as the ultimate outsourcing of enforcement 
 
 119 In many cases victims may do little more than duplicate public enforcers’ efforts or try to build off 
of public enforcers’ efforts by filing suits that mirror the action taken or knowledge disclosed by public 
enforcers.  See, e.g., John F. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 669, 681 (1986) (discussing how “in the field of antitrust enforcement, [] private antitrust class 
actions have tended to piggyback on a prior governmental proceeding”).  
 120 Possession of illegal drugs, pornography, prostitution, and illicit gambling constitute examples of 
“victimless” crimes that, nonetheless, arguably concern public interests such as public morals or health 
and safety.  See Anthony M. Dillof, Criminal Law: Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 827, 872 n.167 (2004). 
 121 Citizen suits are closely related to qui tam litigation and empower private citizens to enforce 
specified laws in return for lawyer’s fees and other expenses.  However, citizen suits appear a far less 
effective enforcement tool than qui tam litigation because all penalties from citizen suits go to the federal 
government, and standing requirements limit the pool of prospective plaintiffs.  Citizen suit provisions 
have been primarily used to augment public enforcement of environmental laws.  See, e.g., Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2000); Clean Water Act of 1976, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); 
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 
(2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000).  While ideological groups, such as environmental 
organizations, may advance their agendas and heighten their public profile through citizen suits, 
nonideological plaintiffs face an expected loss of value from litigation, since at best they can recoup their 
attorney’s fees and expenses.  See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 
TUL. L. REV. 339, 356 (1990).  In contrast, qui tam suits’ offer of monetary awards may attract a wide 
range of plaintiffs, which may enhance overall enforcement and the law’s popular legitimacy.  Citizen 
suit plaintiffs must also establish injury-in-fact and redressability to establish standing to sue.  See Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1998); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
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functions by vesting enforcement discretion in the hands of “private attorney generals.”122  
Although qui tam suits once were the norm for law enforcement,123 now the False Claims Act is 
the notable exception in enlisting private litigants to police federal contract fraud.124 
The False Claims Act provides a valuable model for the design of qui tam provisions and 
their potential efficacy.125  The Act integrates elements of both a private informant and a qui tam 
system.  Qui tam litigants must file a complaint in federal court that is sealed for sixty days, 
during which time even the existence of the suit is not disclosed to the defendant.126  The litigant 
must simultaneously disclose to the federal government “substantially all material evidence and 
information” about the claims.127  By the end of the sixty-day period, the United States can 
choose to assume control of the case and effectively transform the qui tam litigants into 
 
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  In contrast, qui tam plaintiffs appear to have standing if they have the 
prospect of a reward, “even if only a peppercorn.”  Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 127 (Stephens, J., concurring).  
Lastly, citizen suits may be brought only if the violation is ongoing, id. at 109, or the issue is not moot at 
the time the suit was initiated.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
187–88 (2000).  Because the other features of citizen suits are substantially similar to qui tam litigation, 
this discussion will focus solely on the merits of qui tam litigation. 
 122 See Morrison, supra note 104, 590 (noting that “the term [private attorney general] denotes a 
plaintiff who sues to vindicate public interests not directly connected to any special stake of her own”). 
 123 Qui tam actions have long been a feature of English and American law enforcement, but since the 
early nineteenth century public enforcement has almost completely replaced this tool.  For an overview of 
the history of qui tam suits in the United States and United Kingdom respectively, see J. Randy Beck, The 
False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 540–55 
(2000); Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves into a 
Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 456–50 (1998). 
 124 See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. § 3729–33 (2000). 
 125 The False Claims Act was originally enacted to enlist private attorney generals to combat federal 
contract fraud during the civil war.  But by the 1940s concerns arose over the potential for abuse and 
blackmail, which led to restrictions on the ability to make qui tam claims and a dramatic decline in qui 
tam litigation.  See Beck, supra note 123, at 560–61; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal 
Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 296–304 (1989).  The 1986 Act 
significantly expanded the scope of qui tam litigation by empowering individual litigants to bring suit 
even if the information was already available in the public record.  The 1986 Act also made it easier for 
litigants to establish government fraud by lowering the required mens rea for the crime from purposive 
intent to defraud the government to mere recklessness.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000); 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(2) (4)(A)–(B) (2000). 
 126 See 31 U.S.C. § 3739(b)1–2(b) (2000), § 3730(b)(1)–(2) (2000). 
 127 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)–(3) (2000). 
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informants.128  If the government successfully prosecutes the case, then it must award the qui 
tam plaintiff’s litigation costs and attorney’s fees, as well as fifteen to twenty-five percent of the 
penalties.129  If the government chooses not to assume control of the case, litigants may 
successfully pursue the case on their own, and receive twenty-five to thirty percent of the 
damages as well as litigation costs and attorney’s fees.130 
The results of these incentives for qui tam actions speak for themselves.  Since 1986, the 
federal government has recovered over $13.5 billion from federal contract fraud cases under the 
False Claims Act.131  Qui tam litigants have received over $1.4 billion of the proceeds.132  It is 
unclear how much of this fraud the federal government could have uncovered and prosecuted on 
its own (assuming the government both possessed and dedicated enforcement resources towards 
this end).  But regardless of this fact, the amount recovered suggests that prospective qui tam 
litigants can and will augment public enforcement if the level and probability of rewards are 
sufficiently high.133 
 
 128 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(4)(A) (2000). 
 129 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000). 
 130 If the qui tam suit is based on publicly disclosed information or the litigant’s actions contributed to 
the wrongdoing, then the successful litigant will receive less than these percentages.  See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(d)(1)–(3) (2000). 
 131 In 2003 alone, qui tam actions resulted in the collection of $2.1 billion, and from 1986 to 2004 qui 
tam litigation resulted in the federal government’s recovery of $13.5 billion and qui tam litigants’ receipt 
of $1.4 billion.  See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Civil Fraud Recoveries Total $2.1 
Billion for FY 2003; False Claims Act Recoveries Exceed $12 Billion Since 1986 (Nov. 10, 2003), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/November/03_civ_613.htm; THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
LEGAL CTR., FRAUD STATISTICS OVERVIEW 1 (2005), 
http://66.98.181.12/newsources/fcastatsfy2004.pdf. 
 132 See THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT LEGAL CTR., supra note 131, at 1. 
 133 A side effect of a qui tam system is that it serves as an employment program for the plaintiffs bar, 
as entire law firms exist simply to enforce the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act.  See, e.g., 
Phillips & Cohen LLP, http://www.phillipsandcohen.com. 
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Qui tam suits came into being because of the inadequacies of public enforcement,134 and 
reviving qui tam litigation in contexts where the government cannot adequately monitor 
gatekeepers is consistent with its original raison d’être.  In qui tam litigation, private plaintiffs 
with cost-effective access to information on gatekeeper compliance may be expected to file 
enforcement actions if the expected returns exceed their costs of investigation, prosecution, and 
potential retaliation.  In contrast, an overburdened agency, such as the IRS, may lack the ability 
to act even if the tips from private informants are literally right on the money.  Victim suits could 
perform a similar role to the extent victims have cost-effective access to information on 
gatekeeper compliance, but broadening the pool of potential litigants to all private actors may 
significantly enhance monitoring levels.  In qui tam suits, as in victim suits, plaintiffs must bear 
the costs of their investigation and litigation, which may help to deter frivolous suits.  The use of 
a “loser-pays” principle with a qui tam provision could heighten these incentives even more to 
weed our harassment suits that are designed merely to extract a settlement from gatekeepers.135 
Although empowering qui tam litigants may dramatically increase monitoring of 
gatekeepers, these enforcement gains come with significant tradeoffs.  One cost is the potential 
overlap of public and private enforcement efforts, which may entail wasteful redundancies.  The 
False Claims Act attempts to mitigate this danger by creating a sixty-day window for public 
enforcers to review suits and to decide whether to assume control of the case.136  This approach 
 
 134 See Beck, supra note 123, at 565–66, 601; Paul E. McGreal & Dee Dee Baba, Applying Coase to 
Qui Tam Actions Against the States, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 87, 120 (2001) (describing qui tam actions 
as “creatures of necessity” for the early American government because of its public enforcement 
limitations). 
 135 See Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment: The 
Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1, 51 n.250 (1995) (arguing that the incorporation of a loser-
pays principle may significantly reduce frivolous lawsuits). 
 136 The danger exists that the government will assume control of qui tam litigation in order to scuttle it 
because of illicit collusion with the targeted gatekeepers.  But the track record of False Claims Act 
litigation suggests that qui tam litigants received compensation far more often when the government 
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coordinates public and private enforcement efforts only after the case is filed and may miss 
wasteful overlap of public and private enforcement energies before this time.  But the risks and 
costs of overlapping efforts may be a necessary evil for the enforcement gains from enlisting qui 
tam litigants.  Another social cost that may be all but impossible to eliminate would be social 
waste caused by multiple private parties’ attempting to monitor the same gatekeepers.137  The 
fact that under the False Claims Act the case is not disclosed until sixty days after it is filed may 
simply exacerbate the danger of wasteful overlap of private monitoring. 
Another potential shortcoming of qui tam litigation is that it may largely take enforcement 
decisions out of public enforcers’ hands.138  Much of public enforcement turns on discretionary 
judgments by public enforcers.139  Although discretionary powers may be abused, they empower 
public enforcers to contextualize legal requirements and to show flexibility and mercy when it 
may be desirable.  In contrast, private enforcement is a blunt tool, and the danger exists that qui 
tam litigants will engage in wasteful litigation to extract the most for themselves, when public 
 
assumes control of the case than when it does not.  See Bucy, supra note 7, at 51 & n.290 (noting that qui 
tam litigants received significantly less compensation when litigating completely on their own than when 
the government participated in the case).  This fact suggests that qui tam litigants have an interest in 
alerting public enforcers about the scope of their investigation and findings, which may mitigate the 
possibility of a significant overlap of public and private oversight of gatekeepers. 
 137 Sunstein, supra note 104, at 431–32 (noting this concern of overlapping enforcement efforts in the 
§ 1983 context). 
 138 Victim suits also take enforcement discretion out of the government’s hands.  But victim suit 
provisions generally limit standing to cases of actual harm to victims, while qui tam litigants would enjoy 
sweeping discretion to initiate actions in any case of alleged gatekeeper noncompliance. 
 139 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25 (1969) 
(arguing that discretionary enforcement may be “indispensable for individualization of justice”).  
Discretionary enforcement allows leniency when a law appears overly inclusive or when its application 
would impose an injustice in a given case.  Discretionary enforcement has its own shortcomings.  
Officials are often monopsonists of public enforcement and therefore must routinely prioritize 
enforcement efforts, even if mandatory enforcement rules are in place.  They may exercise discretion in 
arbitrary or invidious ways or unconsciously misuse their powers of selective enforcement.  See, e.g., 
Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 939, 981-89 (1997) (discussing how a range of motivations other than maximizing convictions 
may shape the exercise of prosecutorial discretion). 
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enforcers could resolve the case far more efficiently in ways that advance the public interest.  It 
is possible to implement provisions similar to the False Claims Act to empower public enforcers 
to review and assume control of qui tam litigation to mitigate this danger.140  However, 
overwhelmed and underfinanced public enforcers may often be equally ill-equipped to take 
control of cases even when there is a perceived need to intervene to temper enforcement. 
A related danger is that qui tam litigants may employ litigation strategies that establish 
precedents limiting both future qui tam litigants and public enforcers.141  Private litigants may 
solely concern themselves with their private benefits, rather than the broader social benefits of 
deterrence of gatekeepers, and therefore may either under- or overinvest in enforcement in any 
given case.142  Public enforcers may not be in the position ex ante to know whether a particular 
case could lead to outcomes with lasting implications or even to take the time to assess the social 
benefits of government intervention or support of a given lawsuit.  For these reasons, it may be 
best to use qui tam litigation in narrowly defined areas of enforcement where the merits of 
discretionary enforcement or public control of the litigation are low.  This fact counsels using qui 
tam suits as complements to broader enforcement efforts, which may rely on other public or 
private means for other facets of enforcement. 
 
 140 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(2)–(3) (2000). 
 141 While the danger of poor litigation leading to damaging precedents exists, this danger may be 
offset by qui tam litigants’ innovative litigation strategies that may make it easier to uncover wrongdoing 
or to make successful claims.  See Stephenson, supra note 7, at 112–13. 
 142 See Shavell, supra note 102, at 584–85 (arguing that the amount at stake for private litigants is 
only very loosely related to the social benefits of litigation and how it may be socially beneficial to invest 
more than the dollars at stake in the suit in cases where substantial deterrence may result and how in other 
contexts suits should not be brought at all if they may not result in any or much of a likelihood of reduced 
harm); see also Zinn, supra note 101, at 137–39 (noting that the interests of ideologically oriented 
plaintiffs may encompass a broader conception of the social benefits and costs than profit-driven 
plaintiffs). 
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3. The Potential for Private Informants 
The use of private informants offers another way to provide public enforcers with insider 
information, yet to leave public enforcers in control of enforcement actions.  Private informants 
function as profit-driven whistleblowers, who may dramatically enhance the government’s 
monitoring ability yet whose potential use may inflict significant costs on gatekeepers and 
markets.143  Monetary incentives may entice informants to provide invaluable leads that public 
enforcers otherwise could not acquire or could acquire only at prohibitive economic or social 
costs.  However, these benefits come with potential risks of false claims to harass employers or 
secure revenge, risks of encouraging sabotage of gatekeeper compliance from within firms, and 
social costs that may erode relationships between corporate managers and employees and among 
co-workers.144 
Nonetheless, an incentive system for private informants offers several advantages over a qui 
tam litigant approach.  The use of private informants allows public enforcers to heighten 
monitoring of gatekeepers while allowing public enforcers to maintain control of the power to 
prosecute.  Because public enforcers may often be able to leverage informant tips to uncover 
wrongdoing without disclosing informants’ identity, the same insiders may be able to monitor 
continuously gatekeeper compliance in ways that qui litigants or victims may not.  However, 
informants need not put their money where their mouth is, as in victim suits and qui tam 
 
 143 The term “private informant” admittedly also does not carry the best of associations.  However, 
private informants have been routinely used in limited contexts as complements to public enforcement.  
See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
645, 647–51 (2004). 
 144 The enlistment of informants may have chilling effects on interaction between employers and 
employees and between corporations and clients, as these actors may have incentives to minimize 
interaction and disclosures if they fear that information could be used against them at a later point.  See 
Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal 
Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 240–41 (1995). 
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litigation.  For this reason, informants may be more likely to supply false information, which 
enforcers will need to screen out. 
The federal government widely employs incentives for private informants to assist public 
enforcement efforts.145  Prosecutors routinely use immunity or lower sanctions to secure 
cooperation from material witnesses and suspects in criminal and civil investigations.146  Notices 
of public and private bounties for information leading to the arrest and conviction of specific 
individuals or types of criminals are ubiquitous fixtures at police stations, post offices, and on the 
evening news.147 
The Internal Revenue Service and Securities and Exchange Commission have long used 
incentives for private informants to combat tax and securities fraud, respectively.148  In both 
contexts the agencies have limited personnel and face stark challenges in detecting fraud.149  For 
example, in 2000 the IRS only audited about one in every 232 returns.150  By the agency’s own 
admission, staff reductions of one-sixth since 1992 forced the IRS to write off billions in unpaid 
 
 145 See Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 93, 109 (2003). 
 146 See id. at 97–102 (discussing the classic prisoner’s dilemma that seeks to divide the interests of 
defendants by offering the first to cop a plea disproportionate rewards). 
 147 See, e.g., Erik S. Lesser, An Ex-Hostage Receives Her Reward, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2005, at A1 
(noting that the former hostage whose call led to the arrest of courthouse murderer Brian Nichols received 
a $70,000 informants’ reward). 
 148 See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (2000); 
Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
647, 104 Stat. 4849 (1990); Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1(b)(2) (1999); I.R.S. Pub. No. 733 REWARDS FOR 
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY INDIVIDUALS TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (1997). 
 149 For example from 1990 to 2000, the number of SEC enforcers increased by approximately sixteen 
percent, while the number of complaints grew one hundred percent.  During this same period, the SEC 
reviewed in part or whole only eight percent of corporate filings, compared with twenty-one percent in 
1991.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-02-302, SEC OPERATIONS: INCREASED 
WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 13, 21–22 (2002). 
 150 See As Audits Decline, Fewer Taxpayers Balk at Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A11. 
                                                                                                                       PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS                                                        49 
taxes.151  More recently, the IRS has tried to expand its enforcement capabilities,152 but its 
enforcers are still woefully few in number compared to the scale of their task. 
The IRS offers rewards of one to fifteen percent of revenues recouped from tax evasion 
depending upon the agency’s assessment of the usefulness of tips.153  On average the agency 
receives over ten thousand tips each year from private informants concerning billions of dollars 
of alleged tax fraud.154  The understaffed IRS may still lack the personnel to pursue these leads, 
but private informants’ responsiveness to economic incentives suggests how this tool may form a 
valuable complement to public enforcement. 
Private informants may enhance the information-gathering capabilities of enforcement 
agencies, especially when strong networks and connections between gatekeepers and the primary 
wrongdoers pose barriers to public monitoring.  But one other challenge is that enforcement 
decisions may turn on varying combinations of tips from informant and public enforcement 
investigations, which makes reward setting difficult.  One way to approach this problem is to 
employ agency discretion in setting rewards on a case-by-case basis, such as the IRS’ informant 
system.155  This discretionary approach may allow rewards to reflect the risks taken by the 
informant in securing and disclosing the information or the impact in uncovering wrongdoing.  
 
 151 See David Cay Johnston, A Smaller I.R.S. Gives Up Billions in Back Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 
2001, at A1. 
 152 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE DATA BOOK 2005 ii (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05databk.pdf) (detailing 
how the IRS audited 1.2 million individual taxpayers in 2005); Mary Mosquera, IRS, States Expand 
Efforts to Fight Money Laundering, GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS, June 8, 2004, 
http://www.gcn.com/vol1_no1/daily.updates/26149-1.html. 
 153 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(b)(2) (1999); I.R.S. Pub. No. 733 (1997). 
 154 See Marsha Ferziger & Daniel Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of 
Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1167–68.  This number is much smaller than 
what one might expect given the perceived pervasiveness of tax fraud.  This figure may be explained by 
the fact that the informant program is not widely advertised or that prospective informants are reluctant to 
participate for fear of being exposed in the process or because the expected value of benefits are too low 
to justify the risks of being an informant. 
 155 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (1999); I.R.S. Pub. No. 733 (1997). 
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The downside is the lack of predictability may dampen informant participation rates.  Informants 
may not be willing to undergo the risks of information gathering and disclosure without having 
greater certainty concerning the monetary value of the information they provide.  The alternative 
approach is to fix the level of compensation for tips as a set percentage of enforcement outcomes 
to the extent this approach is feasible.  This approach may make it easier for policymakers to 
attempt to set the desired level of enforcement and for prospective informants to decide whether 
the expected value of tips justifies the risks of uncovering the relevant information.156  A 
“sweetener” approach that combines fixed rewards with discretionary incentives based on the 
circumstances of each case may offer the best balance of incentives to create clear expectations 
for informants. 
Another challenge is that the anonymity of private informants is a two-edged sword.  
Anonymity may produce incentives for a higher level of informant participation and a greater 
number of tips.  However, the ability of informants to levy their accusations privately may make 
them more likely to produce highly speculative or false tips to harass gatekeepers they are 
ostensibly monitoring.  Private informant systems generally do not apply sanctions against 
informants for frivolous tips.157  Public enforcers would face the potentially costly burden of 
screening out bona fide leads from false allegations, and the targeted gatekeepers would also 
bear the costs of fending off investigations based on erroneous allegations. 
 
 156 The challenge with any informant system is that public enforcers may choose not to act on 
informants’ tips or settle with gatekeepers at steeply discounted sanctions or none at all.  Informants’ 
compensation therefore will turn on public enforcers’ discretion even if compensation is linked to 
enforcement outcomes that stem from the tips.  See Natapoff, supra note 143, at 681–82 (discussing how 
the rewards for informants turn on the discretion of police officers and prosecutors). 
 157 This risk may be far less in the case of repeat player informants whose continuing interactions with 
public enforcers may produce incentives for providing credible information or allow public enforcers to 
gauge the authenticity of present tips in light of informants’ past reliability. 
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Private informant systems may also be inefficient because of overlapping search costs.  If 
multiple private parties are engaging in search costs, there may be excessive private investment 
in policing gatekeepers and resulting social waste.  If public enforcers coordinated with private 
informants this danger could be mitigated.  The problem of overlapping searches would be more 
common and a necessary tradeoff in cases where private informants come to the government at 
their own accord and volunteer information for rewards.  The use of informants may also be 
costly because government officials will need to invest resources in exploring the validity of tips, 
in weighing the value of their information in calculating rewards, and in making financial 
payments.  While it may be harder to break down the full costs of public enforcers’ uncovering a 
given amount of information, these costs dampen the benefits from private informants’ tips. 
Enforcers will also need to divert resources from monitoring and prosecuting gatekeepers 
towards protecting informants or suspected informants who may face retaliation from 
gatekeepers or other interested parties.  In extreme cases where informants may face threats of 
violence, the need to protect informants may require a commitment to relocate informants and 
their families under a witness protection program.  At minimum, the costs would entail providing 
financial and legal assistance for informants to uphold their rights against retaliation. 
The use of private informants also entails significant social costs that caution towards its 
application in limited contexts.  It may be socially desirable to use the threat of private 
informants to chill particular illegal acts, such as tax evasion and other financial actions that skirt 
the edges of legality.  However, this chilling effect may make it harder for gatekeepers to 
perform their work by providing employers with incentives to minimize exchanges of 
information with clients, employees, or the general public for fear that disclosures could be used 
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against them.158  This approach may make it more difficult for gatekeepers to acquiesce to or 
assist wrongdoing, but it may also chill lawful and socially valuable interaction between 
gatekeepers and other parties.159  Using private informants may also have significant chilling 
effects on social interaction in the workplace and broader community, and therefore should only 
be used in narrow contexts where less invasive information gathering techniques have proven to 
be ineffective. 
4. Enlisting Wrongdoers to Oversee Gatekeepers 
Offering immunity and other incentives for the primary wrongdoers to report gatekeeper 
violations could serve as an ongoing, large-scale sting operation for overseeing gatekeepers.  If 
the reward of clemency and additional financial rewards were high enough, public enforcers may 
be able to get primary wrongdoers to come to them to reveal gatekeeper violations.160  This 
approach is a hybrid between the use of private informants and plea bargaining, because the 
underlying rationale for enlisting gatekeepers is that public enforcers may not be in a position to 
identify, apprehend, or prosecute primary wrongdoers in many contexts.161  Nonetheless, this 
 
 158 See Painter, supra note 144, at 240–41. 
 159 The widespread application of private informant systems may arouse understandable opposition 
from both liberals and libertarians who would see the specter of a “stasi state.”  See Inga Markovits, 
Selective Memory: How the Law Affects What We Remember and Forget About the Past—The Case of 
East Germany, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 533 (2001) (discussing the “stasi,” the secret police for the 
former East German regime, which was notorious for relying extensively on private informers to police 
for dissent). 
 160 These rewards must be substantial because cooperating wrongdoers may face intense social 
sanctions from their community, difficulty in finding employment, and other emotional hardships.  See 
Bucy, supra note 7, at 61–62 (discussing the economic and social costs that whistleblowers may face). 
 161 See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. 
L. REV. 1, 46 (2000) (noting how rewards for cooperating witnesses may be necessary to convince them 
not to exercise their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination). 
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approach has potential because primary offenders may have a substantial interest in coming 
forward to be made clean in the eyes of the law and to receive monetary rewards.162 
Who could be in a better position to know whether wrongdoing was taking place, what the 
gatekeeper knew of the wrongdoing, or how the gatekeeper conducted the oversight than the 
primary wrongdoers?  The primary wrongdoers would likely not be able to look over an 
accountant’s shoulders as she checked quarterly reports or to see whether a lawyer went through 
the proper due diligence checks for an initial public offering.  But primary wrongdoers may be 
able to know firsthand what information the gatekeepers requested and be in the best position to 
produce evidence that wrongdoing was tacitly or explicitly tolerated.  In cases where the interests 
of the primary wrongdoer and the gatekeeper are closely intertwined and difficult to monitor, the 
prospect of clemency and monetary gain may offer public enforcers the only way to uncover 
evidence of understandings that existed between gatekeepers and the primary wrongdoers. 
At first glance, offering clemency and financial rewards to primary wrongdoers might seem 
to be turning enforcement objectives on their heads.  The point of gatekeeper liability is 
ultimately to deter the primary wrongdoers, so why should wrongdoers be allowed to go free or 
profit from their wrongdoing while the gatekeepers may be left facing penalties?  Even in a plea 
bargaining context, cooperating wrongdoers at best receive a clean slate and typically receive a 
reduced sentence.  The logic here is that legitimizing some illicit activity may be an acceptable 
price to pay for the benefit of producing greater incentives for gatekeeper compliance.  If the real 
or perceived probability of wrongdoers’ blowing the whistle on gatekeepers and the resulting 
 
 162 Being granted clemency may be the most compelling interest for many primary offenders, because 
the multiplier effect of being clean in the eyes of the law may be far more valuable than any sum of 
money. 
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sanctions were high enough, then gatekeepers would respond by investing more in efforts to live 
up to their gatekeeper obligations and thus reduce levels of illicit activity in the long run. 
The danger exists that this approach could become a farce of primary offenders receiving a 
“get out of jail free card” with additional sweeteners on a large scale for reporting gatekeepers.  
For this reason, tempering these incentives with a first to report provision offers several 
advantages.  In conventional criminal plea bargaining, the first primary offender to cop the plea 
would receive clemency or disproportionate rewards, while those who plea later may get little 
save a moderately reduced sentence.163  Although this approach admittedly poses the danger of 
soliciting false pleas and lying by defendants turned government witnesses, it offers strong 
incentives for disclosures of illicit activity.  In the context of gatekeepers, the first offender to 
provide information substantially leading to the uncovering of wrongdoing by a gatekeeper 
should reap the bulk of the potential rewards based on the scale of wrongdoing that her 
information uncovers.164 
At the same time, we would not want to discourage other primary offenders from coming 
forward to present evidence of gatekeepers’ wrongdoing.  All offenders may hold their tongues if 
they feel they could gain nothing if they are the second or third person to inform on gatekeepers 
and may actually risk much by disclosing their own culpability in the process.  For this reason, 
other primary wrongdoers who produce evidence of a gatekeeper’s violations before the 
 
 163 See Christopher, supra note 145, at 98–102. 
 164 Much of criminal and civil enforcement literally consists of dangling carrots of clemency or 
reduced sentences to pit one defendant against another in order to reduce the time and costs expended on 
cases.  See Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 
713, 714–17 (1988) (framing plea bargaining as an all-too-literal “prisoner’s dilemma”).  What is 
distinctive here is the argument that offers of clemency and rewards should be awarded exclusively to 
primary wrongdoers with the goal of raising the costs of noncompliance for gatekeepers.  Enforcers could 
do the opposite and offer rewards to firms who disclose primary wrongdoers.  Although this approach 
might make primary wrongdoers more wary of whom they conduct business with, it might actually 
dampen the incentives for firm compliance as firms would only disclose violators if the benefits of 
disclosure outweighed the benefits of turning a blind eye. 
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gatekeeper’s prosecution should receive qualified immunity or reduced sentences or fines for 
their own wrongdoing.  At a minimum, cooperating wrongdoers should face sentences 
dramatically below levels set by the relevant sentencing guidelines or below the expected value 
of sentences that they would receive in conventional plea bargaining.165 
An additional advantage of enlisting primary wrongdoers as informants is that offering 
clemency and rewards to primary offenders may offer the only way to uncover illicit activity in 
the underground economy.  Public enforcers who are unable to monitor gatekeepers in the above 
ground economy on their own may be completely inept at detecting gatekeepers functioning in 
the underground economy.  By using incentives to enlist primary offenders, public enforcers may 
be able to target gatekeepers that they may never otherwise have known even existed.  This 
approach may not only target existing gatekeepers in the underground economy, but also allow 
public enforcers to reduce the incentives for primary offenders and gatekeepers to go 
underground to sidestep gatekeeper liability. 
One important caveat is that the appeal of this plea bargaining approach may turn on the 
nature of the targeted illicit activity.  If the wrongdoing is malum prohibitum rather than malum 
in se,166 this plea bargaining approach would be far more desirable and politically plausible.  It 
might be palatable to have illegal immigrants inform on employers or even oxycontin addicts 
inform on doctors’ making illicit prescriptions in exchange for clemency.  In contrast, it might 
seem outrageous to reward contractors whose labor practices trample on human rights for 
 
 165 This approach is consistent with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which allow for downward 
departures from the Guidelines in cases of acceptance of responsibility, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004), or in cases where the government certifies that the defendant has provided 
substantial assistance to the government in developing cases against other defendants.  Id.  Since primary 
offenders would be eligible to receive these two benefits in the course of ordinary plea bargaining, 
significantly sweetening the incentives may be necessary to entice primary offenders to come forward. 
 166 Malum prohibitum refers to “[a]n act that is a crime merely because it is prohibited by statute, 
although the act itself is not necessarily immoral.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004).  
Malum in se refers to “[a] crime or act that is inherently immoral . . . .”  Id. 
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reporting their American clients’ negligence in failing to police them.  The real line may be 
between primary offenders whose acts deeply offend the public and those who may only offend 
mildly if at all.  For example, the public might not have quietly stood by if Kenneth Lay and his 
associates at Enron had escaped liability or even received rewards for successfully blaming 
negligent attorney or accounting gatekeepers.167 
The downside of this approach is that it would entail significant moral hazards (as would be 
true in any plea bargaining context).  Wrongdoers by definition would have suspect credibility.  
Monetary incentives would give them ample reason to lie about gatekeeper compliance or to 
seek to entrap gatekeepers.  Public enforcers may have to expend substantial resources assessing 
the credibility of wrongdoers’ information as many may come forward for the promise of 
immunity.  Additionally, gatekeepers will face high costs in defending against false claims, 
especially if there is not a clear set of compliance measures, such as a safe harbor of actions 
which gatekeepers can fulfill to comply with their duty. 
Another danger is that gatekeepers may be tempted to collude with the primary wrongdoers 
for mutual profit.  The cost of the sanction for gatekeepers must be high enough, such that 
primary wrongdoers may not simply pay off gatekeepers to take the fall in order for the primary 
wrongdoers to get clean or receive financial rewards.  Otherwise, we might have a travesty of 
justice as crooks could literally launder their money and then report bank gatekeepers for 
laundering their money.  In the process, money launderers might be able to make their money 
literally clean with a side payment going to the gatekeeper for their troubles and to cover any 
liabilities incurred in the process.  The danger of collusion between gatekeepers and the primary 
 
     167 See Alexei Barrieneuvo, Two Enron Chiefs are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 25, 2006 (discussing the convictions of former Enron chief executives Kenneth L. Lay and 
Jeffrey K. Skilling). 
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offenders would be significant in cases where the sanctions gatekeepers face are low.  But the 
costs of collusion for gatekeepers may be higher than they first appear and mitigate this danger 
because of the collateral effects of gatekeepers’ being caught.  Gatekeepers may face escalating 
sanctions if they are repeat offenders and more importantly they may face a higher probability of 
scrutiny from public enforcers in this and unrelated areas, such as tax compliance. 
Even if the expected value of sanctions were high enough that unscrupulous gatekeepers 
would not have the incentive to collude with wrongdoers, wrongdoers might exploit private 
informant provisions to target gatekeepers’ deep pockets.  By rewarding primary offenders who 
inform on gatekeepers, we may create incentives for more intricate efforts at deception by 
offenders that may make it harder and more costly for gatekeepers to fulfill their responsibilities.  
Concerted efforts by fraudulent wrongdoers to bilk gatekeepers may not necessarily be bad 
inasmuch as they paradoxically advance public ends by heightening incentives for gatekeepers to 
live up to their duties to screen for prospective wrongdoers.168  This danger, however, does 
counsel against the use of strict liability standards to guard against this risk of fraud, at least 
unless there is a safe harbor of compliance measures.  Otherwise gatekeepers would be forced to 
bear liabilities for fraud that they may lack any capability to detect (or only at prohibitive 
screening costs) and imposing liability in that type of context would entail social waste.169 
C. Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Using Private Monitors 
This discussion has highlighted how the use of private actors to monitor gatekeeper 
compliance may dramatically enhance the government’s ability to uncover and prosecute 
gatekeeper violations.  But it has also suggested how private oversight tools entail costs that defy 
 
 168 See infra Part IV.A.1-2 (discussing how fraudulent sting operations by undocumented aliens or qui 
tam litigants may paradoxically serve public ends by heightening pressures for employer compliance with 
their verification duties). 
    169 See Hamdani, supra note 2, at 104. 
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easy calculation, which should make policymakers pause before embracing these enforcement 
tools on a large-scale. 
Victim suits entail the least costs but offer the prospect of the least benefits.  Empowering 
victims may not be as invasive on gatekeepers as empowering qui tam litigants or informants and 
therefore avoid the social costs they may inflict.  But this virtue is also the shortcoming of this 
approach as victims likely enjoy no informational advantage over public enforcers and, in fact, 
lack the tools that public enforcers possess to monitor gatekeeper compliance.170  The primary 
appeal of victim suits is that they may fill enforcement roles in cases where public enforcers lack 
the resources to prosecute and the information on gatekeeper violations is readily available.171 
The vice and virtue of the other private oversight tools, such as qui tam suits, informants, or 
cooperating wrongdoers, is their potential invasiveness and the economic and social costs that 
they may inflict in order to achieve their enforcement ends.  The most troubling costs that private 
monitors would entail are the social costs that are difficult to quantify.  Some of these costs 
already exist because gatekeepers face the risk that at any time employees or primary 
wrongdoers could go to the authorities and accuse gatekeepers of failing to comply with their 
duties.172  The principal difference is one of degree because adding financial incentives could 
significantly enhance the number of monitors and the probability that insiders would monitor 
 
 170 In theory, victims could offer bounties to insiders for exposing gatekeepers’ wrongdoing.  Because 
the value of a suit against the gatekeepers may be quite valuable to victims, they may be able to offer 
substantial incentives for information that far exceed those offered by public authorities.  The downside of 
this approach is that insiders may be vulnerable to retaliation by the gatekeepers or to the danger of civil 
or criminal liability for their participation in gatekeeper violations or the targeted wrongdoing.  In 
contrast, public enforcers would be able to offer more credible assurances or clemency to cooperating 
insiders that their information would not be used against them. 
 171 These enforcement gains are partly offset by the possibility of frivolous suits and fishing 
expeditions through discovery imposing wasteful burdens on courts and raising costs on gatekeepers, 
which they may seek to pass on to the market actors that they provide or demand services. 
 172 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act recognized the value of insider whistleblowers by strengthening their 
legal protections.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(e), 1514A(a)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2002) (laying out the whistleblower 
protections for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
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gatekeeper compliance.  This may have a chilling effect on business relations because every 
customer or community could be a potential litigant, and could harm workplace environments 
because bosses and workers may be concerned about potential turncoats in their midst. 
Gatekeepers who do no wrong may in theory have nothing to fear.  However, the reality of 
gatekeeper liability is more complicated because even compliant gatekeepers may face greater 
costs if insiders and primary wrongdoers may profit from reporting on their alleged violations.  
In an ideal world private monitors would only report actual gatekeeper violations, but the profit 
motive may provide incentives to make baseless allegations.  Worse still, insiders may have the 
incentives and the means to sabotage gatekeeper compliance through their actions or inaction, so 
that others may report the violations and they in turn may receive a kickback for their troubles.  
Gatekeepers would face costs in defending themselves against false allegations.  They may also 
have incentives to overinvest in compliance by building in redundancies of internal oversight to 
ensure that their employees are complying with gatekeeper obligations and not subverting 
compliance efforts.  These costs may cause gatekeepers to limit exposure or exit the markets.  
Either way gatekeepers’ clients may be forced to foot the bill by either having reduced access to 
services or by facing higher costs that gatekeepers will seek to pass on them to the extent that 
they can. 
Private monitoring of gatekeepers may dramatically enhance the ability to detect and 
prosecute gatekeepers who fail to live up to their duties.  However, the costs private monitoring 
may inflict are significant and build on the other cost concerns with gatekeeper liability which 
were laid out in part I.173  For these reasons, policymakers should exercise caution in enlisting 
this oversight approach, and their greatest appeal may be in cases where public enforcers are 
 
 173 See supra Part I.B.2. 
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otherwise unable to oversee gatekeeper compliance.  As part III will explore in depth, 
immigration enforcement poses this type of difficult enforcement challenge where private 
monitoring of gatekeepers may be well worth the costs and risks. 
III. THE CASE OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
A. Placing Immigration Enforcement in Context 
1. An Overview of the Immigration Enforcement Challenge 
Immigration enforcement offers a stiff test both of the potential of gatekeepers and the 
desirability of using private monitors to oversee gatekeeper compliance.174  The challenges of 
policing illegal immigration have overwhelmed decades of public enforcement efforts.175  The 
federal government annually spends billions of dollars on policing borders and other ports of 
entry,176 and a myriad of laws claim to threaten illegal immigrants with civil and criminal 
penalties.177  However, the low probability of enforcement, the lack of available sanctions 
 
 174 As noted earlier, immigration enforcement is only one facet of the larger question of immigration 
reform whose full scope this article has neither the space nor the ability to address.  Instead, this article 
seeks to expand the parameters of one dimension of this debate by suggesting how the use of private 
monitors to oversee employer compliance offers a politically viable and economically feasible way to 
heighten immigration enforcement. 
 175 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6–
7 (1997) (discussing how extraordinary expansions of resources spent on border control have failed to 
stem increasing levels of illegal immigration); Eric Lipton, Homeland Security Chief Tells of Plan to 
Stabilize Border, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, at A11 (quoting Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff as 
saying “[w]e have decided to stand back and take a look at how we address the problem [of illegal 
immigration] and solve it once and for all.  The American public is rightly distressed about a situation in 
which they feel we do not have the proper control over our borders.”). 
 176 While politicians periodically engage in political grandstanding over immigration issues, they have 
largely engaged in the politics of symbolism and sidestepped the difficult issues surrounding immigration 
reform.  See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Law and the Border: Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 262 
(2003) (arguing that politicians have incentives to appear “tough on immigration,” regardless of whether 
policies work, in order to reap short-term political gains); Manns, supra note 31, at 145–50 (discussing 
how proposals for the formal abolition of the INS not only failed to address the substantive problems 
facing immigration policy, but also lowered the profile of immigration issues, as the two successor sub-
agencies would have less clout and visibility than the INS). 
 177 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2000) (making first time offender undocumented aliens guilty of a 
misdemeanor with up to 6 month prison sentence and $500 fine or both); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000) 
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against undocumented aliens except for deportation,178 and the ease of reentry through porous 
borders make illegal entry a matter of “when” rather than “whether.”179  The Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement lacks the funds, personnel,180 and above all the ability to 
monitor the vast networks of citizens, legal aliens, and undocumented aliens that facilitate illegal 
immigration.181 
 
(specifying a number of conditions for which undocumented aliens may be deported, such as violating 
visa terms or entering without inspection). 
 178 The government’s routine use of deportation (or voluntary repatriation, which aliens often ignore 
in practice) has very limited deterrent value because of the ease of reentry.  The federal government rarely 
resorts to criminal sanctions because the legal, detention and imprisonment costs of resorting to criminal 
proceedings would be prohibitive if the federal government consistently treated illegal immigration as 
criminal acts.  See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-822T, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE EFFORTS 17–18 (2005) 
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS], available at 
http://www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/stana062105.pdf (noting how the Homeland Security 
Department lacks the resources and facilities even to detain most undocumented aliens who are 
apprehended until a deportation hearing can be held). 
 179 Most enforcement efforts are concentrated on ports of entry, particularly on the Mexican border 
region, see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., America’s Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and 
Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 768 (2000), which may raise the cost of entry for prospective aliens and 
redirect border crossings to more remote areas.  Enforcement efforts largely overlook the millions of 
undocumented aliens who reach the American interior or overstay legal visas and thereafter face only a 
minute probability of detection.  Conservative estimates hold that twenty-five to forty percent of 
undocumented aliens (approximately 2.5 to 4 million people) have overstayed their legal visas.  See 
JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS, 
BACKGROUND BRIEFING PREPARED FOR TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA’S FUTURE 9 
(2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf; see also JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. 
EDWARDS, THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 12–13 (1999) (estimating that 
about half of undocumented aliens overstayed legal visas). 
 180 Although the federal government has taken tentative steps towards enlisting state and local 
governments as enforcers, this effort appears token at best, as the total number of state officers trained by 
the federal government remains only in the hundreds.  See April McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or a 
Nation of Suspects? State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L. 
REV. 1149, 1155–59 (2004). 
 181 The lack of funds, personnel, and inability to manage or oversee immigration flows has been a 
problem plaguing immigration enforcement for decades.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-216, THE INS 
OVERWHELMED AND UNPREPARED FOR THE FUTURE 1–5 (1993) (discussing the INS’ inability to address 
growing levels of illegal immigration); Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public 
Education: An Analysis of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 409, 410 n.7 (1983) (discussing a 1980 
General Accounting Office Report that found the Immigration and Naturalization Service ill-equipped 
and underfinanced); McKenzie, supra note 180, at 1164 (discussing how the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement is “severely understaffed and simply lacks the manpower for proper immigration 
enforcement”). 
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Over twenty years ago the federal government tacitly recognized its inability to address this 
problem on its own by attempting to enlist employers as gatekeepers to confirm the immigration 
status of their employees.182  This approach acknowledged the economic roots for most illegal 
immigration,183 but failed to comprehend the scope of the challenge that employer demand for 
undocumented alien labor would pose for creating an effective gatekeeper regime.  The 
fundamental problem is that both employers of low-wage workers and undocumented aliens 
share a strong economic interest in engaging in formal compliance yet substantive subversion of 
the verification process.  Mutual self-interest has served as a powerful incentive for implicit or 
explicit collusion and obfuscation.  The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement has 
proven so incapable of overcoming these obstacles to monitoring employers for good-faith 
compliance that it has largely abandoned enforcement efforts.184   
 
 182 See Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  This approach once symbolized an innovative attempt at 
reform.  See, e.g., Kathleen M. Johnson, Coping With Illegal Immigrant Workers: Employer Sanctions, 
1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 961 (arguing that the pending employer verification system would be “both 
effective and fair” in deterring illegal immigration).  But see R. Paul Faxon, Comment, Employer 
Sanctions for Hiring Undocumented Aliens: A Simplistic Solution to a Complex Problem, 6 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 203, 204–07 (1984) (arguing that employer verification proposals do not address the 
underlying problems that create pressures for illegal immigration). 
 183 See 8 U.S.C. § 1364(b)(3) (2000). 
 184 The lack of effective oversight coupled with flaws in the design and implementation of the 
verification system undermined the gatekeeper regime and made the probability of liability near zero.  A 
broad literature has documented the failures of the employer sanctions system and the virtual 
abandonment of enforcement efforts in this area by the INS and its successor, the Bureau of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement.  See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY 50–76 (1994) (documenting the failures of the employer verification 
system); Espenoza, supra note 11, 347–48 (arguing that the employer verification regime has failed to 
reduce illegal immigration, yet “succeeded” in heightening discrimination against citizens and legal aliens 
of foreign origin); Medina, supra note 11, at 688–95 (showing how the employer verification system has 
failed to reduce the employment of undocumented aliens and to deter illegal immigration).  But see 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Employer Sanctions: Past and Future, in THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES 
OVER IMMIGRATION 171, 171–78 (Peter Duignan & L.H. Gann eds., 1998) (arguing that the employer 
verification system may have had some impact in deterring illegal immigration and asserting that levels of 
illegal immigration may have risen even more quickly but for the existence of this system). 
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This part will show how the enlistment of private monitors to oversee employers may fill 
oversight gaps by providing access to insider information on gatekeeper compliance and 
increasing levels of enforcement to heighten incentives for employers to engage in good faith 
compliance.185  It will show how private actors may be well situated to produce information on 
whether employment violations are taking place at dramatically lower economic and social costs 
than public enforcers.186  It will suggest how the government may enlist undocumented aliens as 
de facto sting operation agents and empower competitors, employees, and other members of the 
communities to serve as informants or act as qui tam litigants to monitor gatekeeper compliance 
on an ongoing basis. 
This part will also suggest other related reforms to make gatekeeper compliance more swift 
and cost-effective and to mitigate incentives for discrimination against legal aliens and citizens 
of foreign origin which heightened monitoring of employers may create.  It will show how recent 
legislative proposals to expand electronic access to work authorization databases and recently 
enacted enhanced protections for driver’s licenses may provide employers with a cost-effective 
 
 185 Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of the potential to privatize aspects of 
immigration enforcement.  One notable author to touch on the subject is Peter Schuck, who has explored 
the potential for privatizing the monitoring of released aliens who are awaiting deportation hearings.  See 
Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White Paper,” 11 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 667, 682–85 
(1997).  Elsewhere, Peter Schuck considers another variant of privatization in laying out a proposal for 
the “out-sourcing” of refugee and asylum functions from developed countries to developing countries 
through an auction system.  See PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS 
ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 293–325 (1998).  But the broad potential for the privatization of 
immigration enforcement remains a largely untapped area of scholarship. 
 186 In some cases public enforcers could acquire this same information, but at the price of prohibitive 
economic costs and social disruption.  This point was illustrated by the widespread questioning and 
detentions of Arab immigrants in the wake of the September 11th attacks.  Administration officials may 
claim the strategy of questioning and detaining large numbers of Arab men was a success in acquiring 
information on potential terrorist activities and on the immigration status of large numbers of Arab-
Americans.  However, the heavy-handed enforcement approach may have had a poisonous effect on 
Arab-American relations with police and American society for countless years to come, ultimately 
creating greater problems than this strategy “solved.”  See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 47–56 (2003). 
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and accurate means of confirming employees’ identities.187  Although private oversight could 
significantly enhance enforcement under almost any duty standard, this part will show how 
imposing a negligence standard or strict liability standard coupled with safe harbor of 
compliance measures may offer the best incentives for compliance.  Lastly, this proposal will 
suggest how strengthening substantive protections for discrimination against legal individuals of 
foreign nations may offset risks of overdeterrence.  Although this proposal entails significant 
costs and tradeoffs, it offers a cost-effective and politically viable way to overcome the obstacles 
facing immigration enforcement. 
2.  The Nature of the Enforcement Challenge 
Deterring illegal immigration into the United States is an admittedly herculean task that 
would challenge even the most well-crafted policies.188  The United States is not alone in this 
effort as other developed countries have also struggled over the past generation in attempting to 
limit increasing flows of undocumented aliens.189  However, no other country’s challenges 
compare to those posed by the over 500 million people who pass through U.S. borders every 
year.190  Each year, the undocumented alien population increases by approximately 700,000 
 
 187 See Real I.D. Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 202–07, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); H.R. 4437, 109th 
Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d), 274A(e) (2006). 
 188 Approximately eleven million undocumented aliens permanently live in the United States, and this 
figure increases by about 700,000 people each year.  JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 
ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION 1–2 (Mar. 21, 
2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf.  Undocumented aliens add an estimated 
seven to eight million workers to the labor force, and this number increases when one factors in seasonal 
employment.  Id. at 3–4. 
 189 See generally CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Wayne A. Cornelius et al. 
eds., 1994) [hereinafter CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION] (assessing efforts to curtail illegal immigration in a 
cross-section of developed countries). 
 190 See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 182, at 9. 
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people,191 and an estimated eleven million undocumented aliens permanently live in the United 
States.192 
The push and pull factors that surround illegal immigration make this a complex problem.  
Push factors include social, economic, and political conditions in immigrant-sending 
countries,193 such as high birth rates and limited economic opportunities.  Pull factors include the 
economic opportunities and political freedoms of the United States.194  As importantly, 
interfamilial and ethnic networks provide both incentives and opportunities to immigrate, and 
they form mediating structures for new immigrants to enter into the labor market and society.195  
Any agency would be hard-pressed to oversee the overwhelming numbers of undocumented 
aliens and to counter the strength of these factors.  However, the shortcomings of American 
enforcement strategies have made a difficult task appear impossible. 
The challenge of illegal immigration is that the push and pull factors combine to make most 
illegal immigrants both determined to enter the United States and virtually judgment-proof.  
Prospective immigrants are willing to spend large sums and to take tremendous risks in entering 
 
 191 PASSEL, supra note 186, at 2.  This number approximately equals the 800,000 new permanent 
residents that enter the United States each year.  See Schuck, supra note 173, at 4. 
 192 PASSELL, supra note 186, at 2. 
 193 Schuck, supra note 173, at 6. 
 194 Globalization and enhancements in transportation and communication have combined to make 
more people cognizant of vast economic disparities and capable of pursuing new opportunities through 
illegal immigration.  The United States may be a particularly appealing destination because of America’s 
reputation as an accommodating culture and historical openness to immigration. 
 195 See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, From Anonymity to Transparence: Screening the Workforce in the 
Information Age, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403, 408, 409 n.24 (2000) (noting how employers in low-
wages industries rely on immigrant networks to spread word of job openings); Richard C. Jones, Macro-
Patterns of Undocumented Migration Between Mexico and the United States, in PATTERNS OF 
UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION: MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 33, 43–49 (Richard C. Jones ed., 1984) 
(documenting the flow of undocumented aliens from villages to U.S. towns and cities from which earlier 
village residents have relocated in the short or long term); see also Massey, supra note 25, at 68–70 
(discussing the role that social and familial networks play in facilitating legal and illegal immigration). 
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the United States.  In contrast, the costs for public enforcers to detect, detain, and repatriate 
undocumented aliens are prohibitive.196 
One of the greatest challenges in overseeing illegal immigration is that it often operates 
through homogenous networks.197  Initial influxes of legal and undocumented aliens have 
created ethnic networks that have facilitated subsequent illegal immigration.198  Pioneer aliens 
come to the United States legally or illegally and pave the way for their family, friends, and 
 
 196 See RAJEEV GOYLE & DAVID A. JAEGER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DEPORTING THE 
UNDOCUMENTED: A COST ASSESSMENT 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/ATF.CF/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-
5D6FF2E06E03%7D/Deporting_the_undocumented.pdf (estimating that it would take $41 billion a year 
over five years just to apprehend, detain, and deport the undocumented aliens currently in the United 
States). 
 197 Illegal immigration patterns are consistent with patterns of legal immigration from the first 
settlements in British North America to the present.  Pioneers from a given ethnic group paved the way 
and encouraged and assisted others from their community to follow in their footsteps.  For much of U.S. 
history, the lines between legal and illegal immigration were amorphous at best, and benign neglect 
encouraged these types of immigration flows.  See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American 
Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–84 (1993) (discussing how prior to 1875 
most immigration restrictions were state-based and focused on concerns with crime, poverty, disability, 
and contagious disease).  Nativist impulses shaped restrictions on Chinese immigration, see, e.g., 
Naturalization Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254 (1870); Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 22 
Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943), and more comprehensive immigration legislation in 1924 primarily 
targeted Eastern European immigration.  See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) 
(repealed 1965).  But it is noteworthy that benign neglect characterized immigration from the Western 
Hemisphere until after World War II.  See GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY 
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 38 (1999). 
 198 See Philip L. Martin, The United States: Benign Neglect toward Immigration, in CONTROLLING 
IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 83, 89 (Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds., 1994) (noting that “most 
of today’s migration streams have their origins in the colonial or labor recruitment policies of industrial 
countries”).  For example, one of the great ironies of immigration policy is that large-scale influxes of 
undocumented aliens began with the termination of the nation’s only experiment with a temporary 
employment program for low-skilled workers.  The Bracero program brought four to five million 
temporary Mexican workers to work in U.S. agriculture between 1942 and 1964.  See PHILIP MARTIN, 
CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., THERE IS NOTHING MORE PERMANENT THAN TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS 
1 (2004), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2001/back501.pdf; see also RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE 
BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY 5 (1971).  Following the program’s 
abrupt termination, undocumented aliens continued to follow existing employment patterns and served as 
linkages for subsequent intrafamilial and intra-ethnic immigration.  See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE 
STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 152–59 (1992).  Illegal immigration 
streams from other regions, such as Central America and Asia, have followed similar patterns. 
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extended networks to enter the United States.199  The tight intra-ethnic nature of many of these 
networks and the fact that layers of citizens, legal aliens, and undocumented aliens are involved 
in facilitating illegal immigration have made it extremely difficult for enforcement officials to 
oversee and to close off channels for illegal immigration.200 
In spite of these challenges, the nature of illegal immigration patterns also creates 
opportunities for heightened enforcement.  Because of geographical proximity, immigration 
patterns from Mexico and Central America form more of a two-way flow than illegal 
immigration from other parts of the world.201  It is estimated that sixty percent of undocumented 
aliens come from Mexico and another twenty percent from Central America.202  Thus, a large 
majority of undocumented aliens are likely to be highly responsive to changed incentives within 
the United States or their home country.203 
 
 199 While the initial migrant may have come legally, the long waits that can number in years and the 
high costs of immigration processes may make illegal immigration an attractive option, even for family 
reunification. 
 200 Martin, supra note 196, at 89–93. 
 201 This fact reflects the seasonal nature of work in agriculture, construction, and other fields with 
high concentrations of undocumented alien employees, as well as economic conditions in Mexico and 
other nearby countries. 
 202 See B. LINDSEY LOWELL & ROBERTO SURO, PEW HISPANIC CTR., HOW MANY UNDOCUMENTED: 
THE NUMBERS BEHIND THE U.S.-MEXICO MIGRATION TALKS 7 (2002), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6.pdf. 
 203 In contrast, undocumented aliens from East Asia or the Middle East have endured much higher 
costs to gain passage to the United States and therefore may be much less responsive to incentives to 
return to their country of origin.  However, one irony of America’s focus of enforcement resources on the 
Mexican border is that many itinerant workers who would return home after their seasonal work is 
complete have now become full-time residents in the United States because of fears of not being able to 
make it back to the U.S. if they go home.  Id. at 8–10. 
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B.  The Limits of Public Enforcement Tools in Addressing Illegal Immigration 
Public enforcers have repeatedly demonstrated that they lack both the tools and the means to 
address illegal immigration on their own.204  Decades of failed policing of American borders and 
the American interior suggest intrinsic limits in the federal government’s enforcement 
approaches and the need to consider new ways to enlist gatekeepers and other private actors to 
fill the glaring gaps in public enforcement.  Although the attempt to enlist employers as verifiers 
of immigration status has been part of this story of failure, the shortcomings of this approach 
largely reflect the limits of public oversight that plague other areas of public enforcement. 
Politicians have relied on highly visible and costly policing of the Mexican border region 
and other ports of entry as political cover to suggest they are addressing the problem.205  
However, decades of dramatic increases in border patrol resources and personnel have failed to 
stem the tide of increasing levels of illegal immigration and have exposed the limits of a 
perimeter policing strategy.206  The determination, ingenuity, and sheer numbers of illegal 
 
 204 Space constraints dictate that I can only touch upon the limits of public enforcement strategies, 
which each can and have entailed articles and books in themselves.  But suggesting the theoretical and 
practical limits of these approaches is important for underscoring the need for enlisting private actors to 
address the challenges posed by immigration enforcement. 
 205 Targeting ports of entry and border regions produces large numbers of detections and deportations.  
Politicians can then highlight concrete evidence of high numbers of apprehensions or prevented entry to 
show interested constituents that they are dealing with the problem of illegal immigration.  See Johnson, 
supra note 176, at 262.  Highly visible enforcement actions along portions of the Mexican border have 
redirected undocumented aliens away from the most populated areas and have thus helped to dampen 
political pressure for more comprehensive enforcement efforts.  See Sam Howe Vechovek, Tiny Stretch of 
Border, Big Test For a Wall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at A1 (highlighting targeted enforcement efforts 
in the San Diego and El Paso border regions). 
 206 From 1993 to 2004, the federal government increased annual spending on border enforcement by a 
factor of five, from $740 million to $3.8 billion, and almost tripled the ranks of the Border Patrol, from 
nearly 4000 to just under 11,000 agents.  See Walter A. Ewing, From Denial to Acceptance: Effectively 
Regulating Immigration to the United States, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 445, 455 (2005).  During this 
same period the illegal immigration population has more than doubled to eleven million.  PASSEL, supra 
note 186, at 3–4.  But for efforts to tighten border enforcement, levels of illegal immigration may well be 
higher.  Although the focus on perimeter policing appears to have limited efficacy at best, it continues to 
have political appeal.  See, e.g., Bush’s Speech on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006 (discussing 
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entrants would likely overwhelm the most well designed border strategy, let alone the more 
fallible American approach.207  In a world without fiscal or personnel constraints, the United 
States could saturate American borders and other ports of entry with personnel and ensure that 
few could escape an initial inspection.208  But this approach would be both unrealistic and 
extremely wasteful, and as importantly it would be incomplete because upwards of forty percent 
of illegal immigrants initially enter under a valid visa, and subsequently violate the visa terms or 
overstay.209 
Interior enforcement strategies have proven far less effective in deterring illegal 
immigration and underscored the limits of a sole reliance on public enforcement tools.  Recent 
enhancements in the automation and documentation of the entry and exit of foreign visitors have 
made it easier for authorities to document likely visa overstayers amongst the approximately 500 
 
President Bush’s plan to “train[] thousands of new Border Patrol agents and bring[] the most advanced 
technology to the border”). 
 207 Because the costs of detention are prohibitive, Border Patrol agents face no choice but to 
fingerprint apprehended aliens and to deliver them to the Mexican border, only to see (or rather to miss 
seeing) the overwhelming majority of these individuals successfully run the gauntlet of the border region 
in future attempts.  John L. Martin, Ctr. For Immigr. Stud., Can We Control the Border?  A Look at 
Recent Effects in San Diego, El Paso, and Nogales (1995), 
http://www.cig.org/articles/1995/border/border2.html (“The Border Patrol has long known that many of 
the Mexicans whom it apprehends and requires to deport continue to repeat illegal entry attempts in the 
hope that they will succeed the next time.”). 
 208 As immigration expert Wayne Cornelius has opined, “[s]hort of a full-scale militarization of the 
border, no policy will prevent a continued influx into this country of Mexican migrants.”  Wayne A. 
Cornelius, Simpson-Mazzoli vs. The Realities of Mexican Immigration, in AMERICA’S NEW IMMIGRATION 
LAW: ORIGINS, RATIONALES, AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES 139, 141 (Wayne A. Cornelius & Ricardo 
Anzaldua Montoya, eds., 1983). 
 209 See PASSEL, supra note 177, at 9.  One policy argument for a perimeter strategy is that individuals 
desperate enough to attempt illegal entry may be more likely to constitute a potential financial burden on 
the state or pose a greater threat to public order than those affluent enough to secure and violate a visa.  
However, the sophistication of human smuggling networks in securing visas may reduce the socio-
economic gap between visa overstayers and illegal entrants (who trade higher risks for lower financial 
costs for illegal entry).  Even if this point were true, the mandate of the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement is to enforce laws against illegal immigration, not merely to screen out those it 
deems “less socially desirable” aliens.  See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Mission, 
http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
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million people who enter through U.S. borders each year.210  However, overstayers can easily 
disappear into the American interior as, with the notable exception of employment verification, 
enforcers lack any means to track overstayers’ whereabouts, unless they stumble into a 
background check by committing a crime.211  The federal government has required all aliens to 
register with immigration authorities in an effort to fill this gap, but those who register are 
presumably bona fide visa-holders or otherwise law-abiding aliens who would constitute the 
least appealing candidates for deportation.212 
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement lacks the manpower, resources, and 
means to track down on its own the vast majority of undocumented aliens who do not register.213  
Although billions of dollars are allocated to policing the borders and other ports of entry, only a 
 
 210 See Bryan Paul Christian, Visa Policy, Inspection and Exit Controls: Transatlantic Perspectives on 
Migration Management, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 215, 232–33 (1999). 
 211 Heightened visa screening or the use of monetary conditions for applicants from high-risk 
countries may offer alternative ways to reduce risks of overstaying.  Visa screening is by definition 
imprecise, but investing more State Department resources on visa screening is far less costly than tracking 
down overstayers.  Compare Christian, id. at 217, 220 (discussing how low-level State Department 
officials base visa decisions largely on a few minute interview with applicants), with GOYLE & JAEGER, 
supra note 194, at 1 (estimating that it would take $41 billion a year over five years just to apprehend, 
detain, and deport the illegal immigrants currently in the United States). 
 212 See Diane Cardwell, Pakistani and Saudi Men Find Long Lines for Registration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
22, 2003, at D2 (noting that about 100,000 noncitizen Arab adult men registered by the deadlines, which 
constitutes only a percentage of the estimated several hundred thousand Arab noncitizen men in the 
country); Corey Killgannon, All-American? U.S. Says No; Teenager May Be Deported, but Pakistan Isn’t 
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2003, at D1 (describing the fear and outrage that this registration policy has 
created among Arab-Americans in New York City); Rachel L. Swarns, Thousands of Arabs and Muslims 
Could Be Deported, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at A1 (detailing how about fifteen percent 
of the Middle Eastern men who registered with the immigration authorities now face deportation because 
of their illegal status, which led to a backlash to the registration policy). 
 213 Even the registration of aliens is so time consuming that it has placed a significant strain on the 
manpower resources of the Bureau.  See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Will Seek to Fingerprint Visas’ Holders, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A2 (discussing how efforts to register Arab-American men overwhelmed the 
manpower resources of the INS).  To have a realistic prospect of being effective, a registration plan must 
turn on the active support of local authorities in registering aliens.  Although the federal government has 
sought to forge partnerships with state police forces in the wake of September 11th, McKenzie, supra 
note 180, at 1155–59, federalism continues to pose significant barriers to registration efforts and 
immigration enforcement more broadly.  See Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal 
Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promise of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 456–58 (1999). 
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token force of about 2000 Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials enforce 
immigration laws in the American interior.214  The understandable priority of these limited 
number of agents’ efforts is identifying and removing criminal aliens upon their release from 
state and federal prisons.215  Few would quarrel with making the deportation of criminal aliens a 
priority as they may pose the most direct threat to society.216  However, the dearth of interior 
enforcement personnel means that the majority of interior enforcement resources are consumed 
by this task.217  The remainder of scarce resources is scattered amongst efforts to target human 
smuggling and trafficking networks, noncriminal removals, benefit fraud, and enforcement of 
laws against employment of undocumented aliens.218  Even to the limited extent that interior 
enforcement takes place outside of the criminal alien context, these efforts are largely related to 
 
 214 As of 2002, only about 1,800 immigration enforcement officers are dedicated to enforcing 
immigration laws in the American interior outside of ports of entry.  See Eric Schmitt, Administration 
Split on Local Role in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at A1.  This problem has only grown 
worse in recent years, as in 2004 the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement had a deficit of 
$150 to $200 million dollars, which has led to a hiring freeze and reduced enforcement efforts.  See Clark 
Kent Ervin, A To-Do List for Chertoff, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2005, at A21. 
 215 See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., BACKGROUNDER: INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT 
STRATEGY (1999), available at http://uscis.gov/text/shared/lawenfor/interiorenf/strategy.htm.  While the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement does not have an official interior strategy, its resource 
allocation indicates that it continues to make screening for criminal aliens its overwhelming enforcement 
priority.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-660T, HOMELAND SECURITY: CHALLENGES TO 
IMPLEMENTING THE IMMIGRATION INTERIOR STRATEGY 3–5 (2003) [hereinafter HOMELAND SECURITY], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03660t.pdf (statement of Richard M. Stana). 
 216 For example, in 2000, attempts to determine the legal status of over 100,000 convicted criminals 
accounted for 91% of the cases taken up by enforcement officials.  See 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF 
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, § VII, at 3–4 (2002) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERV.], available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/yearbook2000.pdf). 
 217 See HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 213, at 3–5. 
 218 On average, each year the equivalent of four hundred officers’ time is allocated to policing 
smuggling and trafficking networks, and the equivalent of two hundred officers’ time or less is given to 
noncriminal removals, benefit fraud, and worksite enforcement, respectively.  Id. at 5. 
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national security concerns,219 and routine efforts at enforcing immigration laws have become the 
exception outside of the Mexican border region.220 
Given the paltry number of interior enforcement officers, any increase in staffing would 
likely lead to marginally better results.  Increased staffing alone, however, may do little more to 
solve internal enforcement problems than increases in staffing have addressed illegal border 
crossings.  The primary barrier to interior enforcement is the ease with which undocumented 
aliens may virtually disappear within ethnic networks and communities.  These networks often 
serve as an impetus for the decision to migrate and act as the primary mediating structures for 
immigrants to find housing, jobs, and other services.221  Legal immigrants often serve as official 
covers to harbor and employ undocumented aliens, and extended families often include citizens, 
legal aliens, and undocumented aliens, a fact which further complicates oversight.222  Employing 
officers with greater linguistic abilities and cultural understandings may modestly enhance the 
ability to oversee these networks, but acquiring the insider information needed to identify 
undocumented aliens on a large scale is likely well beyond the means of public enforcers to 
achieve on their own.223 
 
 219 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-06, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: DHS HAS 
INCORPORATED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT OBJECTIVES AND IS ADDRESSING FUTURE PLANNING 
REQUIREMENTS 2–3 (2004). 
 220 See id. 
 221 See, e.g., ALBA & NEE, supra note 24, at 188. 
 222 See, e.g., id. at 43. 
 223 Given fiscal constraints on personnel levels, one could imagine recourse to a selective enforcement 
strategy that concentrates efforts on policing ethnic networks and enclaves.  However, this strategy could 
easily backfire.  Racial profiling, whether actual or inferred, may fuel allegations of racism and 
discrimination against people of foreign origin.  Crackdowns could poison relations between ethnic 
communities and federal and local officials and lead to the dispersal and greater decentralization of 
networks.  In this atmosphere the understaffing of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
could become an even more significant liability.  The prohibitive social costs of such an approach would 
likely far outweigh any short-run enforcement benefits.  Compare Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against 
Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000) (arguing that racial profiling 
against Latinos for illegal immigration enforcement perpetuates stereotypes of all Latinos as foreigners), 
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Even when the government is able to identify undocumented aliens, public enforcers lack 
effective sanctions to impose directly on undocumented aliens.  Deportation may be the most 
plausible sanction,224 given that many undocumented aliens are judgment-proof and the sheer 
scale of illegal immigration would overwhelm detention centers and prisons.225  However, 
deportations are costly, especially outside of the border regions, and constitute an ineffective 
sanction because of the ease of illegal reentry.226  Additionally, both the economic and social 
costs entailed in the detention of undocumented aliens, deportation proceedings, and actual 
deportations are so prohibitive that this approach is not a viable option on a large-scale.227 
Sanctions short of deportation, such as the denial of state services to undocumented aliens, 
have proven to be equally ineffective tools of deterrence.228  Economic opportunity, rather than 
 
with Peter H. Schuck, A Case for Profiling, AM. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 59 (making the case for profiling in 
the context of counter-terrorism efforts). 
 224 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000) (specifying a number of conditions for which undocumented aliens 
may be deported, such as violating visa terms or entering without inspection).  If deportees had been in 
the United States for more than 180 days or over one year before their apprehension, then they cannot 
legally reenter the United States for three years or ten years, respectively.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) 
(2000).  The irony of this provision is that the sanction of a multi-year ban on legal reentry may all but 
force these individuals to resort to illegal immigration once again if they wish to reenter. 
 225 Imprisonment offers the illusory promise of making aliens “pay” for their illegal entry with their 
time.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2000) (punishing undocumented aliens with up to a six-month prison 
sentence, a fine, or both for the first offense, and up to a two-year imprisonment, a fine, or both for a 
subsequent offense).  These sanctions are rarely used for good reason, because systematic efforts to 
imprison undocumented aliens not only may arouse popular opposition, but also could pose immense 
social costs and overwhelm already overcrowded prisons.  See PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 
176, at 17–18 (noting how the Homeland Security Department has decided that due to limited detention 
spaces, the detention of aliens subject to national security investigations were to be given priority, while 
employment-related aliens were to be given the lowest priority, which in practice meant they were to be 
routinely released). 
 226 Deportations may simply raise the financial cost for determined migrants, as repeat efforts to cross 
will almost inevitably result in success. 
 227 See GOYLE & JAESER, supra note 194, at 3; Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive 
Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1048–50 & nn.516–22 (1998) (discussing 
the legal costs associated with deportation proceedings). 
 228 For example, the federal government has denied undocumented aliens access to almost all public 
benefits except for emergency relief.  See, e.g., IIRIRA 501, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621 (2000) (denying 
access to all federal grants and licenses); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (cutting off undocumented aliens’ access to most federal 
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social services, is the magnet for most illegal immigration, and denying services to aliens in their 
time of need may end up only magnifying the social burden in the long run.229  For example, 
cutting off access to services such as preventive medicine may ultimately force states to face 
higher burdens to provide constitutionally mandated emergency care.230  Additionally, the denial 
of basic services may make undocumented workers more vulnerable to involvement in organized 
crime.231  This approach, like the other efforts at targeting undocumented aliens directly, failed 
because public enforcers lack the tools and the means to detect and deter undocumented aliens 
on their own. 
C.  The Limits of the Existing System for Enlisting Employers as Gatekeepers 
The enlistment of employers as gatekeepers in 1986 constituted a recognition of the limits 
of public enforcement and the need to enlist private actors to fill the enforcement gaps in the 
American interior.232  The theoretical appeal of requiring employers to verify the legal status of 
prospective employees is intuitive as this approach offers a way to target the economic roots of 
 
public benefits); see also Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Leg. Serv. Prop. 187 (West) (cutting off 
undocumented aliens’ access to most public services in California). 
 229 See Wayne A. Cornelius et al., Introduction: The Ambivalent Quest for Immigration Control, in 
CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION, supra note 187, at 37 (arguing that “there is little empirical evidence for 
the proposition that availability of social services or entitlements is a powerful magnet for would-be 
illegal entrants”). 
 230 Prospective undocumented aliens may also face such poor conditions at home that these attempts 
at deterrence may have little or no effect.  See Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens’ Access 
to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1475, 1478–80 (1995). 
 231 Other sanctions may have illusory appeal, such as rescinding the automatic citizenship provision 
for children of undocumented aliens.  Citizenship by birth may make the United States a more appealing 
destination than other developed countries.  See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the 
Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 54, 60 (1997).  However, the merits of perpetuating illegal status from 
one generation to the next are dubious at best.  As Peter Schuck has argued, even if citizenship by birth 
could be abrogated in the case of illegal immigrants, the notion of having a permanent noncitizen class of 
undocumented aliens being perpetuated from generation to generation appears repugnant to America’s 
egalitarian ideals and broader policy objectives of immigrant assimilation.  See SCHUCK, supra note 183, 
at 352. 
 232 See Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1952)); see also Illegal Immigrant Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 203(b)(4), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
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illegal immigration.233  Employers are uniquely positioned to function as gatekeepers because 
the vast majority of undocumented aliens come to the United States seeking economic 
opportunities from employers.234  An effective verification system with high levels of employer 
compliance could have high deterrent value in decreasing both the value and the availability of 
economic opportunities for undocumented aliens and thus making the United States a less 
attractive destination.235 
The problem is that while employers are well positioned to serve as gatekeepers, their 
economic interests often clash significantly with good-faith compliance.  Employers of low-wage 
workers and undocumented aliens share incentives to find ways around the substance of the 
verification requirement, which has led to large-scale subversion of the law.236  The same types 
 
 233 See Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
 234 In theory, common carriers, landlords, banks, check-cashing stores, and retail stores could all be 
enlisted to screen for the legality of their customers, but this broader approach would impose much higher 
costs on society and pose greater challenges for monitoring.  Each of these gatekeepers could be required 
to confirm the immigration status of individuals who are using their services or for whom they are 
providing services or face the prospect of liability.  These gatekeepers already routinely check 
identification information for both legal reasons and their own self-interest and have developed swift, 
cost-effective ways to confirm identity and creditworthiness.  If driver’s licenses were made into a more 
secure, functional equivalent of a national I.D., see infra Part IV.B, these private actors could confirm 
immigration status at a low cost by swiping an identification card or typing in a social security number.  If 
the error rate of federal databases were low and the expected value of sanctions outweighed compliance 
costs, this broad gatekeeper approach could create significant deterrence for undocumented aliens by 
making it quite difficult for them to participate in any facet of the U.S. economy.  The downside of this 
approach is that the broad enlistment of gatekeepers could pose high social costs on all Americans and 
place unconscionable burdens on undocumented aliens.  It would also suffer from a lack of effective 
monitoring of compliance as both the nature of transactions and their scale would make it difficult for the 
government to monitor more than a token amount of transactions. In contrast, an employer gatekeeper 
approach would impose a minimal burden on the American public by limiting identification confirmation 
to a single context and not bar undocumented aliens from access to essential goods and housing. 
 235 This point would be especially true for the eighty percent of undocumented aliens who are from 
Mexico and other parts of Central America, and therefore have more economically viable options of 
returning to their home countries.  See B. LINDSEY LOWELL & ROBERTO SURO, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 
HOW MANY UNDOCUMENTED: THE NUMBERS BEHIND THE U.S.-MEXICO MIGRATION TALKS 7 (Mar. 21, 
2002), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/reports.jsp?s=allreports. 
 236 See Andrew Parker, Collecting What America Owes, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A9 
(quoting Mark Everson, head of the Internal Revenue Service, as saying “What we cannot afford is to let 
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of shortcomings that have compromised direct enforcement efforts against undocumented aliens 
have led to chronic failures to monitor employer compliance.  The Bureau of Immigration and 
Customers Enforcement lacks both the manpower and the means to acquire insider information 
on noncompliance on its own, and this fact coupled with flaws in the design of the verification 
system has led to the virtual abandonment of large-scale efforts at monitoring employers.237 
The verification regime requires employers to confirm the identity and employment 
eligibility of all workers and to terminate their employment if they lack the proper identification 
materials or if their illegal status later comes to light.238  Employers face a sliding scale of 
sanctions for the knowing employment of undocumented aliens, ranging from a warning and a 
$275 fine for initial violations to a $11,000 fine for repeat offenders.239  Both employers and 
prospective employees must certify the receipt and submission of legal work authorization 
materials.240 
 
our tax laws be viewed in the same way as our immigration or drug laws are, where too large a segment 
of the population says: ‘Those laws are not what we respect.’”). 
 237 As former INS Commissioner Doris M. Meissner conceded: “This whole area of employer 
enforcement has been moribund.  There has been a steady decline in effort and resources directed at the 
workplace.”  See Robert Pear, Clinton to Ban Contracts To Companies That Hire Undocumented Aliens, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at A12. 
 238 Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1952)); see also Illegal Immigrant 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 203(b)(4), 110 Stat. 3009 
(1996). 
 239 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 274(a)10(b)1(ii) (2000).  These figures greatly 
overstate the value of fines as employers routinely negotiate down the level of sanctions in plea 
bargaining with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  See PRELIMINARY 
OBSERVATIONS, supra note 176, at 17.  Employers also face possible criminal penalties for a pattern or 
practice of violations, although this provision has rarely, if ever, been used.  See, e.g., Illegal Immigrant 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 203(b)(4), 110 Stat. 3009 
(amending 8 U.S.C. §1324(a) (1996)) (imposing a penalty of up to five years imprisonment for the hiring 
of ten known undocumented aliens within twelve-month period). 
 240 Employees’ violation of this certification may lead to perjury and additional civil fines, although 
employees have rarely been directly targeted.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)–(h) (2000). 
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The range of materials that prospective employees may furnish to prove work authorization 
makes the rules easy to satisfy or sidestep.241  Broad access to counterfeit identification 
materials,242 and the absence of a requirement to check the identification against a national 
database, makes it easy to satisfy the verification requirements.243  Prospective workers can 
present illegal documentation and employers need only show that they did not know that the 
documentation was false.244  The knowledge standard makes it difficult to prove employer 
violations except in the blatant cases of failures to request or submit identification materials or 
other clear evidence of fraud or collusion.245 
Low fines and low levels of enforcement have combined to produce little deterrent effect for 
employers to engage in more than formalistic compliance.246  Worksite enforcement has 
 
 241 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(b)(1)(B)–(C) (2000). 
 242 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., I-96-08, IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE EFFORTS TO COMBAT HARBORING AND EMPLOYING ILLEGAL ALIENS IN 
SWEATSHOPS 2–7 (1996); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-99-105, ILLEGAL 
ALIENS: SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES TO REDUCING UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT EXIST 2–3 
(1999).  The federal government has required all visitors to have machine-readable passports by October, 
2004 and bio-metric passports by October, 2005.  See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002).  But the problem is that the horse is already out 
of the barn as starter identification documents such as birth certificates and social security cards are 
already readily available on black markets.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ECONOMIC CRIMES POLICY 
TEAM, IDENTITY THEFT FINAL REPORT 10–13 (1999) (discussing how social security numbers and 
driver’s licenses are widely exploited as “breeder” documents to secure other legal forms of 
identification). 
 243 H.R. 4437 and S. 2611 seek to close this particular loophole by requiring employers to confirm the 
social security numbers of job applicants against an electronic database, a significant reform discussed in 
part IV.  See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d), 274A(e) 
(2006).  While the abundance of counterfeit starter documents such as birth certificates will allow 
undocumented aliens to acquire social security numbers, at minimum this approach will raise the costs for 
undocumented aliens to enter into labor markets and pressure employers to engage in more explicit legal 
violations by not checking social security numbers against this database in order to hire undocumented 
aliens.  For a more complete discussion on this point, see Part IV.B. 
 244 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(c)(ii) (2000). 
 245 Employers must retain copies of documentation for three years after hiring and one year after 
dismissal.  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(3)(B).  However, so long as a formal verification process has taken place, it 
is unlikely that the knowing hiring of an illegal alien can be uncovered or proven. 
 246 Sanctions range from $275 for first time offenders who knowingly employ undocumented aliens 
up to $11,000 for repeat offenders.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 274a(b)(1)(ii) (2000).  
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consumed no more than two percent of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
and its successor agency’s enforcement resources over the past decade.247  In 1999 the INS 
dedicated only the equivalent of 240 agents’ time (or 9% of its investigative force) to the 
oversight of employers, and this number dropped to a paltry 90 agents (or 4% of its investigative 
force) in 2003.248  The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement has almost exclusively 
focused its enforcement resources on national security concerns, such as airports and power 
plants, and on the detection of criminal aliens in the wake of September 11, 2001.249  Even in the 
rare instances when employers are caught red-handed, they are at best given a slap on the wrists 
with miniscule fines.250 
Firms have a myriad of strategies to minimize the possibility of effective oversight and 
sanctions, such as engaging in formalistic compliance, subcontracting functions to third parties 
who function on the edges of the underground economy, and failing to keep any record of 
undocumented alien employees.251  Firms are immune from sanctions if they satisfy the formal 
 
Additional penalties of $110 to $1100 apply for failure to complete and retain Form I-9 records verifying 
compliance.  See 8 U.S.C § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (2000); 8 U.S.C § 1324a(e)(5) (2000). 
 247 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-99-105, supra note 240, at 4; see also 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 176, at 18 (noting that the number of worksite arrests 
decreased from 2849 in 1999 to 445 in 2003).  The number of employer investigations ranged only from 
5149 to 7788 per year between 1992 and 2000.  These investigations resulted in a height of 773 warnings 
in 1997, a figure that declined to only 282 warnings in 2000.  Notices of intent to fine employers peaked 
at just over 1000 in 1994 and declined to only 178 in 2000.  See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 
SERV., supra note 214, at 4 & table 60. 
 248 See PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 176, at 3. 
 249 See id. at 12; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: DHS 
HAS INCORPORATED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT OBJECTIVES AND IS ADDRESSING FUTURE PLANNING 
REQUIREMENTS 6–7 (2004), http://www.gov/new.items/d0566.pdf. 
 250 For example, Wal-Mart was caught employing at least 250 undocumented aliens and suspected of 
employing many times more.  The punishment of an eleven million dollar fine appears so miniscule to a 
$220 billion corporation that it will have little-to-no deterrent effect.  See Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart 
to Pay U.S. $11 Million in Lawsuit on Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at A1. 
 251 See, e.g., Harry Austin, When Employers Lure Illegals, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Nov. 
16, 2003, at F4 (discussing Wal-Mart’s claim of no knowledge due to the practice of using contractors to 
recruit employees). 
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requirements of the verification system and did not know of their employees’ illegal status.252  
Even if firms knowingly employed undocumented aliens and knew that there was a high 
probability of being caught, the marginal advantages in terms of wages and productivity from 
employing undocumented aliens may exceed potential fines under the current system.253  The 
shortcomings of the verification regime appear to have emboldened both employers and 
undocumented aliens to violate the provisions at ever-increasing levels.254  Although flaws in the 
design of the verification requirements and a lack of monitoring of employer compliance have 
doomed the current system to failure, the following part will show how the use of private 
monitors can breathe new life into the gatekeeping duties of employers by providing them with 
credible threats that their compliance measures will be subject to ongoing oversight. 
IV.  REDESIGNING THE EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION REGIME 
The existing employment verification system has flaws in its design and implementation, 
but this part will suggest how enlisting private monitors may provide employer gatekeepers with 
heightened incentives to comply with their verification duties.  It will show how policymakers 
may enlist undocumented aliens as part of a de facto sting operation that would paradoxically use 
the incentive of legalization to encourage undocumented aliens to report employer violations.  
Alternatively, it will suggest how other private actors, such as competitors, employees, and other 
 
 252 The nominal enforcement of this law is likely worse than having no law at all, as it has fostered 
norms of formalistic compliance with the law, but subversion of the law’s substance. 
 253 Undocumented aliens bring skills with a willingness to work at lower wages, for longer hours, and 
in poor working conditions.  Companies may feel they have to risk sanctions, because competition 
necessitates reliance on the most cost-effective labor available.  See Celia W. Dugger, A Tattered 
Crackdown on Illegal Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at A1 (quoting a N.Y. City textile factory 
owner saying, “I have to make a profit. . . . I think I have to hire illegal people because I don’t want to pay 
$7, $8 for work that illegal people can do for $4.25.”). 
 254 Other variables obviously have shaped the upsurge in illegal immigration, such as economic 
dislocations caused by the implementation of NAFTA.  However, the failure of employer sanctions may 
have demonstrated the lack of will to enforce immigration laws and tacitly encouraged further 
immigration. 
80                                                                                     PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS 
members of the community, may be well placed to serve as informants or qui tam litigants to 
enhance gatekeeper oversight.  This part will underscore the viability of this proposal by 
highlighting how the federal government may make available the document and database tools 
for employers to comply with their immigration duties in a swift, cost-effective way.  Lastly, it 
will suggest how reforming the duty standard for employment verification and enhancing 
antidiscrimination protections for legal aliens and citizens of foreign origin may mitigate risks of 
overdeterrence. 
A.  The Merits of Private Monitoring of Employer Compliance 
1.  The Perpetual Sting Operation of Enlisting Undocumented Aliens as Informants 
One of the fundamental challenges facing immigration enforcement is the fact that 
employers and undocumented aliens share an interest in subverting immigration laws.  The vast 
wage gap between the United States and undocumented aliens’ countries of origin makes 
undocumented aliens often willing to provide services at or below minimum market rates and to 
acquiesce to labor law violations.255  Employers are more than willing to turn a blind eye to 
immigration violations and identify fraud to secure a cheap, exploitable labor source and to 
bolster their profits.256  So long as the interests of both undocumented aliens and employers 
remain aligned, both parties may continue to seek innovative ways around any stumbling blocks 
that public enforcers may throw in their way. 
For this reason public enforcers need to consider unconventional tactics to divide the 
interest of undocumented aliens from their employers.  On a very limited scale, the Bureau of 
 
 255 See supra Part III.C.  The significance of this issue is underscored by the fact that the Supreme 
Court is hearing oral arguments in April, 2006 concerning the ability of workers to bring a RICO claim 
against their employer for depressing their wages by systematically hiring undocumented aliens.  See 
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams, 411 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 830 
(2006). 
 256 See HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 213, at 3–6; Dugger, supra note 251. 
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the former INS have targeted undocumented aliens 
directly through sting operations by creating sham companies or job opportunities to trap 
undocumented aliens who are seeking employment.257  These tactics may have modest 
deterrence value in capturing headlines and leading to the detention and deportation of small 
numbers of immigrants.258  But enforcement agents lack the resources to carry out these types of 
sting operations on a large scale, as the costs of detentions, legal proceedings, and deportations 
would be financially ruinous and potentially impose an unconscionable human cost on illegal 
immigrants and their families.259 
Instead of wasting scarce resources in attempting to target undocumented aliens directly, 
enforcement energies should be directed solely against employers to dampen the demand for 
undocumented alien labor.  Public enforcers should implement a more counterintuitive strategy 
of enlisting undocumented aliens as monitors of employer compliance.  Enforcers could embrace 
a piecemeal approach of setting up individual sting operations against employers using 
undocumented aliens, but this strategy would be hamstrung by the costs and energies that 
agency-led sting operations would absorb.  Instead, public enforcers should decentralize 
enforcement efforts by offering incentives of temporary or permanent legalization to any 
undocumented aliens who are willing and able to report and substantiate employer violations.  
By seeking to enlist any undocumented aliens as potential informers against their employers, 
enforcers may be able to drive a wedge between the interests of undocumented aliens and 
 
 257 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Officials Defraud Ploy to Catch Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
11, 2006, at A8. 
 258 See Steven Greenhouse, An Immigration Sting Puts Two Federal Agencies at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 16, 2005 (discussing a controversial sting operation in which immigration agents posed as organizers 
of an Occupational Safety and Health Administration meeting in order to detain forty-eight 
undocumented aliens). 
 259 See GOYLE & JAEGER, supra note 194, at 1 (estimating that it would take $41 billion a year over 
five years just to apprehend, detain, and deport the undocumented aliens currently in the United States). 
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employers.  If all undocumented alien applicants had the incentive to inform on their employers 
for their own hire, employers may become far more wary of subverting the verification process 
by casting a blind eye to illegal status.260  This attempt to disrupt symbiotic employer-employee 
relationships would constitute a perpetual sting operation, which, if coupled with strong 
sanctions, could produce lasting incentives for employer compliance with their gatekeeper 
duties.261 
The logic of using incentives for undocumented aliens to report on gatekeeper violations 
turns on the fact that undocumented aliens are in the best position to prove their own illegal 
status and would often be able to confirm firsthand what compliance measures employers did or 
did not perform in their particular case.  The nature of ethnic networks and workplace interaction 
would also place undocumented aliens in a good position to know whether their employers were 
engaging in a pattern of employing undocumented aliens.  It may be troubling to some to reward 
culpable parties for disclosing illicit acts that they instigated, and this approach would admittedly 
pose moral hazards.  However, the enforcement benefits from this decentralization of employer 
monitoring could dramatically magnify the deterrent effect for employers. 
One important question is what level of incentives would be sufficient to get undocumented 
aliens to come forward on a large scale to report on employer violations.  Undocumented aliens 
 
 260 The possibility that undocumented aliens may report employer violations may at minimum give 
employers incentives to compensate and treat undocumented aliens better, which may be good in itself 
and accord with the objectives of those who seek greater protections for undocumented alien workers.  
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Dunne, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy: Understanding Why 
Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented Workers, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 624–26 
(2000); Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for 
Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2179–84 (1994).  As importantly, this 
response by employers would have the valuable collateral effect of making the economics of employing 
undocumented aliens less favorable for employers and help to dampen demand for undocumented alien 
labor. 
 261 This approach would also create incentives for employers to discriminate against all individuals of 
apparent foreign background, an issue which part IV.D will address. 
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may feel they have much to lose from going to the authorities and risking changes in the status 
quo of their employment.  As discussed earlier, the federal government has few tools to 
prosecute undocumented aliens in the American interior because of the prohibitive costs of 
detentions, hearings, and deportations.262  Undocumented aliens, however, may hold fears of 
deportation that vastly outweigh the probability of this sanction and make them leery of any 
contact with authorities.263  They may not want to take any risks that could imperil their current 
economic position as their extended families often may rely on them to send remittances 
home.264  And undocumented aliens may have legitimate fears of retaliation from their fellow 
workers or other members of their community for cooperating with the authorities.  Therefore, 
the incentives for cooperation must be significant enough to overcome these concerns. 
The most effective incentive that the federal government has to offer is the temporary or 
permanent legalization of the undocumented aliens.  Currently, undocumented aliens may be 
able to secure counterfeit documents and engage in identity fraud at low cost to sidestep 
employment restrictions,265 but undocumented aliens are likely to place a high value on 
legalization.  A temporary work visa or permanent residency would allow undocumented aliens 
to return home for periods of time without risking deportation on their return, provide access to 
 
 262 See infra Part III.B. 
 263 See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 
62–63 (2002) (arguing that “when intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the adverse 
outcome, not on its likelihood,” which may significantly distort private and public decisions). 
 264 The remittances that undocumented aliens send home to our regional neighbors form America’s de 
facto foreign aid program.  In 2004 undocumented workers sent $45.8 billion dollars of remittances to 
their families in Latin America and the Caribbean.  See Richard Lapper, Remittances to Latin America 
and Caribbean, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at 8; see also Stephen Fidler, New Migrants Spur Growth in 
Remittances, FIN. TIMES, May 17, 2001, at 7 (highlighting the fact that remittances from the United States 
dramatically exceed development aid to Latin America and equal about one-third of foreign direct 
investment to the region). 
 265 See Press Release, INS, INS Cracks National Counterfeit Document Operation (Nov. 13, 1998), 
available at http://uscis.gov/text/publicaffairs/newsreels/fineprint.htm. 
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social services, tax refunds, and Social Security contributions, create eligibility for permanent 
residency, and make their day-to-day lives much more secure by removing fears of detection.266 
The question remains of how public enforcers could make the reward proportional to the 
scale of wrongdoing that an undocumented aliens exposes.  The federal government could offer 
undocumented aliens a sliding scale of rewards ranging from a one-year temporary workers’ 
permit to permanent residency based on the scale of gatekeeper wrongdoing that their 
information helps to uncover.  Making the minimum reward of a one-year or two-year temporary 
workers’ permit renewable, at least for a set period of years, could place undocumented aliens in 
a position far better than living on the edges of legality.267  Even the minimum reward may 
produce a significant incentive for undocumented aliens to assume the risks of reporting their 
employer, and offering work permits for longer periods up to permanent residency status would 
produce incentives for disclosing multiple instances of employer noncompliance. 
Although legalization may be valuable to undocumented aliens, this reward alone may not 
provide sufficient incentives for undocumented aliens to cooperate with authorities.  
Undocumented aliens may face a stiff price for reporting on their employers, such as disruption 
of their current employment and exposure to threats, retaliation, or alienation from their 
communities.  Thus, two other forms of compensation may be appropriate.  First, they should be 
eligible for monetary rewards of a percentage of the sanction that employers face as a result of 
 
 266 See, e.g., George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President Bush Proposes New Temporary 
Worker Program, Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3. 
 267 To assuage the concerns of those who believe this approach may take away the ability of enforcers 
to address legitimate threats that undocumented aliens may pose, it is important to underscore the fact that 
temporary or permanent residency would be subject to the same conditions that temporary and permanent 
residents of the United States already face.  In particular, just as under current law, the commission of 
crimes of moral turpitude would form a basis for revoking temporary or permanent residency.  See, e.g., 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2000). 
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their tip.268  Because of the value of legalization, this incentive may not need to be as high as to 
attract other informants or qui tam litigants for whom money would be the sole reward.  But 
allowing financial compensation may still offer a way to create proportional incentives to the 
value of the information uncovered. 
A second and far more costly form of compensation would be offering cooperating 
undocumented aliens new identities and the chance for them and their families to be relocated.  
A witness relocation program may be key for overcoming the significant deterrent to cooperation 
with authorities that ruthless human trafficking and smuggling networks may pose.269  These 
groups would not be pleased with activities that threatened to disrupt their “business model” of 
transporting and connecting undocumented aliens with employers.  Therefore, the combination 
of additional monetary rewards and witness relocation may be necessary to overcome these 
disincentives.270 
Another question is what reward to give undocumented aliens who produce evidence of a 
given gatekeeper’s violations, but who are not the first to do so.  The value of their contribution 
may be significantly less, if only because the first tips may alert enforcers to investigate a 
gatekeeper further and prompt piggyback claims from other undocumented aliens who may be 
 
 268 See Cohen & Rubin, supra note 99, at 174–76 (discussing the benefits of enforcement by private 
agents who have a direct interest). 
 269 The risk of retaliation may be especially high in contexts where illegal employment networks are 
interconnected with human trafficking or smuggling syndicates.  See Sadruddin et al., supra note 26, 382–
84 (discussing how human trafficking and smuggling syndicates may easily threaten violence against 
members of their ethnic communities or their relatives in their home countries to deter any cooperation 
with authorities). 
 270 One irony of a witness relocation program for cooperating aliens is that many, if not most, have 
assumed false identities to enter and work in the United States, and therefore their professional and 
educational reputation may often not be closely tied to their employment prospects.  They may 
nonetheless have significant community ties that may form a deterrent to cooperation for both positive 
and negative reasons.  In spite of this fact, the impact of receiving a new identity and a fresh start may be 
less than for many other prospective types of informants and may often be consistent with their economic 
motives for entering the United States. 
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affected.  But the quandary is that policymakers would need to ensure that undocumented aliens 
would not be deterred from reporting violations because of fears that being the second or third to 
report could expose them to the risk of deportation. 
If every person who reported gatekeeper violations received a one-year or two-year, 
potentially renewable temporary worker status, then one can easily imagine that undocumented 
workers would likely agree amongst themselves to go en masse to enforcers to report violations 
so that they all could benefit.  This approach would not necessarily be bad as social and ethnic 
bonds amongst undocumented aliens may be so tight that they will only go to report violations if 
it does not hurt their friends and neighbors.  However, this approach could also become a gaping 
backdoor for subverting the system and overwhelm enforcers with the sheer number of tips from 
aliens seeking temporary worker status.  For this reason, it may be more appropriate to offer 
immunity for those who are second or third in offering good-faith tips on the same set of 
gatekeeper violations and to vest discretion in enforcement officials to determine whether to 
grant temporary worker status in these contexts.  The underlying goal of this enforcement 
proposal is to target employers and only indirectly to shape incentives for undocumented aliens 
not to enter the U.S. or to return home by diminishing opportunities for illegal employment.  For 
this reason granting immunity to undocumented aliens who come forward to the authorities is 
consistent with the policy objectives.  This approach may still pose risks, but it may offer the 
best balance between encouraging tips from undocumented aliens, while not making it such a 
broad loophole for legalization that it undercuts the enforcement objectives. 
Another concern would be that legalization and monetary rewards may pose too great an 
incentive for undocumented aliens to inform on employers and almost beckon fraud.  Explicit 
fraud could undermine the approach and the danger of nuisance accusations and lawsuits could 
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impose high costs on employers.  If the sanctions for employers are low, then one can imagine 
employers willingly being caught employing undocumented aliens for under-the-counter 
payments from the undocumented aliens.  This fraud could become the de facto outlet for 
legalization of undocumented workers with the government receiving “legalization payments” 
vis-à-vis the sanction paid to employers.  It is hard to place a price on what legalization would be 
worth to undocumented aliens or prospective immigrants, but depending on the availability of 
outlets for legal temporary employment or permanent immigration it may well be worth many 
times more to the undocumented alien than the fine costs the employer.  This temptation would 
be especially strong for small-scale employers who would have the least reputational costs at 
stake.  One factor that may mitigate this risk is the fact that being caught for immigration 
offenses may lead to higher penalties for subsequent offenses and a heightened probability of 
monitoring and enforcement for other crimes.  These collateral effects may make this type of 
collusion uneconomical for gatekeepers. 
A related concern is the burden frivolous suits may impose on gatekeepers.  The danger of 
fraud and deception is quite substantial because of the strong incentives undocumented aliens 
may have to trap employers in a self-serving sting operation.  The incentives for deception may 
also cast doubt on the testimony of undocumented aliens whose veracity may be challenged 
because their self-interest would be closely intertwined with the conviction of gatekeepers.  One 
consideration that may temper this danger is the fact that undocumented aliens are by definition 
also in a vulnerable position and would have understandable fears about disclosing their illegal 
status to authorities unless they had credible claims, as they would fear losing their jobs or being 
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exposed to deportation.271  In contrast, informants or qui tam litigants may have greater 
incentives to offer more speculative claims or frivolous tips because of the lack of repercussions 
(except in harming their credibility to public enforcers), and qui tam litigants may merely pursue 
cases for their potential settlement value or to see if they can uncover evidence of actual 
violations through discovery. 
This approach may ironically arouse the ire of opponents of illegal immigration because it 
legitimates the status of undocumented aliens.  They might argue that offering the reward of 
legalization is hypocritical as it may undercut other enforcement efforts and may enhance the 
appeal of the United States as a destination for undocumented aliens.  But it is important to stress 
that this approach is distinguishable from general amnesty programs, which paper over the 
problem in the short run but create expectations for future undocumented aliens that they too will 
be legalized if they dwell long enough in the United States.272  Instead, the virtue of this 
approach is that it rewards undocumented aliens for their contribution to heightening overall 
enforcement against employers.  It consciously trades off present enforcement against 
cooperating undocumented aliens in exchange for greater incentives for employers to comply 
with their verification duties in the long run.273 
 
 271 See Sunstein, supra note 263, at 62–63 (arguing that when strong emotion is involved, people tend 
to focus on the negative outcome and not on the likelihood of occurrence). 
 272 See JoAnne D. Spotts, U.S. Immigration Policy on the Southwest Border from Reagan through 
Clinton, 1981–2001, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601, 610 (2002) (discussing the amnesty policy implemented 
by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986). 
 273 Another virtue is that it would be quite low in expenditure terms (which is a significant criteria for 
securing congressional support).  See Cohen & Rubin, supra note 99, at 176 (arguing that when an 
enforcement agent has an incentive to maximize his self-interest, the policymaker’s interest is also 
maximized, resulting in a more efficient system).  In fact, this approach may even “pay” for itself as the 
revenues from employer fines could offset many of the costs from legalizing the cooperating 
undocumented aliens. 
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Use of the incentive of legalization could also complement the creation of a large-scale 
temporary workers’ program for low-skilled workers.274  Heightened immigration enforcement 
would produce pressures from sectors of the economy that have depended on undocumented 
alien labor for access to low-skilled workers and the creation of a temporary workers’ 
program.275  The enactment of meaningful immigration enforcement measures could be 
combined with the creation of a temporary workers’ program as a quid pro quo to overcome the 
significant political stumbling blocks to reform.276  If a temporary worker program were on a 
large enough scale, it would have the added benefit of providing greater incentives for 
prospective undocumented aliens to work through legal channels to enter the United States by 
providing a credible alternative to illegal immigration.  The government could attempt to manage 
flows of migrant workers by offsetting grants of temporary worker status to cooperating 
wrongdoers by reducing the number of available temporary worker slots in any given year. 
The social costs and risks from enlisting undocumented aliens as part of an ongoing sting 
operation are significant and must be weighed against the benefits of heightened monitoring and 
access to insider information.  However, the moral hazards posed by offering a reward of 
legalization to undocumented aliens may be a small price to pay for an approach that may split 
 
 274 The creation of a temporary workers’ program would serve both as a logical complement to 
greater enforcement against illegal immigration and as a valuable political compromise.  Current Senate 
legislation recognizes the value of integrating these two facets of immigration reform.  See S. 2611 , 
109th Cong. (2006) (proposing the coupling of the introduction of a temporary worker program and 
procedures for the legalization of undocumented aliens who have long resided in the United States with 
heightened enforcement measures). 
 275 While the Bush administration’s proposal for a temporary workers’ program has languished on the 
legislative back burner since the attacks of September 11, 2001, creating temporary employment 
opportunities may address the labor needs in low-wage industries that undocumented aliens currently fill 
and provide incentives for prospective immigrants to work through legal channels.  See President George 
Bush, supra note 264 (laying out a proposal for a temporary workers’ program). 
 276 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 followed a modified version of this approach in 
integrating the creation of an employer verification system with an amnesty for a large percentage of 
existing undocumented aliens.  See Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1952)). 
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the interests of employers and undocumented aliens.  Though this approach may be 
controversial, it may create lasting incentives for employers to comply with their verification 
duties. 
2.  Enlisting Private Informants and Qui Tam Litigants as Monitors of Employers 
Although undocumented aliens may be in the best position to report on employer 
compliance and offer conclusive evidence of gatekeeper violations, cooperation by 
undocumented aliens with the authorities may be limited by concerns about potential economic 
dislocation or threats of violence or other forms of retaliation.  This fact raises the need to 
explore how other private monitors could help fill enforcement gaps. 
In many other contexts we would examine the potential for victim suits to serve as a means 
to hold gatekeepers accountable for failures to fulfill their duties.  But one of the many 
challenges of immigration enforcement is that there is no identifiable class of victims, as illegal 
immigration imposes widely dispersed costs on society.277  Both the scale of these costs and even 
the existence of “victims” from illegal immigration are contentious political questions.278  Even 
to the extent policymakers could identify or specify particular classes of individuals adversely 
impacted by illegal immigration, such as low-wage workers who directly compete with 
 
 277 See Sen. Alan K. Simpson, The Immigration Reform and Control Act: Immigration Policy and the 
National Interest, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 147, 152 (1984) (noting that the exact impact of illegal 
immigration is difficult to gauge). 
 278 The uneven distribution of the social benefits and social costs of illegal immigration makes the net 
costs more difficult to document and imposes disproportionate burdens on those with the least political 
clout.  See BORJAS, supra note 195, at 105–08.  For example, low-income localities bear the burden of 
paying for the public education of children of illegal immigrants out of local property taxes, while farmers 
or other corporate beneficiaries of low-wage workers shoulder few of the costs.  As Robert Borjas has 
highlighted, other costs are harder to document, such as downward pressure on low-income wages in 
illegal immigrant destinations, because migration from these areas to other parts of the country partly 
offsets these effects.  See George J. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: 
Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 9755, 2003) [hereinafter Labor Demand]. 
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undocumented aliens,279 it is far from clear how to define the harm from gatekeeper violations in 
any given case, let alone to imagine what damages would be appropriate to redress the harm. 
In contrast, the enlistment of qui tam litigants and private informants sidesteps the thorny 
issue of victim status and offers public enforcers practical ways to enhance access to insider 
information and to heighten levels of enforcement.  If these private actors received a percentage 
of the sanction and the likelihood of receiving this reward were sufficiently high, private actors 
could be expected to provide tips to enforcers or to investigate or prosecute employers for 
violations.280  This approach would envision four types of prospective informants or qui tam 
litigants: competitors, employees, job seekers, and other members of the community at large.281 
An employer verification regime arguably serves as an unfair competition law.  Firms that 
exploit undocumented alien labor may enjoy a significant cost advantage over their law-abiding 
counterparts, who pay legal minimum wages, overtime, and social security and wage taxes.  
Even if firms do pay taxes for undocumented alien employees, they may also exercise their 
leverage over undocumented aliens to violate other laws in pushing undocumented aliens to 
work longer and harder under illegal working conditions.282  In a competitive market situation, 
 
 279 See Borjas, Labor Demand, supra note 276, at 1335 (concluding that immigration lowers the 
wages of competing workers with similar skills and education). 
 280 See Cohen & Rubin, supra note 99, at 175–76. 
 281 A fifth type of prospective informant would be bounty hunters with no ties to the community 
whose mercenary motives could provide sufficient incentives for them to invest in monitoring employer 
compliance.  See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 80–81 & n.31 (discussing 
the historical role of bounty hunters and their contemporary role as bonds bailsmen).  The list of potential 
private monitors is not comprehensive, but suggests the types of individuals who would have the interest 
and opportunity to monitor and report on violations by employers.  
 282 See Foo, supra note 260, at 2181 (discussing the harsh and illegal working conditions that 
undocumented aliens often face); Abel Valenzuela, Jr. et al., On the Corner: Day Labor in the United 
States, January, 2006, at 12-16, available at 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded_files/Natl_DayLabor-On_the_Corner1.pdf (discussing 
employer workplace violations and abuses of day laborers). 
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nonenforcement of employer sanctions against a significant number of firms may necessitate that 
other firms subvert the law and hire undocumented aliens simply to remain competitive.283 
Under the current system, virtue is its own (and sole) reward for law-abiding firms as they 
may face competitive disadvantages if they comply with their duties by actively screening for 
undocumented aliens, and they have little to gain from monitoring their competitors’ compliance.  
Empowering companies to serve as private informants and qui tam litigants would provide firms 
with a significant financial incentive to police one another.284  An informant system would give 
firms incentives to monitor competitor compliance and provide them with greater reason to 
pressure public enforcers to act on their tips.285  A qui tam approach would provide firms with a 
weapon directly to enjoin the illegal and unfair business practice of employing undocumented 
aliens.  The threat of financial sanctions, coupled with the fact that a percentage of the proceeds 
would go to the competitor litigant, may provide greater deterrence for firms.  This approach 
could level the playing field in a way similar to private causes of action for enforcing antitrust 
laws.286  One significant difference is that because the impact of employment violations is far 
more diffuse than antitrust violations, competitors would simply receive a percentage of the 
 
 283 For example, textile firms in the United States have frequently claimed that they have no choice 
but to employ undocumented aliens because of intense wage pressures.  See Dugger, supra note 251, at 
A1. 
 284 The danger of collusion on the employment of undocumented aliens exists, but the economic 
incentives for reporting or prosecuting may make collusion difficult to sustain in the long run.  See 
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 
18–21 (2004) (discussing in the antitrust context how oligopolists may be able to sustain tacit collusion in 
the long run, but noting how the difficulty of sustaining collusion increases sharply when the number of 
participants increases). 
 285 This approach poses an obvious danger of tips that are designed to harass competitors, but having 
public enforcers screen tips should mitigate this risk, as competitors who cry wolf would lose their 
credibility over time.  In the case of qui tam suits, incorporation of a “loser pays” provision covering legal 
fees and other expenses should also reduce the risk of harassment suits. 
 286 See, e.g., Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2005) (creating a private 
cause of action for antitrust violations with treble damages). 
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sanctions and would not need to establish the level of damages or lost profits caused by unfair 
competition. 
Other types of prospective informants or litigants would include workers within the 
gatekeeper firm, job seekers, and other members of the community who may all have both the 
incentives and access to uncover employer wrongdoing in exchange for rewards.  Employees 
may be well situated to know of the legal status of other employees just by engaging in 
conversations with their coworkers.  They may also enjoy the best vantage point for monitoring 
what verification steps a company is or is not taking.  Low-wage job seekers are the individuals 
most directly affected by the employment of undocumented aliens,287 and they may have 
independent incentives to invest in finding out whether avenues for employment are closed to 
them because of illegal practices. 
Individuals from the community at large may also be better situated than public enforcers to 
detect whether employers are using illegal alien labor.  Immigration status is often an open secret 
in ethnic communities, and local customers may be as well placed as anyone to recognize and 
confirm that employers are engaging in immigration violations.  The threat of informants or qui 
tam suits may create higher tensions within communities.  However, any approach that enlists 
private enforcers necessarily entails social costs, and the prospect of significant monetary gain 
may be the only way that individuals within communities would report this type of violation. 
Providing incentives for informants to come forward to report on employer noncompliance 
may allow public enforcers to overcome information gaps, while preserving prosecutorial 
discretion in screening and pursuing cases.  This approach raises many of the same benefits, 
costs, and risks as providing incentives for undocumented aliens to report on employers.  
 
 287 See Borjas, Labor Demand, supra note 276, at 1370. 
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Monetary compensation for informants may not raise as much of a potential furor as offering a 
reward of legalization for undocumented aliens.  But payment for being a “snitch” may similarly 
open informants’ credibility to impeachment.288  Because informants do not need to bear the 
costs of public investigations, moral hazards exist that informants will levy frivolous accusations 
in hopes that public enforcers will come across evidence of employer noncompliance and result 
in a reward.  To the extent that informants’ tips expose their identities, informants from within a 
firm or from the local community may also face threats of retaliation.  Blown covers may require 
whistleblower protections in the case of gatekeeper employees and, in extreme cases of violent 
threats, may require spending for relocation, which may significantly add to the costs of paying 
informants. 
The most troubling effect of using either private informants or qui tam litigants is the 
chilling effect the threat of reporting violations could have in the workplace and within ethnic 
communities.  Incentives for private enforcers to monitor employers could fuel distrust between 
employees and employers, as well as among coworkers.  Employers and employees would have 
incentives to engage in self-censorship for fear that their words could become bases for 
informant tips or qui tam suits from a disgruntled employee.  Employers would also have 
incentives to engage in redundant oversight of their own compliance efforts to ensure that no 
employee is able to sabotage compliance and then report these “violations” for the sake of 
 
288   See Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants: Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent 
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951) (discussing how informants “have been generally 
regarded with aversion and nauseous disdain”). 
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personal gain.289  These costs may be admittedly high, but the chilling effect on employing 
undocumented aliens would further the underlying purpose of the verification requirements. 
The logic of rewarding individuals who come forward with information on employer 
violations that public enforcers may not otherwise be able to uncover is clear.  In contrast, using 
qui tam suits to oversee employer compliance may be a more counterintuitive approach in this 
context.  Undocumented aliens would likely disappear at the first sign of litigation, and much of 
the evidence of their employment could be concealed or destroyed before the start of a discovery 
process.290  Although the disappearance of witnesses could make prosecutions more difficult, the 
targets of this oversight are not the undocumented alien employees, but rather the employers to 
deter employment violations.  Qui tam litigants would likely be insiders or secure the testimony 
of insiders in advance to ensure that sufficient evidence will exist for prosecutions. 
The False Claims Act provides a well-developed model for a qui tam provision.291  The key 
element of the False Claims Act framework is that it retains the potential for prosecutorial 
discretion.  Qui tam litigants must disclose “substantially all material evidence and information” 
about the claims to the government at the time of filing a sealed complaint.292  At the end of a 
sixty-day period, the government can choose to assume control of the case and award the 
litigants costs and attorney’s fees, as well as fifteen to twenty-five percent of the penalties 
imposed.  If the government chooses not to assume control of the case, qui tam litigants will 
 
 289 The problem of sabotage would exist even if human resource personnel could not serve as 
informants or qui tam litigants.  They may simply work through third parties inside or outside of the firm 
who could file valid tips of suits and then receive a kickback once the rewards were received. 
    290  A case in point is the failure of Operation Vanguard, a 1999 operation in which the then INS 
subpoenaed personnel records from Midwestern meatpacking plants and compared them against INS and 
Social Security databases.  Of those workers called in for questioning, seventy percent disappeared rather 
than being interviewed.  See Spencer S. Hsu & Kari Lydersen, Illegal Hiring is Rarely Penalized, WASH. 
POST, June 19, 2006. 
 291 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730 (2000); see also infra Part II.B.2. 
 292 See id. § 3730(b)(2)–(3). 
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receive twenty-five to thirty percent of the penalties, as well as litigation costs and attorney’s 
fees, if they prevail.293  Use of some variant of this approach will allow public enforcers to 
intervene when significant policy or precedent issues are at stake.294  The particular percentages 
used in setting rewards under the False Claims Act may not be sufficient given the fact that the 
potential penalties for employment verification violations pale in comparison to government 
contracts fraud.  However, the principle of setting upper and lower bounds on rewards levels is 
useful in making reward levels more predictable but also incorporating a measure of discretion to 
reflect the quality of qui tam litigants’ efforts and information. 
The responsiveness of both qui tam litigants and informants will turn on the level of 
compensation and the probability of compensation.  There is no set formula for determining what 
sanction level for employers or what reward level for qui tam litigants or informants would 
provide appropriate incentives as it will depend on the probability of receiving a reward and the 
risk of retaliation.  What is clear is that current penalties for employers, ranging from a warning 
to $275 fines for initial violations up to $11,000 for repeat offenders, are so low that they offer 
little deterrent value and little incentive for informants or qui tam litigants regardless of what 
percentage of the sanction serves as the reward.295 
 
 293 See id. § 3730(d)(2). 
 294 See Shavell, supra note 102, at 601–04 (discussing how the fact that private litigants do not usually 
take the deterrence value of trials into account may lead them to pursue socially excessive levels of trials 
or settlements in a given context).  There may be instances where the public interest may call for a 
settlement rather than full prosecution of employment violations or the reverse.  Additionally, there may 
be cases of such high stakes in terms of revenue or legal implications that the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement has a substantial interest in managing the case.  If the federal government 
intervened too often, it could depress the rewards, and therefore dampen the incentives, for participation 
by qui tam litigants.  However, the limited enforcement resources of the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement would likely allow qui tam litigants to act as litigants in the overwhelming 
majority of cases. 
 295 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1) (2005). 
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This article will propose a sliding scale of sanctions based on the size of the employer.296  
The advantage of this approach is that it imposes sanctions that are roughly proportional to the 
deeper pockets of larger corporations, so that smaller corporations do not bear higher relative 
exposure to liability.  The ceiling on penalties for gatekeeper violations would be $15,000 per 
violation for employers of one to fifteen workers, $25,000 per violation for employers of fifteen 
to one hundred employees, and $50,000 per violation for employers of 101 to 200 workers, and 
potential fine levels could more gradually increase for firms with higher numbers of employees 
up to a cap of $75,000 per violation.297  The floors for violations could be set at half the cap 
levels with a baseline of $7500 per offense for employers of one to fifteen employees.  Repeat 
offenders could face a sliding scale of increasing sanctions to attempt to deter violations.298 
Determining what percentage of these fines would be sufficient to attract informants or qui 
tam litigants may be a matter of approximation at best.  Given the sliding scale for businesses,299 
it may make sense to offer rewards of fifty percent of the fines small-scale employers must pay 
and to gradually decrease this figure to twenty or twenty-five percent of fines for employers of 
over two hundred.  This level of compensation will likely be more than adequate to attract a high 
 
 296 This proposal applies a modified version of the framework for compensatory awards in intentional 
discrimination cases brought under Title VII, which was laid out in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  See 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(2000)).  A gatekeepers’ failure to verify employer status is less reprehensible than intentional 
discrimination, and the proposed compensation framework reflects this fact by capping penalties at 
approximately half the amount of compensation used in the 1991 act. 
 297 See id. § 1981 a(b)(3) (creating a scale for damage awards based on the number of employees). 
    298  Recent Senate legislation has proposed a lower scale of sanctions for employment verification 
violations ranging from $500 to $4,000 per undocumented alien for initial employer offenders and $4,000 
to $10,000 for repeat offenders. S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(e)4(A).  The Senate bill would also threaten 
potential criminal sanctions of up to three years of imprisonment (and/or a fine of $20,000 per 
unauthorized alien) for employers “engag[ing] in a patter or practice of knowing violations,” a far more 
draconian step.  Id. at § 274A(f).   Use of a criminal sanction for a civil offense may serve as a substitute 
sanction to deter otherwise judgment-proof employers who have flagrantly violated immigration law on 
many occasions, but without an effective way to oversee gatekeeper compliance this approach may serve 
as a symbolic, yet toothless threat.  
 299 See id. 
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level of private informant and qui tam participation.  Thus, it would be better to err initially on 
the side of too small an incentive for qui tam suits to avoid the danger of overdeterrence.  Then, 
if necessary, incentives could be raised to solicit higher levels of participation.300 
Empowering qui tam litigants poses risks of abuse.  Thus, safeguards are necessary to 
prevent overdeterrence and abuse of litigants’ powers, and to reduce the social costs imposed by 
this approach.  Inclusion of a “loser-pays” principle in the qui tam provision would help avoid 
the danger of frivolous lawsuits and the use of qui tam litigation for harassment purposes.301  
Without this provision, plaintiffs would have greater incentives to engage in highly speculative 
lawsuits or to go on fishing expeditions against targets with deep pockets in efforts to uncover 
unlawful practices.302  However, having the loser pay the opposing side’s legal fees would force 
prospective plaintiffs to take more of the full costs of suits into account.  This provision would 
also mitigate concerns that corporations or their proxy entities would use qui tam suits to hurt 
competitors or that disgruntled employees would use this tool to harass employers. 
The danger exists that private informants or qui tam litigants will sacrifice the state’s 
interests for greater personal gain.  Qui tam litigants may have incentives to blackmail employers 
or to agree to less than optimal settlements in exchange for kickbacks.  In this way, they could 
either cut the government out of the compensation entirely or extract a higher percentage of 
 
 300 Over time, it may prove necessary to increase the percentage that private informants or qui tam 
litigants collect if participation in there is low participation.  The False Claims Act offers a good example 
of the need to adjust fine levels over time.  Its overhaul in 1986 resulted in the establishment of higher 
levels of rewards and a higher probability of compensation.  This approach attracted many more qui tam 
litigants and became the poster child for successfully enlisting private actors.  See Beck, supra note 123, 
at 561–63. 
 301 See Brookins, supra note 135, at 51 n.250 (arguing that incorporation of a loser-pays principle may 
significantly reduce frivolous lawsuits). 
 302 A loser-pays provision may decrease harassment suits and magnify incentives for those with valid 
claims.  But the more uncertain it is that courts will be able to recognize valid claims as such, the more 
likely that a loser-pays principle may screen out valid claims and attract false claims based off of 
litigants’ calculations of the expected value of gain or loss from suits.  See Shavell, supra note 102, at 
587–88. 
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rewards for themselves.  Implementing fixed minimums for verification penalties or 
requirements that a court approve any settlement should mitigate some of the conflicts-of-interest 
issues concerning settlements. 
Mitigating the risks of blackmail is more difficult.  Existing laws applying criminal and civil 
sanctions to blackmail seek to deter this conduct.303  However, a blackmailer will have leverage 
to contract a settlement outside of the state’s auspices if others are unlikely to discover the 
violations.  This risk of blackmail may not be all bad inasmuch as it would still raise the costs for 
employing undocumented aliens and therefore have some deterrence value, even though it would 
take revenue away from the federal government.304  However, the risk of blackmail may not be 
very high in practice because of the nature of employment violations.  In most cases, employers 
would have good reasons to believe that if one person knew about the fraud, then others would 
likely unearth it, making blackmail payoffs a poor investment and making a settlement with the 
government and future verification compliance a better option. 
A related concern is that private informant or qui tam provisions may be exploited as 
money-making schemes by con artists.  For example, immigrant smuggling rings could place 
undocumented aliens in jobs with fake documentation.  The undocumented alien employees 
could then conveniently disappear at the same time that a third party filed a qui tam action 
against the employer.  Related principal-agent problems could arise within a corporation.  A 
human resources employee could be complicit in violations of the employer verification regime 
 
 303 See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 670–73 
(1984) (suggesting how blackmail may perversely further public enforcement objectives in some 
contexts). 
 304 See Jennifer G. Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935, 1943–49 (1993) 
(arguing that legalizing blackmail of criminals would actually deter crime). 
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and then become a private informant or qui tam litigant, or tip off a third party to do so and profit 
from violations she helped commit. 
Clever con artists would make it extremely difficult to link a third-party informant with a 
scheme to frame employers.  Because of the difficulties in detecting this type of fraud, one could 
impose high civil or criminal sanctions in attempts to deter this conduct.305  Blatant cases of 
entrapment could form a defense for employers, especially when there is evidence that an insider 
set them up, yet in most cases it would likely be impossible to prove the entrapment.  Guarding 
against this risk of fraud admittedly will impose greater costs on businesses.  However, this 
danger may ultimately play a positive role in providing employers with additional pressure 
actively to guard against the employment of undocumented aliens. 
Another concern is the need to protect the whistleblowers.  A private informant approach 
may allow the identities of informants to be kept completely secret depending upon whether the 
information they provide necessarily reveals their identity.  However, qui tam litigants who are 
still employees of employers engaging in illegal practices would be putting their necks on the 
line.  As in the case of other whistleblower statutes, employers should be barred from taking any 
retaliatory measures against employees engaged in qui tam suits or suspected as informants.306  
Retaliation may assume many subtle forms, but providing employees broad protection with the 
full range of legal remedies that other whistleblower statutes provide should guard against this 
danger.307 
 
 305 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2000) (allowing courts to reduce the bounty to parties who 
“planned and initiated” the violation of the statute). 
 306 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(e), 1514A(a)(1)–(2) (2004) (laying out the whistleblower protections 
for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
 307 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2004) (providing employees who faced retaliation with “all relief 
necessary to make the employee whole,” including reinstatement, back pay, and special damages, such as 
litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees). 
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Lastly, public enforcers should be banned from using insider knowledge to file qui tam 
actions.  Establishing a presumption that enforcement personnel and their close families are 
ineligible for qui tam actions would reduce the potential for conflicts of interest.  Otherwise, 
enforcement personnel would have every incentive to look the other way on the job and then to 
file qui tam actions when off the job.  Society would be worse off if had to pay enforcers both 
their salaries and qui tam proceeds to secure the same enforcement results.308  Similarly, an 
insider trading principle should limit parties from collecting anything more than their reasonably 
and actually incurred expenses if they knew or reasonably should have known that the 
information they acted upon came from an enforcement agency or officer’s tip.  Otherwise, 
public enforcers may have incentives not to act and to tip off third parties in exchange for 
kickbacks. 
B.  Filling the Need for a Swift, Accurate Means of Compliance 
Creating a swift, accurate means of gatekeeper compliance is crucial for containing the costs 
that gatekeeper liability may impose on employers and prospective employees and mitigating 
incentives employers may have to discriminate against applicants of apparent foreign origin to 
mitigate potential liabilities.  One significant challenge is that pervasive identity fraud and the 
widespread use of counterfeit documents threatens to compromise the accuracy of the 
 
 308 One alternative would be to incorporate rewards for detecting gatekeeper violations into the 
contracts of public enforcers.  In theory, making part of a public enforcer’s compensation contingent on 
enforcement outcomes could mitigate the risk of public enforcers “double dipping” to receive informant 
rewards.  See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of 
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD., 1, 1–3 (1974) (proposing that policemen be compensated based on the fines 
produced from their enforcement efforts).  The problem is that there is a strong public aversion to linking 
the efforts of public enforcers to enforcement outcomes.  Here there would also be a significant moral 
hazard that public enforcers would abuse their extensive enforcement powers and discretion to frame or 
extort gatekeepers for the sake of private gain. 
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verification process and make it easy for employers to turn a blind eye to fake documentation.309  
For this reason, enhanced identification protections and access to information on immigration 
status must complement efforts to heighten incentives for employer compliance with their 
verification duties. 
Recent legislative efforts have recognized the significance of this problem and focused on 
ways to combat document and identity fraud by attempting to create a more accurate system for 
verifying identity and immigration status.  Both the Real I.D. Act of 2005 and proposed 
legislation on employer verification duties have sought to make the electronic verification of 
Social Security numbers a centerpiece of efforts to address document and identity fraud.310  The 
Real I.D. Act seeks to make electronic confirmation of Social Security numbers and immigration 
status an integral part of state department of motor vehicle processes for granting and renewing 
driver’s licenses.311  Proposed legislation in Congress seeks to extend this approach to the 
employer verification context by mandating that employers confirm Social Security numbers of 
employees against a similar electronic database.312In conjunction with private oversight of 
employers, the combinations of these approaches would go far towards providing employers 
with both significant incentives to comply with their verification duty and a cost-effective and 
more accurate means for employers to fulfill their duty.  
 
 309 See Press Release, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., INS Cracks National Counterfeit 
Documents Operation (1998), available at http://www.rapidimmigration.com/www/news/news_124.html 
(documenting a single INS bust which led to the seizure of two million counterfeit resident alien cards, 
social security cards, and driver’s licenses and noting that these IDs had a street value of a mere $40 to 
$200). 
 310 See Real I.D. Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 202–207, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); H.R. 4437, 
109th Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d), 274A(e) (2006).   
 311 See Real I.D. Act of 2005 §§ 202. 
 312 See, e.g., H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701, 702 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d), 274A(e) 
(2006).  
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1.  Assessing the Impact of the Real I.D. Act of 2005 
The need for a more secure identification system has been obvious since the inception of the 
employer verification regime.313  Under the current system, undocumented aliens can easily 
secure and use fraudulent documentation to “confirm” their legality.314  The Real I.D. Act of 
2005 attempts to fill this gap by seeking to transform state driver’s licenses into a de facto 
national I.D by May, 2008.315  The Act prohibits federal agencies from accepting state driver’s 
licenses and personal identification cards unless these identification materials meet a set of 
conditions to counter identity and document fraud.  State identity documents must incorporate 
uniform data and antifraud provisions based on a national standard and use a common machine-
readable technology.  States must also allow electronic access by all states to their databases, and 
state department of motor vehicles must verify the presented documents and the immigration 
status of applicants.316  Specifically, the Act requires applicants to submit a photo I.D., 
documentation confirming birth date and present residence, a social security number, and 
documentation confirming legal status.317  The Act also requires state departments of motor 
vehicles to electronically check applicants’ social security numbers and immigration status 
 
 313 Others have argued that a national identification card or a functional equivalent is essential for the 
verification process to have any deterrence effect.  See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra 
note 182, at 54–60; Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the 
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 1003 (arguing “short of the 
erection of a two-thousand-mile wall along the United States-Mexican border and implementation of an 
effective national identification card system . . . exclusionary immigration policy will regulate the 
velocity of the labor flow but will never threaten the flow itself”).  Most European countries, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand use national identification cards.  See, e.g., Mark Landler, Fine-
Tuning For Privacy, Hong Kong Plans Digital ID, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at C1 (noting that Hong 
Kong has had a national identification card system for over fifty years). 
 314 See id. 
 315 See Real I.D. Act of 2005 §§ 202–207, Pub. L. No. 109-13 (2005). 
 316 See id. § 202. 
 317 See id. §§ 202(c)(1)–(2). 
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against the Social Security Administration and Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements 
databases.318 
State driver’s licenses already serve many of the purposes of a de facto national I.D. within 
the United States, and if successful, the Real I.D. Act’s approach would help curb this form of 
document fraud.  But it remains to be seen to what extent states are able and willing to comply 
with this massive unfunded mandate or whether the target date of 2008 is even remotely 
realistic.319  The Congressional Budget Office estimated that compliance will cost states $100 
million over the next five years,320 but the National Conference of State Legislatures has 
estimated that it will cost between $500 and $750 million.321  Additionally, the Act may only 
have a moderate impact in combating fraud because the federal government may be poorly 
positioned to oversee compliance by state departments of motor vehicles and states may lack 
sufficient incentives to comply with this federal mandate. 
 
 318 See id. §§ 202(c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(C). 
 319 See id. § 204 (granting the Department of Homeland Security authority to make grants to states to 
comply with the Act, but not appropriating any money for this purpose).  The existence of minimum 
national standards and a national database for commercial driver’s licenses suggests the potential viability 
of this initiative, although the Act poses challenges because of its more sweeping coverage.  In 1986 
Congress set minimum national standards for state commercial driver’s licenses that required the 
inclusion of the name, address, social security number or equivalent, and physical description of the 
licensee.  See Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, H.R. 5484, 99th Cong. 
§ 12006 (Jan. 21, 1986).  Congress authorized a private association, the American Association of Motor 
Vehicle Administrators, to create a database containing this information, as well as updated information 
on the dates and status of licenses that is accessible to states, commercial drivers, and prospective 
employers.  See AM. ASS’N. OF MOTOR VEHICLES ADMIN., COMMERCIAL DRIVER LICENSE 
INFORMATION SYSTEM (CDLIS): DEFINITIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLIANCE 
2–3 (11997), http://www.aamva.org/Documents/drvCDLcompliancerequire.pdf. 
 320 See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 418, REAL I.D. ACT OF 2005 1–2 (2005), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6072&sequence=0&from=6 (estimating that 
compliance with the Real ID Act would cost state and local governments $100 million from 2005–2010 
and would cost the federal government $100 million during this period). 
 321 See Ann E. Marimow, Anti-Terror Legislation Expected to Lengthen DMV Lines, WASH. POST, 
May 14, 2005, at B5. 
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The Real I.D. Act primarily addresses document fraud and will do little to address identity 
fraud.  That horse is already out on the barn as fraudulent starter documents, such as birth 
certificates, are widely available and can be used to acquire social security numbers and licenses 
“legitimately.”  This approach will not deal with this loophole, but it will raise the cost for 
prospective undocumented aliens to establish fraudulent identities.  Criminal syndicates will 
have to go to more trouble and expense to compile the legitimate documents needed to acquire a 
driver’s license.  Incorporating fingerprinting or biometric data for social security cards and birth 
certificates would narrow the opportunities for identity fraud by more clearly linking driver’s 
licenses to their holders,322 but would also raise the cost of compliance and the political ire of 
those opposed to a national I.D.323  But regardless of this fact, the Real I.D. Act may create a 
more accurate common form of identification that could be used as the centerpiece of a more 
accurate verification system. 
2.  The Potential for Electronic Verification 
Under the current system the lack of access to a database for employers to confirm the 
authenticity of identification documents significantly reduces the effectiveness of the verification 
process.324  The appeal of mandating that employers use an electronic database to verify and 
record employment eligibility is intuitive.325  If a highly accurate computer database existed, 
 
 322 See Robert Pear, Foreigners Obtain Social Security ID with Fake Papers, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 
2002, at A12.  Incorporating a fingerprint or biometric data would not be foolproof either, but it would 
make it harder to use duplicate identification documents and raise the cost of producing fraudulent 
identities. 
 323 It is noteworthy that even the proposed legislation to mandate access to a social security database 
for employment verification expressly disclaims any intent to create a national I.D.  See H.R. 4437, 109th 
Cong. § 701(a)(H)(ii) (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(c)(6) (2006). 
 324 See supra Part Section III.C. 
 325 The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform noted the need for such a database over ten years 
ago, but to date the INS and its successor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services have experimented 
only with pilot programs of limited scope.  See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 182, 
at 60.  More recently, H.R. 4437 and S. 2611 have  proposed that the Homeland Security Department and 
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then employers could confirm employment status with a click of a button at a quick speed and 
low cost. 
Both the Real I.D. Act and proposed legislation on the verification process rely on 
electronic verification of Social Security numbers as a tool to make immigration status 
verification swift, cost-effective, and accurate.326  Past and current agency experiments suggest 
the viability of allowing uniform employer access to a computerized database of Social Security 
numbers and immigration status information.327  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 required the then-INS to initiate three pilot programs: a machine-
readable document system, a citizen attestation program, and a Basic Pilot Program using an 
electronic database program.328  Although the first two programs were abandoned because of 
technical difficulties and concerns about accuracy and heightened discrimination, respectively,329 
the Basic Pilot Program serves as a template for broader reform of document verification.330 
 
Commissioner of Social Security make available an online or telephone-based database for employers to 
confirm the accuracy of job applicants’ social security numbers, so that mandatory confirmation of social 
security numbers’ accuracy can be incorporated into employers’ verification obligations.  H.R. 4437, 
109th Cong. § 701 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(d) (2006).   
 326 See, e.g., H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 701 (2005); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(d) (2006). 
 327 The INS has experimented with a range of telephone-based and electronic verification initiatives.  
The first project was the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program in 1986, a 
telephone-based database for government officials to confirm eligibility for public benefits.  See Wendy 
Zimmermann, The Save Program: An Early Assessment, in THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER 
SANCTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND REFORM 129–55 (Michael Fix ed., 1991).  Subsequent pilot 
programs in the 1990s used the SAVE database and other INS databases to explore the potential for 
telephone-based and electronic employment verification processes.  See INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH & 
WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE CITIZEN ATTESTATION VERIFICATION PILOT PROGRAM EVALUATION 14 
(2003) [hereinafter CITIZEN ATTESTATION], available at 
http://149.101.23.2/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/piloteval/newpageforcavp.htm. 
 328 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§§ 401–04 (1996). 
 329 See CITIZEN ATTESTATION, supra note 327, at 35–43 (criticizing the citizen attestation verification 
program because of flaws with the database and the requirement that only noncitizens needed to provide 
electronic verification, raising concerns about illicit discrimination); INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH & 
WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE MACHINE-READABLE DOCUMENT PILOT PROGRAM EVALUATION 85–86 
(2003), available at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repssutides/piloteval/newpageformrdp.htm 
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The Basic Pilot Program is currently a voluntary program that allows employers to check all 
prospective employees’ social security numbers against an electronic Social Security 
Administration database.331  If the validity of the number is not confirmed, then the data of 
noncitizens is electronically checked against a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) database.332  If the number is still not confirmed, then USCIS status verifiers manually 
check other USCIS databases.  Prospective employees may then file an appeal with the SSA or 
USCIS to contest the rejection of their employment eligibility, which the agencies must resolve 
within ten working days.333  If employees’ data is not found in the databases after a manual 
check or employees do not file an appeal, then they are presumed to be unauthorized workers 
and can be terminated by their employers.334 
The primary shortcomings of the Basic Pilot Program are the limited, voluntary 
participation by employers, the fact that it only addresses identity or document fraud in a limited 
way, and the fact that its efficacy relies on employer self-compliance without any credible threat 
of direct monitoring.  Given that the program uses electronic databases, it would be virtually 
costless to allow uniform employer access to the SSA and USCIS databases, aside from the 
potential cost of employing more powerful servers.  The main costs would be the need to hire 
 
(finding that the pilot program of using machine-readable Iowa driver’s licenses to verify immigration 
status failed because of technical and procedural problems); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program Page, 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/SAVE.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005) (noting that these pilot programs 
were terminated in May and June, 2003, respectively). 
 330 See INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH & WESTAT, INS BASIC PILOT EVALUATION: SUMMARY 
REPORT 4–8 (2002), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/piloteval/INSBASIC_summ.pdf (providing an 
overview of the features of the Basic Pilot Program). 
 331 See INSTITUTE FOR SURVEY RESEARCH & WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE BASIC PILOT PROGRAM 
EVALUATION 40–44 (2002) [hereinafter BASIC PILOT], available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/piloteval/C_II.pdf. 
 332 Id. at 42. 
 333 Id. at 44. 
 334 Id. 
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dramatically more status verifiers to perform manual checks of immigration status, to handle 
appeals and to heighten the accuracy of the SSA and USCIS databases in order to reduce the 
need for manual checks.335  The former INS and current USCIS have managed telephone and 
electronic databases on immigration status for twenty years,336 which should give them a 
foundation to build on in making these databases more accurate if higher levels of funding were 
available. 
The Basic Pilot Program places Social Security cards at the center of the employment status 
confirmation process,337 and a common theme of pending legislation for electronic verification is 
the use of Social Security Cards or state driver’s licenses in the verification process.338  This 
focus on one or two means of identification confirmation represents a step of progress from the 
current system where a broad range of documents may be used to confirm immigration status.339  
Mandating verification of social security numbers may mitigate risks that completely fraudulent 
social security numbers are being used.  But one problem that neither the Real I.D. Act nor the 
Basic Pilot Program resolves is the fact that starter documents, such as birth certificates that are 
easily counterfeited, may be used to acquire lawful social security cards.340  While this fact 
 
 335 Currently, thirty-eight status verifiers manually verify immigration status for 2300 participating 
employers.  See PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 176, at 9–11. 
 336 See CITIZEN ATTESTATION, supra note 327, at 7–8. 
 337 See BASIC PILOT, supra note 327, at 35–36. 
 338 See, e.g., H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 702 (2005) (requiring electronic verification of social security 
numbers); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(c)(1) (2006) (requiring prospective employees to present a 
passport, driver’s license, permanent residence card, or employment authorization card for electronic 
verification). 
 339 Job applicants currently can produce twenty-seven different types of documents to prove 
employment eligibility, and these documents include a range of identification documents that are either 
easily counterfeited, easy to obtain, or faceless and fungible, such as social security cards.  See DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION FORM I-9, at 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/files/i-9.pdf. 
 340 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-830T, IDENTITY FRAUD: PREVALENCE AND LINKS 
TO ALIEN ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 6–7 (2002) (statement of Richard M. Stana) (noting that there are 8,000 
state or local offices that issue birth certificates and other forms of identification that aliens can use as 
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means there would still be a significant loophole in the system, at minimum these reforms would 
make document and identity fraud more difficult and make it more costly for counterfeiters to 
sidestep the system’s requirements. 
If proposed legislation succeeds and all employers were required to participate in electronic 
verification under a variant of the Basic Pilot Program, errors could have much more far-
reaching impact and delays in making manual checks or hearing appeals could harm the welfare 
of lawful workers.341  Undocumented aliens who are conditionally rejected may well disappear 
once they receive a notice of non-confirmation for fear of being detected as such by the 
authorities.  To minimize risks of frivolous claims clogging up an appeals system, appellants or 
their employers could be required to place a bond or money into an escrow account that would 
be forfeited if the appellant could not establish her work status eligibility.342  To provide 
incentives for accurate data-keeping and swift processing of appeals, USCIS could be obligated 
to compensate legal workers a fixed per-diem sum or the opportunity cost of the temporary 
denial of employment if resolution of their work status lasted beyond a set time frame, such as 
 
starter documents to prove their residence and identity); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-133T, 
COUNTERFEIT IDENTIFICATION RAISES HOMELAND SECURITY CONCERNS 1 (2003) [hereinafter 
COUNTERFEIT IDENTIFICATION] (statement of Ronald D. Malfi) (showing that social security certificates, 
birth certificates, and driver’s licenses are easily forged and that this fraud is difficult to detect).  Some 
legislative reforms have sought to address birth certificate fraud.  See, e.g., S. 1438, 109th Cong. § 312 
(2006) (Bill Proposed by Texas Senator John Cornyn).  But even the most effective system of electronic 
recording of birth certificates will have only prospective effect for future births and will not address the 
current problem of birth certificate fraud. 
 341 See, e.g., H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701–702 (2005) (embracing the Basic Pilot Program’s 
approach of having a ten-day period for a secondary check of Social Security numbers if they initially are 
not recognized); S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(d)(8)(C) (also providing for a ten-day window for a 
secondary check of prospective employee information). 
    342  The proposed Senate legislation prohibits employers from requiring prospective employees to post 
bonds or to indemnify the employer against potential liability arising from the employment verification 
requirements. S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(h) (2006).  However, the requirement that presumptive 
undocumented aliens or their employers post a bond to file an appeal would be a partial mirror image of a 
federal government obligation to compensate legal aliens or citizens for erroneous identifications. 
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the ten-day norm under the Basic Pilot Program.343  Employers would be prohibited from 
rescinding offers of employment during the appeal period, although employees could not begin 
work until appeals are successfully resolved.344 
Offering uniform access to the Basic Pilot Program would equip good-faith employers with 
better tools to comply with their duties.  However, absent effective oversight of employer 
compliance, policymakers may be stuck with many of the same failures as under the current 
system.  Some shortcomings of the Basic Pilot Program could be easily overcome by mandating 
that multiple uses of the same social security card or other forms of prima facie document or 
identity fraud automatically trigger a red flag in the database.345  For example, USCIS could 
mitigate some of these dangers by imposing minimal recording requirements on employers, such 
as by having the electronic database automatically record the identity of job applicants and 
documents used when employers make inquiries, and employers could be required to record the 
dates of commencement and termination of employment into the database.  Although many 
 
 343 See S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 274A(d)(10)(D), 274A(d)(11)(D) (2006) (proposing to compensate 
lost wages to workers whose employment is terminated because of an erroneous denial of employment); 
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 701(7)(I) (2005) (authorizing Federal Tort Claims Act claims for dismissals 
based on an erroneous non-verification).   Merely compensating for lost wages may understate the 
economic impact of erroneous denials of immigration status.  See, e.g., Manns, supra note 103, at 1996–
99 (laying out a framework for determining and administering an opportunity-cost-based compensation 
system).  Determining the amount of compensation more accurately may depend on the consequence of a 
false positive identification.  For example, individuals who are merely inconvenienced in waiting to 
clarify their legal status but ultimately receive the employment may have less of a claim than individuals 
who do not receive a job because an employer has cold feet.  One way to minimize this problem is to 
mandate that employers check the immigration status of prospective employees only after they have made 
job offers official, with the proviso that employers may not withdraw job offers to a prospective employee 
until the affected individual has the chance to contest the database’s record of his or her immigration 
status.   
 344 The Senate bill incorporates a prohibition on termination until a final non-confirmation decision is 
issued.  See S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(d)(8)(D)(viii) (2006). Strengthening anti-discrimination 
protections could also help to guard against employers using more informal means of revoking offers to 
appellants.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 345 See BASIC PILOT, supra note 331, at 27–29 (discussing the heightened incentives for identity fraud 
that the Basic Pilot program may create). 
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Americans have multiple jobs to make ends meet, listings of three or more contemporaneous 
jobs at once or jobs in different parts of the country could provide clear evidence that identity 
fraud is taking place.  The database could automatically alert the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement and the Social Security Administration of prima facie cases of 
identification fraud, such as multiple uses of the same social security number, and trigger review 
of gatekeeper compliance or identity theft.346  Counterfeiters will undoubtedly try to adapt by 
engaging in more sophisticated types of identification fraud, such as by using easily 
counterfeited starter documents such as birth certificates to acquire legal social security numbers.  
But at a minimum this approach could significantly raise the costs for undocumented aliens of 
securing fake identification to satisfy the verification system’s requirements. 
A more significant challenge is that employers may respond to a more accurate employer 
verification system by sidestepping the system.  Because of the current verification system’s 
reliance on employer self-compliance, employers could simply choose not to use the databases, 
ignore the databases’ negative responses, or tacitly or explicitly ask prospective employees to 
come up with other identity information to process into the system when there are doubts about 
the authenticity of identification materials.  Employers might have incentives to serve merely as 
gatekeepers of their own self-interest in detecting potential violators, so that the information of 
undocumented aliens would not be processed into the verification system.  So long as employers 
 
 346 Currently, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is denied access even to 
outcomes of database searches because of concerns that employers would not participate if they were 
exposed to a higher probability of oversight.  Implementing automatic disclosures of multiple non-
confirmations accords with the proposed House measure for automatic investigations if multiple attempts 
to confirm the same social security number signal potential fraud.  See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 
701(F)(ii) (2005).  By contrast, the Senate legislation would create a watered down disclosure regime 
which would allow disclosure to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement of verification 
data only if a company has had 100 or more employees rejected over a three-year period or ten or more 
employees who attempt to use the same social security number.  See S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(e) 
(2006).   
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stand to gain from employing undocumented aliens and face a low risk of direct monitoring of 
noncompliance, they can be expected to continue to subvert their duties.  For this reason making 
identification confirmation a swift and highly accurate process is only one step in strengthening 
the employer verification system.  Combining this reform with private monitoring of gatekeeper 
compliance may give employers both better tools for compliance and a credible threat of 
oversight, so that they have less incentives either to evade compliance or to engage in 
discrimination against individuals of foreign origin to minimize their liability exposure. 
C.  Weighing the Costs and Benefits of a Heightened Duty Standard 
Reducing document and identification fraud would make it easier for employers to verify 
employment status.  However, an equally significant concern is the ease with which employers 
can formalistically satisfy their legal burdens while subverting the verification system in 
practice.  The existing employer sanctions system imposes a knowledge mens rea requirement on 
employers, which makes it difficult for public enforcers to prove violations except in extreme 
cases.347  In fact, this standard perversely gives employers an incentive to “know” as little as 
possible about the legal status of prospective employees.348  Private monitors, such as 
undocumented aliens or other insiders, may be best placed to produce credible information 
 
 347 See supra Part III.C.  The Senate has proposed only a minor shift to a standard of “knowing” or 
“reckless disregard” of an undocumented alien’s status.  See S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 274A(1)(A) (2006), 
while House legislation provides for a good-faith defense for compliance with the electronic verification 
system’s requirements..  See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 701(a)(7)(J), 702(1)(B)(i) (2005); S. 1438, 109th 
Cong. § 732 (2005).  The House’s good-faith defense may be sufficient in the context of public oversight 
alone, as enforcers may implicitly recognize that defense through nonenforcement even in the context of a 
strict liability regime.  In the context of private oversight of gatekeepers, the considerations of over- or 
underdeterrence loom larger because private enforcers are likely to be motivated solely by profit motives 
and will be concerned solely about establishing liability. 
 348 Given the ease with which undocumented aliens can acquire fraudulent identification materials, 
this approach makes the verification process a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy from the standpoint of 
employers.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material 
element of an offense when:  (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exists.”). 
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regarding what employers knew about employment status and what compliance steps were taken.  
However, it may still be difficult and costly for private or public enforcers to prosecute cases 
concerning employer’s knowledge because of the ability of firms to mount strong defenses 
concerning their knowledge and what compliance steps they took. 
In contrast, the use of negligence or strict liability standards may offer significant 
advantages in both addressing concerns of underdeterrence and in making it easier for private 
enforcers to produce conclusive evidence of gatekeeper violations.  If employment verification 
databases are highly accurate, then either standard would produce similar outcomes.  But any 
database is bound to have significant limitations because of the easy access to fraudulent starter 
documents and the ability of aliens to engage in identity theft.349  Thus, the choice on which 
standard to use may turn on the degree of uncertainty about what constitutes good-faith 
compliance.350  Such uncertainty could raise the costs for businesses seeking to guard against 
potential liability.  Ambiguity may also result in greater administrative costs from contested 
enforcement actions, based on claims that a reasonable investigation was conducted. 
In contrast, imposing a strict liability requirement would provide enforcement officials with 
the lightest burden of proof for enforcement.351  The vice and virtue of this approach would be 
the chilling effect this standard may have on both the employment of undocumented aliens and 
foreign-born citizens and legal aliens.  A strict liability standard would draw a bright line 
between the hiring of undocumented aliens and the hiring of all other authorized workers.  The 
approach would also underscore Congress’s commitment to deter the hiring of undocumented 
aliens.  However, use of this standard could result in punishing employers who acted in good 
 
 349 See COUNTERFEIT IDENTIFICATION, supra note 336, at 6 (showing that social security certificates, 
birth certificates, and driver’s licenses are easily forged and that this fraud is difficult to detect). 
 350 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 68, at 10–14. 
 351 See SHAVELL, supra note 66, at 5–17. 
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faith to uphold the verification procedures, resulting in social waste from residual liability and 
undermine popular support for enforcement.  This danger is especially significant in the context 
of victim suits or qui tam litigation, because private parties are unlikely to exercise prosecutorial 
restraint in response to good-faith efforts at compliance in ways that public enforcers are more 
likely to do.352  A strict liability standard may also have a greater chilling effect on the hiring of 
all foreign-born citizens and legal aliens due to employers’ efforts to minimize potential 
liability.353 
Either integrating safe harbor provisions into a strict liability regime or delineating what set 
of steps entail a full defense of good-faith compliance may offer the best approach to limit the 
dangers of overdeterrence.354  Employers could be required to (1) examine documents for 
authenticity and preserve a record of the identification materials for a minimum of three years 
after the termination of employment; (2) confirm these materials against an electronic database 
of social security and/or immigration status information; and (3) record the immigration status 
inquiry, the employment decision, and the date of the employment’s termination in the 
immigration database.355  Requiring employers to perform this set of obligations would be a 
manageable burden, especially with access to SSA and USCIS databases under an extension of 
 
 352 In most strict liability contexts public enforcement officials implicitly have discretion to decide 
what constitutes good faith compliance that should not be penalized and exercise that discretion through 
nonenforcement.  See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 14–15 (1996) (discussing how, in practice, liability is almost always combined with a 
measure of discretionary enforcement as exemplified by overinclusive drug laws). 
 353 See infra Part IV.D. 
    354 For example, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice routinely issues enforcement 
guidelines that effectively create a safe harbor from enforcement.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm. 
 355 The current system requires employers merely to copy the identification materials for employees 
and to retain this information until one year after the duration of employment.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) 
(2000).  Implementing a safe harbor provision along the lines described above would be consistent with 
the good-faith affirmative defense proposed in the House legislation.  See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. 
§§ 701(a)(7)(J), 702(1)(B)(i) (2005).    
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the Basic Pilot Program and heightened document and identity protections under the Real I.D. 
Act. 
D.  Balancing Sanctions with Concerns for Preemptive Discrimination 
Another problem with the existing employer verification system is the low expected value 
of sanctions that employers face.  The potential sanctions range from a warning to fines starting 
at $275 for a first offense and rising to a maximum of $11,000 for repeat employers of 
undocumented aliens.356  Even if private oversight dramatically increased enforcement, fines 
must also increase for the expected value of violations significantly to shape corporate hiring 
practices.357  One danger of heightened fines for employing undocumented aliens is that it may 
result in greater incentives for discrimination against citizens and legal aliens who appear to be 
of foreign origin.  Thus, greater enforcement should be coupled with heightened 
antidiscrimination protections for legal aliens and citizens of foreign origin. 
Data from the initial implementation of the employer verification system in 1986 supports 
the need for strengthening antidiscrimination provisions.  During the first two years following 
the enactment of gatekeeper liability, employers appear to have anticipated higher levels of 
enforcement against employing undocumented aliens and have responded by significantly 
heightening discrimination against individuals of foreign origin regardless of employment 
 
 356 Sanctions range from $275 to $2000 per alien for first-time employer offenders; $2000 to $5000 
per alien for second-time offenders; and $3000 to $11,000 per alien for employers who have committed 
violations on numerous occasions.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2000); 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.10(b)(1)(ii)(A)–
(C) (2005) (adjusted for inflation).  Additional penalties of $110 to $1100 apply for violations of 
verification paperwork requirements.  See 8 U.S.C § 1324a(e)(5) (2000). 
 357 The expected value of sanctions must increase such that it raises the aggregate costs of employing 
undocumented aliens to levels higher than employing legal aliens or citizens.  This level is challenging to 
determine because the wage gap and value employers place on employing undocumented aliens over their 
legal counterparts may vary significantly by skill, industry, and geography. 
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status.358  After 1988, employers appear to have recognized that public enforcers were poorly 
positioned to oversee employer compliance and that few enforcement actions were taking 
place.359  As a result, there was little incentive for preemptive discrimination against individuals 
of apparent foreign origin, and discrimination appears to have declined commensurately.360 
To the extent that more effective oversight of employers succeeds in heightening 
enforcement levels, the danger of preemptive discrimination against legal aliens and citizens of 
apparent foreign origin will also increase.  Existing antidiscrimination laws exclude legal aliens 
from protection who are not “actively pursuing” naturalization,361 and antidiscrimination laws do 
not apply to employers of three or less employees.362  Although the federal government should 
provide incentives for the active pursuit of naturalization, making the application of 
 
 358 See, e.g., Cynthia Bansak & Stephen Raphael, Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino 
Workers: Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination?, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 275, 276–80 
(2001) (discussing the potential increase in employment discrimination against legal aliens who appeared 
to be of foreign origin from 1986 to 1988); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-62, 
IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 23 (1990); 
TASK FORCE ON IRCA-RELATED DISCRIMINATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE TASK FORCE ON IRCA-RELATED DISCRIMINATION 25 (1990) (noting that the 
employer sanctions regime creates “a greater incentive to comply with the sanctions provisions than with 
the anti-discrimination provisions”). 
 359 See Medina, supra note 11, at 689–90 (arguing that declines in illegal immigration and the 
employment of undocumented aliens from 1986 to 1988 were largely attributable to the large-scale 
legalization of existing aliens in 1986, rather than the efficacy of the employer verification system). 
 360 See, e.g., Katharine M. Donato & Douglas S. Massey, Effect of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act on the Wages of Mexican Migrants, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 523, 534–36 (1993) (finding that the 
employer sanctions regime had not had a lasting effect of heightened discrimination against legal aliens of 
foreign origin).  However, empirical studies may not fully capture the impact of employer sanctions in 
encouraging discrimination based on foreign origin because such discrimination is hard to prove. 
 361 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(B) (2000).  The 
antidiscrimination provisions extend protection to discrimination based on citizenship status for citizens 
or legal aliens who demonstrate the intent to naturalize.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)–(3).  Legal aliens 
who do not apply for naturalization within six months of eligibility are not protected, nor are 
undocumented aliens who do not receive naturalization after two years, unless they are “actively 
pursuing” naturalization.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(B).  Additionally, this provision exempts firms that 
privilege citizen applicants over their equally qualified legal alien counterparts and government 
contractors who discriminate based on citizenship status because of state orders to do so.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324b(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(C). 
 362 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A). 
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antidiscrimination laws turn on this fact appears to be arbitrary and misguided.  Similarly, 
policing employment decisions of small-scale employers may pose the most difficult challenges, 
but legal applicants of foreign origin should receive protection in this context as well. 
Admittedly, these loopholes are modest, but a more significant weakness of current 
antidiscrimination protections is that the default response for employment discrimination against 
legal aliens or citizens based on national origin or citizenship status is the issuance of cease and 
desist orders.363  Administrative judges also have discretion to add a modest range of financial 
sanctions up to a maximum $10,000.364  In a world of moribund enforcement against the 
employment of undocumented aliens, these protections may have been adequate, but in a world 
of heightened enforcement they may be far too weak to overcome the incentives to discriminate 
against legal aliens. 
Ideally, policymakers should attempt to have the expected value of sanctions for hiring 
undocumented aliens approximate the expected value of sanctions for discriminating against 
legal citizens and aliens of apparent foreign origin.  This approach would seek to place 
employers in a position where discriminating against individuals of apparent origin does not 
appear to be a cost-effective strategy for limiting liability exposure under the verification regime.  
Although this goal sounds simple, it may prove difficult to make the expected value from both 
violations approximate each other because the probabilities of enforcement may be different. 
The problem is that it would likely prove far harder to establish intentional discrimination 
based on apparent foreign origin than to show violations of the verification requirements.  But 
how much harder it would be to establish intentional discrimination than gatekeeper 
noncompliance is an open question that may be hard to pin down, especially before reforms are 
 
 363 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(A). 
 364 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5). 
118                                                                                     PRIVATE MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS 
implemented.  For this reason it may make sense to impose significantly higher sanctions for 
intentional discrimination than for verification violations, but to set broad ranges to allow judges 
to account for the need to impose stiffer penalties if preemptive discrimination occurs much 
more frequently. 
Application of the compensation levels for intentional discrimination laid out in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 would lead to sanctions that roughly double this article’s proposed penalty 
levels for verification violations.365  Firms with fifteen to a hundred employees face a cap of 
$50,000 per violation, employers of 101 to 200 face a cap of $100,000, employers of 201 to 500 
face a cap of $200,000, and a maximum of $300,000 for employers of over 500.366  The 
minimum compensation for intentional discrimination could be set at half of these levels, which 
would provide significant discretion for judges in setting penalties.  There is nothing special 
about these particular compensation levels, but the fact that they are used in other intentional 
discrimination contexts makes them form a useful benchmark. 
If empirical data suggests that preemptive discrimination increases significantly in the wake 
of a reform of the verification system, then allowing an adjustment to higher compensation levels 
for employment discrimination may be appropriate.  Setting sanctions levels is admittedly an 
imprecise science at best, but this approach would represent progress both in creating more 
credible deterrence through higher sanctions and a proximate symmetry of incentives. 
 
 365 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered 
sections of 2 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 366 See id. § 102(b)(3).  These proposed compensation ranges are dramatically higher than the mild 
compensation for discrimination against legal aliens which Senate legislation has proposed, see S. 2611, 
109th Cong. § 305 (2006).  (In contrast, the House legislation did not recognize the need to strengthen 
anti-discrimination provisions at all.).  The higher compensation levels in this proposal reflect the very 
real risk that companies may respond to a significantly higher threat of prosecution by private monitors by 
engaging in sweeping discrimination against individuals of perceived foreign origin. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This article has shown how the enlistment of private monitors may allow public enforcers to 
overcome limits in their ability to oversee gatekeepers.  Private monitors may provide public 
enforcers with cost-effective access to information on wrongdoing and enforcement resources to 
address gatekeeper contexts where the nature and scale of both the wrongdoing and compliance 
measures would otherwise be difficult to detect or confirm.  Victim suits, incentives for primary 
wrongdoers to report on gatekeeper violations, rewards for informants from the community, and 
the enlistment of qui tam litigants present distinct costs, risks, and tradeoffs.  But in narrowly 
defined contexts, each of these tools may offer politically plausible and economically feasible 
ways to enhance gatekeeper compliance with their duties. 
The case study on immigration enforcement has shown how the enlistment of private 
monitors may provide employer gatekeepers with significantly heightened incentives to comply 
with their verification duties.  Offering undocumented aliens the reward of legalization to inform 
on their employers may seem to be a counterintuitive strategy, but this approach has the potential 
of dividing the interests of employers and undocumented aliens and producing incentives for 
employer compliance.  Enlisting private actors, such as competitors, employees, job seekers and 
other members of the community, as informants and qui tam litigants may provide other ways to 
gain insider information on noncompliance and to heighten enforcement levels.  Although this 
approach poses costs and risks, this article has shown how it is possible to equip employers to 
fulfill their obligations in a cost-effective, accurate way and how to mitigate concerns of 
overdeterrence through the design of duty standards and the adoption of antidiscrimination 
protections.  The challenges of overseeing employer gatekeepers in the immigration context are 
both stark and distinctive, but this approach may serve as a blueprint for thinking about how 
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private monitors may oversee similar challenges facing the oversight of gatekeepers in other 
contexts. 
